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The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Andrzej Baranski Open the ORCID record for Andrzej Baranski [Opens in a new window]  and
Rebecca Morton
Andrzej Baranski*
Affiliation:
Division of Social Science, NYUAD, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Rebecca Morton
Affiliation:
Division of Social Science, NYUAD, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Department of Politics, NYU, New York City, United States
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

We analyze the data sets of all majoritarian Baron and Ferejohn (Am Political Sci Rev 83(4):1181–1206, 1989) experiments through 2018. By exploiting the variation of the experimental parameters, we are able to identify how group size, discount factor (cost of agreement delay), voting weights, and communication affect bargaining outcomes and dynamics. The outcomes are qualitatively in line with the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., minimum winning coalitions are modal; proposers demand larger shares than non-proposers; and most agreements are reached without delay. Experience and communication between players move outcomes closer to the equilibrium. However, bargaining dynamics are not stationary. Behavior following a disagreement is history-dependent in the form of retaliation towards failed proposers and their supporters, which, if rationally expected, may deter proposers from demanding high shares.

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , September 2022 , pp. 1079 - 1108
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2021

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Footnotes

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09734-7.

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