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Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Douglas Davis ,
Oleg Korenok  and
Robert Reilly
Douglas Davis*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA
Oleg Korenok*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA
Robert Reilly*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matched or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing. Experimental results indicate that such variations can have first order effects on outcomes. For this reason, we recommend that results in oligopoly experiments be carefully interpreted in light of the procedures selected.

Keywords

Market experimentsOligopolyRe-matchingInformationMarket concentration

JEL classification

D4: Market Structure, Pricing, and Design C9: Design of Experiments L4: Antitrust Issues and Policies
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 65 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9195-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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