On average, the poor European periphery converged on the rich industrial core in the four or five decades prior to the First World War. Some, like the three Scandinavian economies, used industrialization to achieve a spectacular convergence on the leaders, especially in real wages and living standards. Some, like Ireland, seemed to do it without industrialization. Some, like Italy, underwent a less spectacular catch-up, and it was limited to the industrializing North. Some, like Iberia, actually fell back. What accounts for this variety? What role did trade and tariff policy play? What about emigration and capital flows? What about schooling? We offer a tentative assessment of these contending explanations and conclude that globalization was by far the dominant force accounting for convergence (and divergence) around the periphery. Some exploited it well, and some badly.

This paper examines the determinants of migration from 19 southern counties to six major destinations in England and Wales from 1861–70 to 1891–1900. I find that, while the size of origin-destination wage gaps and the distance between origin and destination areas were important determinants of migration flows, as expected, migration was also strongly influenced by the number of previous migrants from an origin county living in a destination. The assistance provided by previous migrants to friends and relatives contemplating migration led to a perpetuation of earlier migration patterns, and helps to explain the continued dominance of London as a destination for migrants in the 1890s.

This paper surveys West Germany's export performance since the 1950s, focusing on geography, the exchange rate regime, and international specialisation. It emphasises the importance of Europe as a ‘natural trading bloc’, with Germany at its centre. It challenges the claim that Germany's export boom of the 1950s and 1960s can be mainly explained by relatively low domestic cost increases. It further challenges the claim that Germany's export position has been transformed from early maturity to relative decline.

This paper sets out the evolution of Anglo-German comparative labour productivity levels since 1870, using a nine-sector disaggregation. Germany caught up with and overtook Britain in terms of aggregate labour productivity largely by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving her relative productivity position in services rather than by improving her position in manufacturing. The key role attributed by many economic historians and growth economists to technology transfer in manufacturing as a major factor driving convergence of productivity and living standards is called into question.