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Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Darryl A. Seale ,
James E. Parco ,
William E. Stein  and
Amnon Rapoport
Darryl A. Seale*
Affiliation:
Department of Management, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV 89154, USA
James E. Parco*
Affiliation:
Department of Management, United States Air Force Academy, Academy, CO 80840-2944, USA
William E. Stein*
Affiliation:
Department of Information & Operations Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843 USA
Amnon Rapoport*
Affiliation:
Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
*
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
email: [email protected]
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Abstract

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.

Keywords

batch queueingequilibrium solutionexperimentcoordination

JEL classification

C71: Cooperative Games D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , June 2005 , pp. 117 - 144
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 Economic Science Association

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References

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