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Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Anna Louisa Merkel Open the ORCID record for Anna Louisa Merkel [Opens in a new window]  and
Johannes Lohse
Anna Louisa Merkel*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany
Johannes Lohse*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, J G Smith Building, Edgbaston Campus Birmingham, UK
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

Evidence from response time studies and time pressure experiments has led several authors to conclude that “fairness is intuitive”. In light of conflicting findings, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which conditions an increase in “fairness” due to time pressure indeed provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the “fairness is intuitive” hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al. in Nat Commun 6:7455, 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects decisions under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the “fairness is intuitive” hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person binary dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games under time pressure or time delay. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option. Our main finding is that time pressure does not consistently promote fairness in situations where this would be predicted after accounting for choice difficulty. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that “fairness is intuitive”.

Keywords

Distributional preferencesCooperationTime pressureResponse timesCognitive processesDrift Diffusion Models

JEL classification

C32: Time-Series Models • Dynamic Quantile Regressions • Dynamic Treatment Effect Models • Diffusion Processes • State Space Models D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers H41: Public Goods C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , 15 March 2019 , pp. 24 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9566-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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