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Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John A. List  and
Todd L. Cherry
John A. List
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1400
Todd L. Cherry
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608-2051
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Abstract

Focusing on responder behavior, we report panel data findings from both low and high stakes ultimatum bargaining games. Whereas Slonim and Roth (1998) find that offers are rejected fairly equally across rounds in both low and high stakes games, we find that learning does take place, but only when there is sufficient money on the table. The disparate results can be reconciled when one considers the added power that our experimental design provides-detecting subtle temporal differences in responder behavior requires a data generation process that induces a significant number of proportionally low offers.

Keywords

bargaining gamesresponder behaviorlearning

JEL classification

C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C9: Design of Experiments
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , June 2000 , pp. 11 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Economic Science Association

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