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The Irrelevance of Political Party Differences for Public Finances – Evidence from Public Deficit and Debt in Portugal (1974–2012)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2017

André Corrêa D’almeida  and
Paulo Reis Mourao
André Corrêa D’almeida
Affiliation:
Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, 420 West 118th Street, Room 1435, New York, NY 10027, USA. Email: [email protected]
Paulo Reis Mourao
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Economics & Management School, University of Minho, 4700 Braga, Portugal, & NIPE. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper attempts to empirically test whether inter-party political differences impact public finances in Portugal differently. Focused on public debt and on government budget deficit, and using data since 1974 for several variables, this paper applies econometric modelling to show that inter-party differences have had, until now, no significant impacts on the public finances’ performance in Portugal. In this context, this paper aims at dispelling some myths regarding the ‘value’ of a policy process based on political intrigue, enmity and a discourse of confrontation around differentiated political parties’ merits in modern democracies.

Type
Articles
Information
European Review , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 560 - 587
Copyright
© Academia Europaea 2017 

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