(1) See, for instance, the articles by Waran, M. and Byrski, Z. in the Paris émigré monthly Kultura (No. 1–2 and 9, 1984)Google Scholar.

(2) Aleksander Malachowski, a prominent member of Solidarity's leadership, has provoked a strong protest among the young émigré Poles in Los Angeles by talking about Jaruzelski's regime against the back-ground of his forty-years-long experience with Communism (see ‘Letter to the Editor’ in Kultura, No. 10 (1984), pp. 156–7). An extreme example of the ignorance of the younger generation is a ‘Letter to the Editor’ signed ‘Age-group 1955’ whose author wondered why Jaruzelski should be treated as any better than the Nazi criminal Frank, Hans, the governor-general of German-occupied Poland (see Kultura, No.5 (1984), pp. 174–5)Google Scholar.

(3) The view that the communist system is ‘unreformable’ and has not changed throughout its entire history is becoming a part of the émigrés orthodoxy. J. Szrett has gone even further: he concedes that communism in Poland has undergone some changes but interprets them as making the party rule increasingly hard-line (See Kultura, No. 4 (1985), p. 160).

(4) See Touraine, Alain, Dubet, Franzois, Wieviorka, Michel, Strzelecki, Jan et al. , Solidarité (Paris, Fayard, 1982)Google Scholar. Transl. by Denby, David: Solidarity. The analysis of a social movement: Poland 1980–1981 (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 191Google Scholar. After writing this article I learnt that the same point has been made in Bhomke, Adam, Eastern Europe in the Aftermath of Solidarity (New York, Columbia University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

(5) See, for instance, Toeplitz's, K. T. clear statement that Jaruzelski's government is a ‘minority government’ (‘Gry o wszystko ciag dalszy’, Polityka, No. 37, 10 ix 1983, p. 10)Google Scholar. Barcikowski, K., a member of the Politburo, does not dispute this view, claiming only that the social base of the government is broader than many people believe (‘Stan umyslów, Stan partii, stan paristwa’, Polityka, No. 9, 3 03 1984, p. 5)Google Scholar.

(6) See Kopta, J., ‘Sztuka kompromisu’ (The art of compromise), Polityka, No. 16, 04 1984, p. 16Google Scholar.

(7) For a more comprehensive analysis of this process see my article ‘The main components of the situation in Poland: 1980–1083’ in Politics [Journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association], XIX (1984), No. 1, pp. 4–17Google Scholar.

(8) Cf. Touraine, Alain, op. cit. pp. 156–8Google Scholar.

(9) See Michnik, A., ‘Analiza i perspektywy’, Kultura, No. 7–8 (1983), p. 70Google Scholar.

(10) I owe this information to Dr. Z. Pelczynski of Pembroke College, Oxford.

(11) Gwalt i perswazja, Antologia publicystyki z lat 1981–1983. Ed. by Adamski, J. (Warsaw, PIW, 1983)Google Scholar.

(12) For more information about this journal and the ideology of the ‘Cracow Liberals’ see Wildstein, B., ‘Krakowska Szkola Iiberalów’. Kontakt [Paris], 10. 1983, pp. 11–16Google Scholar.

(13) See Gwalt i perszuazja, pp. 275–296. Another of Lagowski's programmatic articles has the self-explanatory title: ‘I proclaim a theology of liberation through the market’ (Zdanie, No. 11/84). — The reception of Lagowski's views within the party was ambiguous but, on the whole, amazingly sympathetic. Thus, for instance, a publicist from Sprawy i ludzie, a weekly expressing the views of the ‘hard-liners’ (sic), called Lagowski ‘an honest philosopher’ whose views have performed a positive function in the years 1981–2 and deserve to be seriously studied (Czakon, T., ‘Socialistyczny konserwatyzm?’, Sprawy i Ludzie, No. 7, II, 1985)Google Scholar.

(14) Quoted from Passent, D., ‘Goraczka filozoficzna’ (Philosophical Fever), in Polityka, No. II, 17 III 1984, p. 16Google Scholar.

(15) Ibid. It should be noted, however, that at the beginning of 1985 the first issue of a new quarterly Myśl Marksistowska (Marxist Thought) was published with Ladosz as one of its principal authors. — It seems proper to add here a fact from my own experience. At the end of 1983 the New York Review of Books (Vol. XXX, (1924), No. 18, pp. 50–5)Google Scholar published my article ‘Marx and Freedom’—an article strongly and explicitly critical of Marxism. Soon afterward a Polish translation of this article was published in the Polish monthly Zdanie (No. 2 (1984), pp. 27–34). In an editorial note this article was specially re commended to readers as an example of serious (as opposed to demagogic) criticism of Marxism (Ibid. p. 1).

(16) ‘Gdzie Iewica?’ A review with Holuj, T., Polityka, No. 28, 13 VII 1985, p. 8Google Scholar.

(17) See Król, M., ‘Zwyciestwo historii’ (The Victory of History), Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 16, 21 iv 1984, pp. 1–2)Google Scholar. The same observation has been made in the pages of Polityka (see. Pietrasik, Z., ’Remont placu Zwyciestwa’, Polityka, No. 46, 12 ix 1983, p. 3)Google Scholar. —Interestingly, the wellknown British historian, Norman Davies, fully subscribes to the view that Polish history repeats itself. See especially his recent book Heart of Europe. A short history of Poland (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984)Google Scholar. For sharp criticism of this phenom enon of ‘advancing while looking back wards’ see Zdzislawski, P., ‘Historia jako alibi’ (History as alibi) in Przeglqd Tygodniowy, No. 16, 1985Google Scholar.

(18) Professor Rostworowski, an eminent historian often writing in Catholic Weekly, has always avoided direct historical analogies. In spite of this his views on the Polish reform movement in the eighteenth century (diametrically opposed to those of Dr. Lojek) have been widely understood as critical of Solidarity and proclaiming the need to curtail Polish national aspirations in order to avoid conflict with Russia. Because of this Waran, M. mentions his name among those authors praising ‘everything treacherous, wicked, slavishly servile towards Russia’ in Polish history, who see martial law as proof of the correctness of their historical views (See Kultura, No. 1–2 (1984), pp. 185–6)Google Scholar.

(19) See ‘Jakby zycie bylo zdrada’ (As if life was a betrayal), a discussion between M. Janion (historian of literature), M. Za lewski and W. Terlecki (writers of histor-ical novels), Wajda, A. and Bajer, M. (journalist), Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 4, 27 I 1985, pp. 1–4Google Scholar.

(20) Ibid. p. 4. The government's position towards the Warsaw uprising is reflected in the controversy over the proper name of the monument commemorating this event the authorities refuse to call it ‘a monument to the Warsaw uprising’ (i.e. to an historical event) proposing instead to call it a monu- ment to the insurgents of Warsaw' (i.e. to heroic individuals).—For many years Cie chanowski's book on the Warsaw uprising (Ciechanowski, J. M., The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar could not be published in Polish because its author, living in Britain, would not agree to censorship. After martial law, however, the need for books critical of the uprising be came of such urgency for the authorities that they finally allowed the uncensored publication of this book. It appeared in 1984.

(21) ‘By spectacular principledness’, Podgorecki explains, ‘we mean the attitude which not only approves a given norm or value for its own sake, but which also celebrates certain norms and certain values because they are considered sacred and symbolically significant. The clear tendency of the Poles is to accord particular respect to everything connected with the fatherland, political independence, the suffering of the nation throughout its history [martyrology], their organic scepticism regarding everyday systematic work […] Ordinary, common sense principledness is alien to this attitude’ (Podgorecki, A. and Loś, M., Multidimensional Sociology (London 1979), pp. 240–1)Google Scholar.

(22) This refusal ‘to pay the price of blood’ was severely criticized in Kultura by Herling-Grudzinski, G. (NO. 7–8/84, pp. 8–9)Google Scholar and S. Denfert (No. 3/85, pp. 82–90).

(23) For a detailed critique of this theory see my article ‘Myśli o sytuacji politycznej i moralno-psychologicznej w Polsce’ (Thoughts on the political, moral and psychological situation in Poland) published in Aneks [London], No. 35 (1984)Google Scholar. Briefly speaking, I have tried to argue that scope of possible liberalization is directly propor-tionate to the degree of ‘disalienation’ of the authorities, which means that struggling for a complete isolation of official establishment cannot lead to the desired end (if this end is conceived as a change within the system, and not as the overthrow of it). A government ostentatiously deprived of social support can hardly afford creating more room for its enemies. The best strategy for those who want a liberalization of the system (being aware of the practical impossibility of getting rid of it) is, therefore, constructive opposition, combining criticism of the rulers with conditional support for some of their efforts. You cannot influence those from whom you are com pletely isolated. In a discussion which followed nine people took part (all of them associated with the opposition) but, predict ably, only one of them (S. Kisielewski) supported my position.

(24) See Trybuna Ludu, 19 I 1984.

(25) See ibidem, 28 II 1984.

(26) See Kultura [Paris], No. 5 (1983), pp. 102–11Google Scholar.

(27) See Letters to the Editor, Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 52 (1984), No. 1 (1985) and No. 4 (1985). Cf. Passent, Daniel column in Polityka, No. 3, 19 I 1985, p. 16Google Scholar.

(28) See his recently published book Z dziejów honoru w Polsce (Essays on the History of Honour in Poland) (Paris 1985)Google Scholar.

(29) See Márkus, G., in Féher, Ferenc, Heller, Agnes and Markus, György, Dietatorship Over Needs (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), p. 41Google Scholar.

(30) See my article in Aneks (cf. note 23) and Kisielewski's, support for this view (Aneks, No. 36 (1984), pp. 24–28)Google Scholar. Before the military takeover I presented this view on the pages of Polityka. See Walicki, A., ‘W strone przeci?tności’ (Towards mediocrity), Polityka, No. 27, 4 VII 1981Google Scholar. I wanted originally to publish this article in Tygodnik Solidarność (Solidarity Weekly) but its editors elegantly refused to accept it.

(31) I have taken these figures from Sisyphus. Sociological Studies. Vol. III Crises and Conflicts. The Case of Poland 1980–1 (Warsaw 1982)Google Scholar. The survey ‘Poles 80’, based on the representative quote sample of 2500 adults, was conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in December 1980. Reportedly, a copy of Sisyphus sent to the Soviet Union provoked a scandal: it was returned to Jaruzelski himself with an indignant remark about the information that 49.6 % of the respondents saw the Soviet Union as a threat to the independence of Poland (cf. Sisyphus, p. 187).

(32) The survey ‘Poles 81’, also conducted by sociologists from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, was not permitted to be published, but its main results were presented on the pages of an underground journal, Krytyka. See Powiórski, J., ‘Polacy 81’ (Poles 81) in Krytyka, No. 13–14 (1983)Google Scholar, reprinted by Aneks Publishers (London 1984), pp. 41–63Google Scholar.—It is interesting to compare these data with those of American surveys which show a diametrically opposite picture. Cf. Rainwater, Lee, What Money Buys: inequality and the social meaning of income (New York 1974)Google Scholar. The newest data were presented and analysed by Lane, R. E. in his Market Justice, Political Justice. Hugo Wolfsohn Memorial Lecture, 1 05 1985 [Melbourne]Google Scholar. His conclusion was that ‘except for political resources, the idea of SKALessentially equal distribution of resources does not seem attractive to most people, while, in contrast, the idea of payment according to contribution to production is attractive’.

(33) See Touraine, Alain, op. cit. pp. 164–5Google Scholar.

(34) See ‘Poles 81’ (as above, note 32).

(35) See Reykowski, J., ‘O alienacji politycznej w Polsce’ (On political alienation in Poland), Polityka, No. 14, 6 iv 1985Google Scholar.

(36) I quote these figures from Skalski, E. (Tygodnik Powszechny. No. 16, 21 iv 1985, p. 3)Google Scholar and from Kultura, No. 4 (1985), pp. 77–82.

(37) See Professor Malecki, Ignacy, as quoted in ‘Obraz tygodnia’, Tydogttik Powszechny, No. 9, 3 III 1985, p. 1Google Scholar. The government itself is far from optimistic; official publications describe the situation in such terms as ‘chronic illness’, ‘housing calamity’, ‘ecological catastrophe’, ‘arteriosclerosis in investments’, etc. An émigté publicist, B. Drukier, agrees with these terms without concealing his satisfaction that the government's efforts to improve the situation have proved so ineffective. At the end of his article he quotes Jaruzelski's words about a ‘politico-psychological barrier’ preventing economic recovery and joyfully concludes that this, to him most significant, barrier cannot be removed by the present authorities. See Kontakt [Paris], No. 4 (1985), p. 31Google Scholar.

(38) The ‘party of crazy liberals’, Kisielewski tells us, had existed in 1948–56; it ceased to exist in 1957 because its deputy chairman, Leopold Tyrmand (in later years active in U.S.A.), strongly protested against Kisielewski's presence in the newly-elected Polish Parliament. The reactivation of this party, under the chairmanship of J. Korwin-Mikke, was solemnly proclaimed by Kisielewski in his column in Tygodnik Powszechny (No. I, 1985, last page). A few months later Kisielewski explained that the views of this party, as expressed by him, have nothing in common with the views of the editor-in-chief of the Catholic Weekly; he also expressed his regret that these views are treated by the authorities as mere witticisms, and not serious proposals (Ibid. No. 17, 28 IV 1985, last page).

(39) See Turski, J., ‘Opinia spoleczna o reformie gospodarczej’ (Public opinion on economic reform), Polityka, No. 33, 13 VIII 1983, p. 4Google Scholar.

(40) See Touraine, Alain, op. cit. p. 190Google Scholar.

(41) The widely publicized trial of the four secret policemen responsible for the kidnap-murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko should be seen in this context. I refrain from discussing it since it is a subject for a separate article.—Timothy Garton Ash credits Jaruzelski with claiming ‘to head a strong but civilized state which is governed by a rule of law, a Polish Rechtsstaat’, and comments as follows: ‘This may be a pretence, but in Poland over the last few years it has been a curiously effective pretence’. See Ash, Timothy Garton, Poland: the uses of adversity, New York Review of Books, XXXII (1985) No II, p. 8Google Scholar.

(42) See Belotserkovskii, W., ‘Pis'mo k buduschchim vozhdyam SSSR’, in SSSR. Demokraticheskie alternativy (Achberg 1976), pp. 261–3Google Scholar.

(43) This point has repeatedly been made by Adam Bromke. Cf. his book Poland. The protracted crisis (Ontario, Oakville, 1983)Google Scholar.

(44) Words quoted from Malia, M., Poland's Eternal Return, New York Review of Books, XXX (1983) No 14, p. 27Google Scholar.