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S36-03 - Responsibility: Agency and Morals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 April 2020

F. Oyebode*
Affiliation:
Psychiatry, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

Abstract

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Responsibility can be defined as an obligation or duty that something happens in a situation for which one can be praised or blamed. In this presentation, the constitutive elements of a moral account of responsibility such as whom a moral agent is, under what conditions moral responsibility applies, and the possible objects of responsibility ascriptions will be discussed. The contributions of Aristotle, Strawson, Carl Ginet, Hans Jonas, Daniel Wegner and others to our understanding of responsibility, causal determinism, and the illusion of conscious will be explored. The presentation will conclude by discussion the implications of these ideas for psychiatry particularly with regard to patient autonomy and responsibility.

Type
Psychopathology: Nature and narratives of responsibility
Copyright
Copyright © European Psychiatric Association 2010
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