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Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Luís Aguiar-Conraria ,
Pedro C. Magalhães  and
Christoph A. Vanberg
Luís Aguiar-Conraria*
Affiliation:
NIPE and Economics Department, University of Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
Pedro C. Magalhães
Affiliation:
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Av. Prof. Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9, Lisbon, Portugal
Christoph A. Vanberg
Affiliation:
Alfred-Weber-Institut, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.

Keywords

Election designParticipation quorumApproval quorumLaboratory experiment

JEL classification

D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 886 - 909
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9473-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Previous versions of this paper have benefited from several comments. We thank the participants of the 50th Anniversary Conference of The Public Choice Society, New Orleans, and the European Political Science Association Meeting in Barcelona, 2013. We also thank the participants in seminars at Catholic University of Portugal (in Porto and in Lisbon), University of Puerto Rico, University of Aveiro, University of Minho and Nova School of Business and Economics. In particular we wish to thank the very helpful discussion with Miguel Portela, Anabela Botelho, Marieta Valente, and Pedro Robalo. Luís Sá provided great research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

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