Recent work by sociologists, geographers and anthropologists has drawn attention to the “de-territorialization” of money, and to the emergence of “alternative” monetary forms such as e-money and complementary currencies. The increasingly diverse nature of these forms raises doubts as to whether “money” is a sufficiently coherent entity to be covered by a single definition. In this paper, these doubts are explored through a critical evaluation of the work of four prominent scholars of money: Cohen, Ingham, Zelizer and Hart. I argue that, despite their empirical richness, these approaches are undermined by a number of conceptual confusions: for example, by a tendency to refer to “money” and “currency” as if they were synonymous. The paper concludes by suggesting that Simmel’s “pure concept” of money provides the most promising basis on which to develop an analytically rigorous treatment of money which can embrace the variety of forms which circulate today.

Most authors view trust as a psychological disposition that motivates an agent to cooperative behavior in circumstances where the consequences of the agent’s action are uncertain and especially when this uncertainty depends on the reaction of other agents. This article criticizes this general approach and argues that trust is best seen as the action rather than as whatever it is that motivates it. Trust is defined as an act through which an agent gives to another agent power over him or herself.

This article discusses the thesis according to which a necessary link exists between a culture of trust and the emergence of a democratic regime. After analyzing the ordinary uses of the word trust, it differentiates three conceptions of “civic trust”: culturalist, rational-instrumental and moral. Then, by comparing the features of both a democratic and a totalitarian regime, it refutes the idea of a constitutive relation between trust and democracy. It then concludes that one cannot claim that a population lacks the ability to establish a democracy because it possesses certain cultural traits.

Bourdieu was the founder of a structuralist paradigm which is now often applied by some sociologists and strongly criticised by others. We are interested here in the intermediate attempts made by Lahire and Corcuff. Without omitting to notice some dead ends, they understood the interest of the “singular” habitus concept. After following their approach, we propose a “fictional” definition of this habitus in order to make this paradigm operational in areas where its heuristic capacity is low (like the new social movements).

Modernization, contrary to the common assumption of most writings in the field, does not follow a uniform path. The diversity of the historical experiences in the Third World countries imposes a severe revision of the theory. The case of India is taken as a good example. It helps the author to declare that there are two theorical lines which must be at the same time divided and connected. The first is functionalist, the second sequentiel, including contradictions and break thoughts. A last section is devoted to the necessity of reflexivity.