Hostname: page-component-669899f699-7xsfk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-25T02:18:05.977Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Claire Rimbaud Open the ORCID record for Claire Rimbaud [Opens in a new window]  and
Alice Soldà
Claire Rimbaud*
Affiliation:
Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007), 75016 Paris, France
Alice Soldà*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, RISLαβ, Ghent University, Sint-Pietersplein 6, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Pro-social individuals typically face a trade-off between their monetary incentives and their other-regarding preferences. When this is the case, they may be tempted to exploit the uncertainty in their decision environment to reconcile this trade-off. In this paper, we investigate whether individuals with belief-dependent preferences acquire information about others’ expectations in a self-serving way. We present a model of endogenous information acquisition and test our theoretical predictions in an online experiment based on a modified trust-game in which the trustee is uncertain about the trustor’s expectations. Our experimental design enables us to (1) identify participants with belief-based preferences and (2) investigate their information acquisition strategy. Consistent with our predictions for subjective belief-dependent preferences, we find that most individuals classified as belief-dependent strategically select their source of information to avoid the cost of their conscience.

Keywords

Belief-dependent preferencesInformation acquisitionSelf-serving biasesExperiment

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , July 2024 , pp. 491 - 547
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

The replication and supplementary material for the study is available at https://osf.io/fujdg/?view_only=0ec4ab35410e477997765ddb7549c34e.

References

Andreoni, J., & Sanchez, A. (2020). Fooling myself or fooling observers? Avoiding social pressures by manipulating perceptions of deservingness of others. Economic Inquiry, 58(1), 12–33. 10.1111/ecin.12777CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., & Nagel, R., et al. (2022). Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in the trust game. IGIER Working Paper Series, 506.Google Scholar
Attanasi, G., Rimbaud, C., & Villeval, M. C. (2019). Embezzlement and guilt aversion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167, 409–429. 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Balafoutas, L., & Fornwagner, H. (2017). The limits of guilt. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 3(2), 137–148. 10.1007/s40881-017-0043-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2007). Guilt in games. American Economic Review, 97(2), 170–176. 10.1257/aer.97.2.170CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bellemare, C., Sebald, A., & Strobel, M. (2011). Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid guilt: Estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 26(3), 437–453. 10.1002/jae.1227CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bellemare, C., Sebald, A., & Suetens, S. (2017). A note on testing guilt aversion. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 233–239. 10.1016/j.geb.2016.11.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bellemare, C., Sebald, A., & Suetens, S. (2018). Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects. Experimental Economics, 21(2), 316–336. 10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review, 90(1), 166–193. 10.1257/aer.90.1.166CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G., Oprea, R., & Yuksel, S. (2021). How do people choose between biased information sources? Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(3), 1656–1691. 10.1093/jeea/jvaa051CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, S., & Heese, C., et al. (2021). Fishing for good news: Motivated information acquisition. University of Bonn and University of Mannheim Discussion Paper Series, 223.Google Scholar
Chopra, F., Haaland, I., & Roth, C. (2023). The demand for news: Accuracy concerns versus belief confirmation motives. NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper, 01.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, J. (2013). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences, New York: Academic press 10.4324/9780203771587CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory, 33(1), 67–80. 10.1007/s00199-006-0153-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Di Tella, R., Perez-Truglia, R., Babino, A., & Sigman, M. (2015). Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others’ altruism. American Economic Review, 105(11), 3416–42 10.1257/aer.20141409CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential decision criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 568 10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.568CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dufwenberg, M. (2002). Marital investments, time consistency and emotions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(1), 57–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dufwenberg, M., & Dufwenberg, M. A. (2018). Lies in disguise: A theoretical analysis of cheating. Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 248–264. 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011). The framing of games and the psychology of play. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 459–478. 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268–298. 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Exley, C. L. (2016). Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk. The Review of Economic Studies, 83(2), 587–628. 10.1093/restud/rdv051CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Exley, C. L., & Kessler, J. B. (2021). Information avoidance and image concerns. Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868. 10.1162/003355399556151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feiler, L. (2014). Testing models of information avoidance with binary choice dictator games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 45, 253–267. 10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Festinger, L. (1962). Cognitive dissonance. Scientific American, 207(4), 93–106. 10.1038/scientificamerican1062-93CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fong, C. M., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2011). Truth in giving: Experimental evidence on the welfare effects of informed giving to the poor. Journal of Public Economics, 95(5–6), 436–444. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.017CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic behavior, 6(3), 347–369. 10.1006/game.1994.1021CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedrichsen, J., Momsen, K., & Piasenti, S. (2022). Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 100, 101913 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101913CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garcia, T., Massoni, S., & Villeval, M. C. (2020). Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving. European Economic Review, 124, 103412 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103412CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Golman, R., Hagmann, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2017). Information avoidance. Journal of Economic Literature, 55(1), 96–135. 10.1257/jel.20151245CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Z., & Van Der Weele, J. J. (2017). Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(1), 173–217. 10.1093/jeea/jvw001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haisley, E. C., & Weber, R. A. (2010). Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 614–625. 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hauge, K. E. (2016). Generosity and guilt: The role of beliefs and moral standards of others. Journal of Economic Psychology, 54, 35–43. 10.1016/j.joep.2016.03.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hertwig, R., & Engel, C. (2016). Homo ignorans: Deliberately choosing not to know. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(3), 359–372. 10.1177/1745691616635594CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Inderst, R., Khalmetski, K., & Ockenfels, A. (2019). Sharing guilt: How better access to information may backfire. Management Science, 65(7), 3322–3336. 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3101CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jia, T. (2021). Empathy, motivated reasoning, and redistribution. Working Paper.Google Scholar
Khalmetski, K. (2016). Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior, 97, 110–119. 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khalmetski, K., Ockenfels, A., & Werner, P. (2015). Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence. Journal of Economic Theory, 159, 163–208. 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larson, T., & Capra, C. M. (2009). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference for fairness? A comment. Judgment and Decision Making, 4(6), 467 10.1017/S1930297500004009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(3), 593–622. 10.1006/redy.1998.0023CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92(368), 805–824. 10.2307/2232669CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003). Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52(2), 267–275. 10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00003-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morell, A. (2019). The short arm of guilt: An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 332–345. 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.022CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, M. (1995). Moral preferences, moral constraints, and self-serving biases. Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper, 95–241.Google Scholar
Saccardo, S., & Serra-Garcia, M. (2023). Enabling or limiting cognitive flexibility? Evidence of demand for moral commitment. American Economic Review, 113(2), 396–429. 10.1257/aer.20201333CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sengupta, A., & Vanberg, C. (2023). Promise keeping and reliance damage. European Economic Review, 152, 104344 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104344CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Serra-Garcia, M., & Szech, N. (2022). The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance. Management Science, 68(7), 4815–4834. 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4153CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. K., Trivers, R., & von Hippel, W. (2017). Self-deception facilitates interpersonal persuasion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 63, 93–101. 10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.012CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soldà, A., Ke, C., Page, L., & Von Hippel, W. (2020). Strategically delusional. Experimental Economics, 23, 604–631. 10.1007/s10683-019-09636-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soraperra, I., van der Weele, J., Villeval, M. C., & Shalvi, S. (2023). The social construction of ignorance: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 138, 197–213. 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spiekermann, K., & Weiss, A. (2016). Objective and subjective compliance: A norm-based explanation of ‘moral wiggle room’. Games and Economic Behavior, 96, 170–183. 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woods, D., & Servátka, M. (2016). Testing psychological forward induction and the updating of beliefs in the lost wallet game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 56, 116–125. 10.1016/j.joep.2016.06.006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Xiao, E., & Bicchieri, C. (2012). Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others. Synthese, 187(1), 49–63. 10.1007/s11229-011-0026-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 13, 75–98. 10.1007/s10683-009-9230-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar