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Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Emmanuel Dechenaux ,
Shakun D. Mago  and
Laura Razzolini
Emmanuel Dechenaux*
Affiliation:
Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242, USA
Shakun D. Mago*
Affiliation:
University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173, USA
Laura Razzolini*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284, USA
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

This study considers a model of road congestion with average cost pricing. Subjects must choose between two routes—Road and Metro. The travel cost on the road is increasing in the number of commuters who choose this route, while the travel cost on the metro is decreasing in the number of its users. We examine how changes to the road capacity, the number of commuters, and the metro pricing scheme influence the commuters’ route-choice behavior. According to the Downs-Thomson paradox, improved road capacity increases travel times along both routes because it attracts more users to the road and away from the metro, thereby worsening both services. A change in route design generates two Nash equilibria; and the resulting coordination problem is amplified even further when the number of commuters is large. We find that, similar to other binary choice experiments with congestion effects, aggregate traffic flows are close to the equilibrium levels, but systematic individual differences persist over time.

Keywords

CongestionLaboratory experimentsDowns-Thomson ParadoxCoordination

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness R41: Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion • Travel Time • Safety and Accidents • Transportation Noise R40: General
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 461 - 487
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9378-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

This research is funded by the National Science Foundation (Grant 0527534). We thank Tim Cason, Oleg Korenok, the editor Jacob Goeree, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the University of Siena, Italy, the International Meeting of the Economic Science Association, and the European Meeting of the Economic Science Association for helpful comments.

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