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Assessing Kenya's Cooperative Model of Devolution: A Situation-Specific Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

James Thuo Gathii  and
Harrison Mbori Otieno
James Thuo Gathii
Affiliation:
Loyola University Chicago School of Law
Harrison Mbori Otieno
Affiliation:
Strathmore University Law School, Nairobi, Kenya
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Abstract

Kenya's form of quasi-federalism termed devolution was introduced under the Constitution of Kenya (2010) (‘2010 Constitution’). This governance system establishes 47 county governments which are constitutionally independent sub-national units with direct election of county level leaders. Given the complexity of devolution's relationship to national politics, as well as the broad variation in how devolution has unfolded in the 47 counties since 2013, this article argues in favour of a situation-specific assessment of devolution in Kenya. This analysis departs from the emerging scholarly consensus of devolution in Kenya represented in two predominant approaches. One approach contends that devolution in Kenya has simply devolved corruption and patronage from the national to the county level. Another approach argues that devolution has so far been relatively successful because it has introduced a new political system at the county level that has a robust system of checks and balances but that has empowered a new dynamic in Kenya's politics at the sub-national level. This article argues the first approach paints the emerging devolution experience with a broad brush that is not reflected in every county or even on every issue. This article has more in common with the second view. However, we argue for a more situation-specific, case by case analysis of devolution to show variations in how devolution has or has not facilitated the delivery of services and opportunities that were prior to 2013 likely to be unavailable particularly in the most economically disadvantaged counties.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 595 - 613
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

The authors would like to thank Ron Levy and an anonymous reviewer for their comments.

References

1 2010 Constitution art 203(2).

2 County Governments Act (Kenya) No 17 of 2012 s 33.

3 2010 Constitution art 93(1).

4 Chege, Michael, ‘Kenya's Electoral Misfire’ (2018) 29 Journal of Democracy 158CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 170. A combination of factors explain why a large number of women representatives were voted out, including inadequate political support from their political parties, and lack of resources to challenge poorly conducted political party primaries: National Democratic Institute and Federation of Women Lawyers, ‘A Gender Analysis of the 2017 Kenya General Elections’ (Report, February 2018) <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Gender%20Analysis%20of%202017%20GeneralElections%20FINAL%20High%20Res%20for%20Printer%20-%20NEW%20COVER_small.pdf> 6.

5 See generally Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Willis, Justin, ‘Decentralisation in Kenya: The Governance of Governors’ (2016) 54 Journal of Modern African Studies 1Google Scholar; Alex Dyzenhaus, ‘Decentralisation: Accountability in Local Government’ in Nic Cheeseman (ed), Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 327.

6 Michelle D’Arcy and Cornell, Agnes, ‘Devolution and Corruption in Kenya: Everyone's Turn to Eat?’ (2016) 115 African Affairs 246Google Scholar; Brendon J Cannon and Ali, Jacob Haji, ‘Devolution in Kenya Four Years On: A Review of Implementation and Effects in Mandera County’ (2018) 8 African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 1Google Scholar.

7 See generally Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, above n 5, 6.

8 James Gathii, ‘Implementing a New Constitution in a Competitive Authoritarian Context: The Case of Kenya’ in Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Haq (eds), From Parchment to Practice: Implementing New Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

9 Rachel Beatty Riedl and Dickovick, J Tyler, ‘Party Systems and Decentralization in Africa’ (2014) 49 Studies in Comparative International Development 321Google Scholar, 327.

10 Chege, above n 4, 158.

11 Yash Ghai, ‘Ethnicity, Nationhood and Pluralism: The 2010 Kenya Constitution’ in Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell Ghai (eds), Ethnicity, Nationhood and Pluralism: Kenyan Perspectives (Katiba Institute, 2016) 98, 75.

12 Ben Christopher Nyabira and Ayele, Zemelak Ayitenew, ‘The State of Political Inclusion of Ethnic Communities Under Kenya's Devolved System’ (2016) 20 Law, Democracy and Development 131Google Scholar, 131–2.

13 On this, see Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Illegal and/or Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Republic of Kenya, 2004).

14 See Riedl, Rachel Beatty, Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gathii, ‘Implementing a New Constitution’, above n 8.

15 See James Gathii, ‘Kenya's Legislative Culture and the Evolution of the Kenya Constitution’ in Yash Vyas et al (eds), Law and Development In the Third World (University of Nairobi, 1994) 74, 82.

16 Kenya is one of several African countries to experiment with political decentralization in the last two decades. For other African cases, see J Tyler Dickovick and Rachel Beatty Riedl, ‘Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Final Report and Summary of Findings’ (United States Agency for International Development, September 2010) <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7170/3844afc30d61e792c212fb6b03e8e53014c6.pdf>. The term devolution, a ‘term of art,’ was inherited from Great Britain. See Yash Ghai, ‘Comparative Theory and Kenya's Devolution’ in Conrad M Bosire and Wanjiru Gikonyo (eds), Animating Devolution in Kenya, The Role of the Judiciary: Commentary and Analysis on Kenya's Emerging Devolution Jurisprudence under the New Constitution (International Development Law Organization, Judicial Training Institute, Katiba Institute, 2015) 13, 18–20.

17 According to the Supreme Court in The Speaker of the Senate v Attorney-General [2013] eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Reference No 2 of 2013) [316]: [The] Kenyan people, by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 chose to de-concentrate State power, rights, duties, competences—shifting substantial aspects to the county government, to be exercised in the county units, for better and more equitable delivery of the goods of the political order.

18 Article 174 of the 2010 Constitution identifies the objects of devolved government as follows: (a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power; (b) to foster national unity by recognising diversity; (c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them; (d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their development; (e) to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities; (f) to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya; (g) to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya; (h) to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya; and (i) to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.

19 Ghai, Yash, ‘Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan State’ (2008) 2 Journal of Eastern African Studies 211CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 215.

20 See Agranoff, Robert, ‘Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations’ (2004) 14 Regional and Federal Studies 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 26.

21 See Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (Kenya), ‘Final Report’ (11 October 2010) 66–7 <https://katibaculturalrights.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/coe_final_report-2.pdf>.

22 For example, in the first year of devolution there was a petition to dissolve one county because the Governor and the county Legislature could not work together. See Edwin Mutai, Uhuru Names Commission of Inquiry for Makueni County Row (10 February 2015) Business Daily <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Uhuru-names-team-to-hear-Makueni-county-dispute/-/539546/2619508/-/147vk8/-/index.html>. However, that County was not dissolved and no County has been dissolved to date.

23 Copperfield Lagat and Charles Wokabi, ‘World Bank Lauds Kenya for Devolution’, Daily Nation (online), 3 February 2015 <http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/smartcompany/World-Bank-lauds-Kenya-for-devolution/-/1226/2611618/-/4knkydz/-/index.html>.

24 Kamotho Waiganjo, ‘We Risk Paying a Heavy Price if State Stifles Devolution’, Standard Digital (online), 23 June 2018 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001285112/we-risk-paying-a-heavy-price-if-state-stifles-devolution>.

25 Art 4(2) as read together with art 10(2)(a).

26 See ibid arts 1(1), 1(3)(a)(b), 1(4)(b).

27 As the High Court observed in Institute of Social Accountability v National Assembly [2015] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 71 of 2013) [122]: Article 1(4) of the Constitution recognises two levels of government, the national and county governments. Each of these levels exercises power derived from the Constitution itself. Under Article 1 of the Constitution, the county government does not derive its power from the national government but directly from the People of Kenya and under the Constitution. These two levels of governments are therefore, in theory, equal and none is subordinate to the other.

28 Article 6(2) of the 2010 Constitution describes the government at the two levels as being ‘distinct and inter-dependent’. See also Bosire, Conrad M, Devolution for Development, Conflict Resolution, and Limiting Central Power: An Analysis of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (PhD Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2013)Google Scholar 304 <http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11394/3008/Bosire_PHD_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

29 Thus the Supreme Court of Kenya has noted that ‘the wisdom of our Constitution is its categorical rejection of exclusionary claims to powers of governance: its letter and spirit is suffused with the call for accountability, co-operation, responsiveness and openness’: Speaker of the Senate v Attorney-General [2013] eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Reference 2 of 2013) [229] (emphasis in original). For the case of the United Kingdom, see Keating, Michael, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998)Google Scholar.

30 Christina Murray, Kenya's 2010 Constitution, 37 <http://www.health.uct.ac.za/usr/public_law/staff/Kenyas%202010%20Constitution.pdf>.

31 Ibid.

32 Conrad Bosire and Yash Pal Ghai, ‘Powers and Functions of County Governments’, The Star (online), 27 April 2013 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/04/27/powers-and-functions-of-county-governments_c766556>.

33 Ibid. See sch 4 of the 2010 Constitution dealing with the functions of agriculture and health. The National Government deals with agricultural policy and health policy: 2010 Constitution sch 4 pt 1 items 28–9. The counties deal with a myriad of functions under the heads ‘[a]griculture’ (crop and animal husbandry; livestock sale yards; county abattoirs; plant and animal disease control; and fisheries) and county ‘health services’: 2010 Constitution sch 4 pt 2 items 1–2.

34 2010 Constitution sch 4 pt 1 item 23.

35 Ibid sch 4 pt 2 item 2. Here any power or function not mentioned (perhaps a national vaccination campaign) is a residual matter and a national responsibility. The question therefore is what is ‘concurrent’ power in this case? The clash between the function and powers of the National Government and counties was litigated in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti v Attorney General [2014] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 593 of 2013).

36 Although this paper argues that Kenya adopts a weak form of devolution, it is nevertheless a strong form of devolution in the African context. On this see, Beatty Riedl and Dickovick, above n 9, 327.

37 2010 Constitution art 209(3)(a).

38 Ibid art 209(3)(b).

39 Ibid art 209(4).

40 Ibid sch 4 pt 2 items 4–5.

41 On the evolving relationship between counties and the national government on security matters, see Burbidge, Dominic, ‘Security and Devolution in Kenya: Struggles in Applying Constitutional Provisions to Local Politics’ (2018) 3 Strathmore Law Journal 131CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In early 2018, the national government directed counties to work with county commissioners, who are appointed by the national government as holdovers from the pre-devolution provincial system of administration, on security matters. See Cyprus Ombati, ‘Matiangi: I Said This Was a New Way of Operation the Government Had Adopted to Curb Crime’, Standard Digital (online), 5 February 2018 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001268491/matiang-i-said-this-was-a-new-way-of-operation-the-government-had-adopted-to-curb-crime>.

42 2010 Constitution arts 189(1)(a)–(c).

43 Ibid art 189(1)(a).

44 Ibid art 109(4)–(5).

45 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (Kenya), above n 21, 114. According to a three judge bench of the High Court of Kenya, the constitutional mandate of the Senate: is that of representation of counties and protection of the interests of counties at the national level; law-making in relation to matters concerning counties at the national level; and allocation of revenue to counties, and oversight over national revenue allocated to counties. Its mandate, like that of the National Assembly, does not extend to matters or functions reserved by the Constitution to counties at the county level. Council of Governors v Senate [2015] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 381 of 2014 as consolidated with Petition No 430 of 2014) [90].

46 2010 Constitution art 201(b)(ii).

47 Ibid art 201(b)(iii). 48 Ibid art 204(1).

49 Ibid art 204(2).

50 Ibid art 203(2).

51 Ibid arts 207(1) and 207(2) respectively.

52 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, ‘Assessment of the Implementation of the System of Devolved Government: From Steps to Strides’ (June 2014) 2 <http://devolutionhub.or.ke/file/35e0b4f8ec748888848abe6ef5102eb3.pdf>.

53 These were the Provincial, District and Local Government Administration that together long-served as a fourth-arm of the Central government.

54 The World Bank notes that with the architectural infrastructure of devolution already put in place, it would be ‘impossible to alter the foundations, at least not without knocking it down and starting again’: Fiscal Decentralisation Knowledge Program Team, ‘Devolution Without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful New Kenya’ (Report, World Bank, November 2012) vi <http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/11/15/000333037_20121115230524/Rendered/PDF/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf>.

55 Ibid xxviii. See also James Gathii, ‘Assessing Kenya's Constitution Five Years Out’ in Tom Ginsburg et al, Measuring Constitutional Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2016) from which some of the preceding paragraphs were drawn from.

56 Ekwee Ethuro, ‘Senate: Advancing Devolution Agenda’, Standard Digital (online), 10 February 2017 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228848/senate-advancing-devolution-agenda>.

57 Ekwee Ethuro, ‘Senate: Advancing Devolution Agenda’, Standard Digital (online), 10 February 2017 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001228848/senate-advancing-devolution-agenda>.

58 This was after the National Assembly allocated a meagre Ksh50 million (USD500 000) for the repair and construction of new courts in the 2018/2019 budget: Lillian Mutavi, ‘Drastic Budget Cuts Will Stall 70 Judiciary Projects, Maraga Warns’, The Star (online), 24 July 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/24/drastic-budget-cuts-will-stall-70-judiciary-projects-maraga-warns_c1792073>.

59 See Gathii, ‘Implementing a New Constitution’, above n 8.

60 Article 189(1)(a) of the 2010 Constitution states: [g]overnment at either level shall- perform its functions, and exercise its powers, in a manner that respects the functional and institutional integrity of government at the other level, and respects the constitutional status and institutions of government at the other level and, in the case of county government, within the county level See also arts 6(2), 189(1)(b)–(c). See also art 6(2) noting that devolution is based on the principle of distinctness, interdependence, cooperation and consultation.

61 IGRA s 3.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid s 7.

64 Ibid s 19(1).

65 Imende Benjamin, ‘We Need Immunity Just Like the President, Say Governors’, The Star (online), 10 July 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/10/we-need-immunity-just-like-the-president-say-governors_c1784447>.

66 See Imende Benjamin, ‘Giving Courts Sh50m for Growth in Bad Faith - CoG’, The Star (online), 28 July 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/28/giving-courts-sh50m-for-growth-in-bad-faith-cog_c1793837>.

67 D’Arcy and Cornell, above n 6; Cannon and Ali, above n 6.

68 D’Arcy and Cornell, above n 6, 248.

69 Boone, Catherine, ‘Land Conflict and Distributive Politics in Kenya,’ (2012) 55 African Studies Review 75CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 75.

70 Barasa, Edwine W et al, ‘Recentralization within Decentralization: County Hospital Autonomy under Devolution in Kenya’ (2017) 12(8) PLOS ONE 1CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

71 D’Arcy and Cornell, above n 6.

72 Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis, above n 5.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Dyzenhaus, above n 5.

76 Gathii, ‘Implementing a New Constitution’, above n 8.

77 Ibid.

78 The axis of conflict in the 2008 elections, like in prior national elections since 1991 when multi-party elections were introduced in Kenya, was between the Kalenjin, on the hand, and the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Luhya, on the other. The Kalenjin regarded these groups as outsiders who did not have a right to reside in the Rift Valley which the Kalenjin claim is their home. Since these non-Kalenjin groups traditionally voted for opposition political parties under then President Daniel Arap Moi's reign, the Kalenjin engaged in ethnic cleansing to punish these ethnic groups for supporting opposition political parties.

79 Susanne Mueller, D, ‘Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election and the Law’ (2014) 8 Journal of Eastern African Studies 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80 Mwaniki Wahome, ‘How the Governors Spent Your Money’, Daily Nation (online), 5 February 2015 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/How-the-governors-spent-your-money/1064-2614608-mqw20hz/index.html>.

81 See World Bank Group, ‘Decision Time: Spend More or Spend Smart?’ (Public Expenditure Review Volume 1, December 2014) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/230971468254049239/pdf/940210WP0v10Bo0ort0Vol01201400FINAL.pdf>.

82 Justus Wanga, ‘30 Sitting, Former Governors to Face Corruption Charges’ Daily Nation (online), 29 July 2018 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/30-sitting--former-governors-to-face-corruption-charges/1056-4686624-jj40ca/index.html>; Maggie Fick, ‘Kenya to Prosecute County Governor, Nine Others in Graft Case’ Reuters (online), 3 July 2018 <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-corruption/kenya-to-prosecute-county-governor-nine-others-in-graft-case-idUKKBN1JT0HV?rpc=401&>.

83 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, above n 52, 103.

84 Moses Njagih, ‘President Uhuru Kenyatta Declines to Disband Makueni County Government’, Standard Digital (online), 7 September 2015 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000175491/president-uhuru-kenyatta-declines-to-disband-makueni-county-government>.

85 See, eg, Martin Nyaga Wambora v Speaker of the Senate [2014] eKLR (Kenyan Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No 21 of 2014).

86 County Governments Act (Kenya) No 17 of 2012 ss 33(3)(a)–(b), (4).

87 Moses Njagih, ‘Why Gachagua Survived Impeachment Though He Was Guilty of Charges’, Standard Digital (online), 15 September 2016 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000216095/why-gachagua-survived-impeachment-though-he-was-guilty-of-charges>.

88 Dennis Odunga, ‘Bill Seeks to Raise Bar for Governors’ Impeachment’ Daily Nation (online), 17 May 2014 <https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Bill-seeks-to-raise-bar-for-governors-impeachment/1950946-2318572-format-xhtml-ugbwft/index.html>.

89 Jael Keya, ‘EACC to Reconstitute 40 County Governments’ Kenyans.co.ke (online), 21 August 2018 <https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/26347-eacc-reconstitute-40-county-governments>.

90 David Ndii, ‘Why the Doctors Are Fighting Devolution’ on Daily Nation Blog (13 December 2013) <http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/Why-the-doctors-are-fighting-devolution/-/1949942/2111146/-/format/xhtml/-/plxa90/-/index.html>.

91 PFMA s 109(2)(a).

92 Jaindi Kisero, ‘To Stop Corruption, Address the Accounting Hitches in Counties’ on Daily Nation Blog (25 April 2018) <https://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/To-stop-corruption--address-accounting-hitches-in-counties-/1949942-4520858-14w59gr/index.html>.

93 Ibid.

94 Kennedy Kimanthi, ‘Devolution Laws under Review, Says CS Eugene Wamalwa’, Daily Nation (online), 4 June 2018 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Devolution-laws-under-review--says-CS-Eugene-Wamalwa/1064-4593862-15cetyd/index.html>. See, eg, Council of Governors v Senate [2015] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, Petition No 381 of 2014 as consolidated with Petition No 430 of 2014). The High Court held that County Development Boards established under the County Governments (Amendment) Act (Kenya) No 13 of 2014 (‘CGAA’) are unconstitutional.

95 Kimanthi, above n 94.

96 Fred Kibor, ‘Senate Seeks Powers to Secure Devolution’, Standard Digital (online), 9 December 2017 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001262544/senate-seeks-powers-to-secure-devolution>.

97 2010 Constitution art 192(1).

98 Ibid art 192(2).

99 Ibid art 182(2).

100 Re Speaker, County Assembly of Embu [2018] eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya, Reference No 1 of 2015).

101 Patrick Gathara, ‘(D)evolved Healthcare: Makueni's Trailblazing Experiment in Providing Universal Health Coverage’, The Elephant (online), 11 January 2018 <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/01/11/devolved-healthcare-makuenis-trailblazing-experiment-in-providing-universal-health-coverage/>.

102 Pius Maundu, ‘Kibwana Launches Ambitious Free Healthcare Plan for Makueni Residents’, Daily Nation (online), 16 September 2016 <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/makueni/Makueni-County-to-offer-free-healthcare-to-residents/1183294-3383768-vwve2o/index.html>. The system covers parents and all their children below 18 years (up to 24 years in the case of students).

103 Gathara, above n 101.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid. See also Graham Kajilwa, ‘How Makueni Plans to Sustain Subsidised Healthcare Programme’, Standard Digital (online), 5 April 2018 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001275698/how-makueni-plans-to-sustain-subsidised-healthcare-programme>.

107 ‘Amazing: Devolution Miracles in Makueni; Two Factories Launched by Gov Kivutha Kibwana’, Kenya Today (online), 12 January 2018 <https://www.kenya-today.com/business/devolution-miracles-makueni-factories-milk-mango-kivutha-kibwana>.

108 Ibid.

109 Wambui Mbuthia, ‘Netizens Crown Kivutha Kibwana ‘the Governor of the Year’ for Piloting Food Processing and Preservation’ Ureport 12 January 2018 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2001265699/netizens-crown-kivutha-kibwana-the-governor-of-the-year-for-piloting-food-processing-and-preservation>.

110 Susan Muhindi, ‘EU Gives Makueni Sh110m to Build Fruit Processing Plant’, The Star (online), 17 May 2018 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/05/17/eu-gives-makueni-sh110m-to-build-fruit-processing-plant_c1759498>.

111 Daniel Wesangula, ‘Kibwana: Why Makueni is Best Example that Devolution Works’, Standard Digital (online), 27 January 2018 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001267429/kibwana-why-makueni-is-best-example-that-devolution-works>. The MCAs had tried to impeach the Governor and he subsequently moved to dissolve the entire county government. A commission on inquiry looked into the disputes at Makueni and made some recommendations to the President that the Makueni County government be suspended. The President, however, never forwarded the report to the Senate for debate and approval, effectively vetoing the recommendations.

112 Ibid.

113 Mutua Kameti, ‘Clean Sweep after Only One Out of 30 Makueni MCAs Bounce Back to Assembly’, The Star (online), 9 August 2017 <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/08/09/clean-sweep-after-only-one-out-of-30-makueni-mcas-bounce-back-to_c1613599>.

114 Silas Apollo, ‘How Devolution has Changed Kenya’, Daily Nation (online), 23 April 2018 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/How-devolution-has-changed-Kenya/1056-4494048-117qesa/index.html>.

115 John Kipchirchir, ‘How Devolution Has Impacted Positively on Kenyans’, Ureport (online), 20 October 2016 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2000220434/how-devolution-has-impacted-positively-on-kenyans>.

116 Apollo, above n 114.

117 Enrolment in ECD Centres Rise After the Sector Was Devolved (26 January 2017) Kenya News Agency (KNA) <http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/?p=100833>. The number of children in ECD Education centres in Kiambu county doubled after the education sector was devolved.

118 Beatrice Elachi, ‘Devolution has made Kenya a better Country’ on Fifth Estate (16 February 2016) <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/eblog/2016/02/16/devolution-has-made-kenya-a-better-country/>.