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Beyond Methodological Individualism: Social Scientific Studies of Rational Practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2012

John Wettersten
John Wettersten*
Affiliation:
Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Mannheim [[email protected]].
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Abstract

Standard versions of the sociology of rational practice assume justificationist theories of rationality: all rational beliefs are justified and rational individuals do not believe any non-justified statements. This theory appears to some to offer the possiblity of finding “deeper” insights into social behavior: some actions presented by actors as “rational” can, in fact, be explained as non-justified and, therefore, as mere consequences of prestige and/or power conflicts. When, however, it turns out that no theories can be justified, then all theories are irrational. This leads to relativism. The possibility, that we may profitably construct alternative theories of rationality is, in contrast, raised nearly uniquely by fallibilist theories of rationality. In order to take advantage of this, an alternative to the dominant methodological individualist theory of rational action is needed and possible. According to this alternative, rational action consists of problem-solving within institutional contexts without justification. Such a non-relativist sociology of rational practice can be enlightening and useful. Differing institutional contexts offer differing standards of rationality.

Résumé

La sociologie standard de la rationalité considère que toutes les croyances rationnelles sont “justifiées” et que les individus rationnels refusent de croire en des propositions non justifiées. Certains pensent que cette théorie permet d’entrer plus profondément dans la compréhension du comportement social : certaines actions présentées par les acteurs comme rationnelles peuvent en fait être comprises comme non justifiées, pures conséquences de conflit de prestige ou de pouvoir. Cependant, s’il apparaît qu’aucune théorie ne peut être justifiée, alors toutes les théories sont irrationnelles, ce qui conduit au relativisme.

Toute théorie alternative de la rationalité doit s’appuyer sur une théorie faillibiliste. Or il est possible de présenter une alternative à la domination de l’individualisme méthodologique. Une action rationnelle est une résolution de problème dans un contexte institutionnel sans justification. Une telle sociologie non relativiste de l’action rationnelle peut être éclairante et utile. Des contextes institutionnels différents offrent des standards de rationalité différents.

Zusammenfassung

Etablierte Alternativen der Soziologie der rationalen Praxis, gehen davon aus, dass Rationalität mit Rechtfertigung gleichzusetzen ist: Jeder rationale Glaube ist gerechtfertigt und rationale Individuen glauben nicht an nicht gerechtfertigte Aussagen. Diese Theorie scheint für manche Kollegen, die Möglichkeit einer tiefen Einsicht in soziologischen Verhaltenswiese zu eröffnen: Handlungen, die als rational vorgestellt werden, können sich in der Realität als nicht gerechtfertigt entpuppen. Aus diesem Grund werden sie als bloße Folgen von Prestige- und/oder Machtkonflikten betrachtet. Wenn es sich aber herausstellt, dass keine Theorie gerechtfertigt werden kann, sind alle Theorien irrational. Diese Konsequenz führt zu Relativismus. Die Möglichkeit, dass wir vorteilhafte alternative Theorien der Rationalität konstruieren können, und sie in der Praxis überprüfen, ergibt sich im Gegenteil beinahe eigenständig aus fallibilistischen Theorien der Rationalität. Um einen Vorteil aus ihr zu erlangen, brauchen wir eine nützliche Alternative zur dominanten methodologischen individualistischen Theorie des rationalen Handelns. Nach dieser Alternative besteht rationales Handeln aus der Lösung von Problemen innerhalb institutionellen Kontexten. Einleuchtend kann eine aus dieser Alternative entstehende nicht relativistische Soziologie der rationalen Praxis. Verschiedene institutionelle Kontexten bieten verschiedene Maßstäbe der Rationalität an, und wir können diese überprüfen.

Keywords

Methodological individualismRationalityFaillibilist theoryRelativismIndividualisme méthodologiqueRationalitéThéorie faillibilisteRelativismeMethodologische IndividualismusRationalitätFallibilistische TheorieRelativismus
Type
Research Articles
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , April 2012 , pp. 97 - 118
Copyright
Copyright © A.E.S. 2012

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