The advent of a new branch of social research under the name of civil-military relations studies within the course of the last two decades may be taken as an indication that the relationship between military and civil institutions has become one of the crucial problem areas in highly developed industrial societies. Whether this state of affairs might be characterized in terms of an increasing militarization of industrial society, like the Garrison State theory implies, or on the other hand, as a permeation of military institutions by specific values of civil institutions, does not now seem to be clear. Very likely, the problem before us does not lend itself to clear-cut statements like these. Notwithstanding the complexity of the relationships involving the two subsystems and the divergence of interpretations by different students of civil military relations, there appears to be agreement that both military and civil institutions have lost some of their relative autonomy. Something like a reciprocal interpenetration of both subsystems, without precedent in the history of industrial societies, has taken place. Likewise, the reasons for changes in the relations between the two sectors seem to be beyond controversy. The question of national defense has become a crucial problem of industrial societies which has been traced back to changes in the traditional world balance of power on the one hand, and revolutionary advances of weapons technology on the other. Concentrated as they are in the hands of two overwhelming antagonists, modern weapons, because of their range and destructive power, are capable of dealing a decisive blow to the war potential of the opponent within a matter of hours. Consequently, the outcome of any conflict must be anticipated within its earliest phase; to put it another way, the antagonists have to be prepared to face a showdown at any moment or risk their own destruction. It is for this reason that the full deployment of the military potential before a conflict is even in sight has become a postulate of modern military policy (2). Yet, permanent mobilization, as it is required by a rational military policy in the atomic age, tends to call in question the very social order which it to be secured against outside aggression.