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Similarities and differences when building trust: the role of cultures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Fabian Bornhorst ,
Andrea Ichino ,
Oliver Kirchkamp ,
Karl H. Schlag  and
Eyal Winter
Fabian Bornhorst
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Andrea Ichino
Affiliation:
CEPR, CESifo and IZA, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Oliver Kirchkamp
Affiliation:
University of Jena, Jena, Germany K.H. Schlag (ISI)
Karl H. Schlag*
Affiliation:
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
Eyal Winter
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We run an experiment in which students of different European nationalities are matched in groups of five and repeatedly choose with whom within their group they want to play a trust game. Participants observe of each other age, gender, nationality and number of siblings. The region of origin, “North” or “South” is a major determinant of success in the experiment. Participants tend to trust those they trusted before and who trusted them. We do not find evidence of regional discrimination per se. It is only the underlying and significant differences in behavior that translate through repeated interactions into differences in payoffs between the two regions.

Keywords

TrustTrustworthinessEuropean regionsExperiments

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior Z13: Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology • Language • Social and Economic Stratification
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 260 - 283
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9240-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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