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Judge and lawgiver in Anglo-American history

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2003

R. C. VAN CAENEGEM
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Ghent, Universiteitstraat 4, 9000 Gent, Belgium

Abstract

Politicians are not expected to interfere with the judiciary. Parliament passes laws and the courts interpret and apply them. On the Continent, judicial freedom is restricted by codification, which was avoided in England where greater judicial flexibility survived. In the United States the Restatement of the Law was a move in the direction of codification. Also in that country, judicial review of the constitutionality of the laws gave the judges the power to declare statutes passed by the representatives of the people unconstitutional. No such power exists in England, but the courts have other means of reducing the impact of Acts of Parliament, such as the exclusionary rule and the convention that the lawgiver does not intend to change the common law, which is judge-made case law, governed by the doctrine of precedent. Those traditional elements of the English common law were recently eroded by modernizing trends: the rule of exclusion was given up in favour of the search for the intention of the lawgiver, and the force of stare decisis was reduced. The recent incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law has introduced a form of judicial review of the laws into the British system.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Academia Europaea 2003

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