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Violence as a Tactic of Social Protest in Postcolonial India
From the Railway Workers’ Strike to the Baroda Dynamite Conspiracy, 1974-1976
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 August 2019
Abstract
In March 1974, trade union leader and Chairman of the Socialist Party of India, George Fernandes, formed a new independent trade union of railway workers and then led a massive nation-wide strike lasting about a month. Two years later—March 1976—Fernandes was arrested as the principal accused in the Baroda Dynamite Conspiracy Case, a plot to bomb strategic targets in New Delhi in resistance to Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian rule. How did George Fernandes’ political work change over these two years—from engaging in traditional trade union movement tactics during the Railway Workers’ Strike in 1974 to being the ringleader of a plan to bomb strategic targets in resistance to the postcolonial state? Why would an activist who advocated non-violent social movement tactics change strategies and end up leading a movement that primarily uses violent tactics? I argue that in its violent repression of the Railway Workers’ Strike and its illegal imprisonment of the strike’s leaders, Indira Gandhi’s administration demonstrated to Fernandes and other opposition party leaders that there was no room for a peaceful solution to the ever increasing social conflict of early 1970s India. Therefore, when Gandhi instated herself as dictator, longstanding advocates of satyagraha believed that symbolic violence against the state was the tactic most likely to lead to the restoration of democracy in India.
Résumé
En mars 1974, le dirigeant syndical et président du Parti socialiste indien, George Fernandes, a formé un nouveau syndicat indépendant de cheminots et a mené une grève massive dans tout le pays pendant environ un mois. Deux ans plus tard, en mars 1976, Fernandes est arrêté et inculpé dans l’affaire « Baroda Dynamite Conspiracy », un complot visant à attaquer des cibles stratégiques à New Delhi en résistance au régime autoritaire d’Indira Gandhi. De quelle manière le travail politique de George Fernandes a-t-il évolué au cours de ces deux années, passant de la tactique traditionnelle du mouvement syndical lors de la grève des cheminots en 1974 à l’élaboration d’un plan visant à attaquer des objectifs stratégiques pour résister à l’État postcolonial ? Pourquoi un activiste qui a préconisé jusqu’alors des tactiques non-violentes change-t-il de stratégie au point de devenir le leader d’un mouvement utilisant principalement des tactiques violentes ? L’article montre que, dans sa répression violente de la grève des cheminots et son emprisonnement illégal des dirigeants de la grève, le gouvernement d’Indira Gandhi a convaincu Fernandes et d’autres dirigeants de partis d’opposition qu’il ne pouvait y avoir de solution pacifique au conflit social croissant en Inde au début des années 1970. Par conséquent, lorsque Gandhi s’est établi comme dictateur, les anciens partisans du satyagraha ont estimé que la violence symbolique contre l’État était la tactique la plus à même de contribuer à la restauration de la démocratie en Inde.
Zusammenfassung
Im März 1974 gründet George Fernandes, Gewerkschaftsführer und Präsident der indischen sozialistischen Partei, eine neue unabhängige Bahnerer-Gewerkschaft und steht an der Spitze eines landesweit stark befolgten, einmonatigen Streiks. Zwei Jahre später, im März 1976, wird Fernandes als Hauptangeklagter im Fall der « Baroda Dynamite Conspiracy » verhaftet, das Bombenattentate auf strategische Ziele in New Delhi zum Ziel hatte, um dem autoritären Regime Indira Gandhis Widerstand zu leisten. Wie hat sich die politische Arbeit George Fernandes in zwei Jahren wandeln können – von einer klassischen Gewerkschaftstaktik hin zu einem Bombardierungsplan strategischer Ziele eines postkolonialen Staates? Wie konnte ein bis dahin gewaltfreier Aktivist sozialer Bewegungen seine Strategien ändern und eine Bewegung aufbauen, die sich der Gewalt verschreibt? Meiner Meinung nach hat die Regierung Indira Gandhis durch die brutale Niederschlagung des Eisenbahnerstreiks und der rechtswidrigen Verhaftung der Streikführer Fernandes und anderen Oppositionsführern bewiesen, dass es keinen Platz für eine friedliche Lösung des zunehmenden sozialen Konflikts im Indien der frühen 70er geben konnte. Als sich Indira Gandhi zum Diktator mauserte, sahen die ehemaligen Verfechter des satyagraha im symbolischen Widerstand gegen Staat die einzige Möglichkeit, die Demokratie in Indien wieder herzustellen.
Keywords
- Type
- Varia
- Information
- European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , August 2019 , pp. 171 - 210
- Copyright
- Copyright © A.E.S. 2019
Footnotes
Thanks to Charles Lemert, Julia Adams, José Itzigsohn, Ted Fertik, Sarah Brothers, Hira Singh, Zaheer Baber, Gabriel Winant, Julian Go, Zophia Edwards, the participants of the Comparative Research Workshop at Yale University, and the participants of “Decolonizing the Social” at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies for their helpful comments. I thank Iqbal Abhimanyu for his excellent research assistance and I acknowledge funding for this project from the Joseph C. Fox International Fellowship, the John G. Bruhn Fellowship, the Darius Thompson Wadhams Fellowship, and the DAAD.
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