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A community-based theory of rebellion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

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Extract

Much literature has been written on why men rebel. However, the whole of human history can be characterized as a reason for why men rebel; the last four thousand years have presented us with one sorry set of oppression and exploitation after another. Basically, normal life for human beings has consisted of small groups of people taking advantage of larger groups of people. The real puzzle is why the larger groups of people don't rebel against the smaller groups of people more often. Perhaps the most important question is not why men rebel, but how they rebel. How does an individual gain the confidence or courage to take the tremendous risks involved in a rebellion? How does a rebellion sustain itself against the powers of the established regime?

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1993

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