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Vladimir Putin’s Aspiration to Restore the Lost Russian Empire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2017

Chaim Shinar
Chaim Shinar*
Affiliation:
Hazamir St., 22/23, Kiryat Ono, 5550722, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, by his political actions in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Central Asian countries, and his current actions in Ukraine, strives to re-establish the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, ignoring the principle of international law that protects the sovereignty of each nation-state over its territory. In order to achieve his goals Putin uses ‘soft force’ and social fermentation in Russian-speaking ‘near abroad’ nation-states of the former Soviet Union. He also uses a policy of weakening the economy of the target countries and uses the Russian chauvinism and irredentism as the basis of his policy.

Type
Articles
Information
European Review , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 642 - 654
Copyright
© Academia Europaea 2017 

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References

References and Notes

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