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What about Sunday Trading … ? – The Rise of Market Access as an Independent Criterion under Article 34 TFEU

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Moritz Jesse
Moritz Jesse*
Affiliation:
Leiden University
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Type
Case Notes
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 437 - 444
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

1 Judgment of 26 April 2012, Third Chamber, n.y.r.

2 Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italy [Trailers], Judgment of 10 February 2009; Case C-142/05, Aklgaren v. Percy Mickelson and Joakim Roos, Judgment of 4 June 2009. These cases have been extensively annotated, see, for example, Thomas Horsley, “Anyone for Keck?” annotation of Case C-110/05 and Case C-142/05, and Case C-256/06, Commission v. Portugal, Judgment of 10 April 2008, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009), pp. 2001–2019; Spaventa, Eleanor, “Leaving Keck behind? The free moment of goods after the rulings in Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos ”, 34 European Law Review (2009), pp. 914–932 Google Scholar; Claus Dieter Classen, “Vorfahrt für den Marktzugang? Anmerkungen zum Urteil des EuGH vom 10. Februar 2009, Rs C-110/05 (Kommission/Italien)”, EuR, Heft 4, (2009), pp.555–562.

3 For another case note on ANETT, see Purnhagen, Kai, “Anmerkung zu EuGH – C-456/10, ANNETT, Urteil vom 26.4.2012”, 67 Juristenzeitung (2012), pp.742–745 Google Scholar.

4 Case C-456/10, paras.10–12.

5 Case C-456/10, para. 20.

6 Case C-456/10, para. 12.

7 Case C-456/10, paras.13–15.

8 Case C-456/10, para. 16.

9 Case C-456/10, para.18.

10 Case C-456/10, paras. 22–23, reference made to Case C-189/95 Franzen [1997] ECR I-5909, para 35; and Case C-170/04 Rosengren and Others [2007] ECR I-4071, paras.17–18.

11 Case C-456/10, paras. 25–56.

12 Case C-456/10, para. 27, reference to Case C-170/04 Rosengren and Others [2007] ECR I-4071, para. 22.

13 The Court here distinguishes C-170/04 Rosengren and Others [2007] ECR I-4071, para. 24; where individuals were affected by the ban to import alcohol into Sweden; likewise, different from Rosengren, the monopoly in instant case would not touch upon the ‘monopoly's system of product selection’, the sale network or the marketing or advertising of the products distributed by the monopoly.

14 Case C-456/10, paras.30–31.

15 This could be seen as a hint that selling arrangements indeed lost influence in the assessment of Article 34 TFEU cases and that the Court moved on to assess the impact of a rule on market access foremost, see on these thoughts Purnhagen, “Anmerkung zu EuGH – C-456/10”, supra note 3.

16 Case C-456/10, para. 32; reference to Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para. 5, and Case C-110/05 Trailers, para. 33.

17 Case C-456/10, para. 33; reference to Case C-110/05, Trailers, para. 34, and Case C-108/09 Ker-Optica [2010], para. 48.

18 Case C-456/10, para. 35.

19 Case C-456/10, para. 36.

20 Case C-456/10, para. 37.

21 Case C-456/10, paras.38–41.

22 Case C-456/10, para. 42.

23 Case C-456/10, paras.43–45.

24 Case C-456/10, paras.45–49.

25 Case C-456/10, paras.50–55.

26 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, ECR 1993 p. I-06097, paras. 12–16. There is hardly any case which arguably ‘suffered’ from more attention in legal literature than the Keck-case, see, for example, Barnard, Catherine, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press 2010), p.123 et sqq Google Scholar.

27 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck, para. 16.

28 Case C-108/09 Ker-Optica [2010], paras. 46–56.

29 See on this point and the confusion this move by the Court created back then, de Sousa, Pedro Caro, “Through Contact Lenses, Darkly: Is Identifying Restrictions to Free Movement Harder than Meets the Eye? Comment on Ker-Optika ”, 37 European Law Review (2012), pp. 79–89, at p. 81Google Scholar.

30 Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at p. 142.

31 Dassonville formula: “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be regarded as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions”, Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi vs. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, ECR 1974 p. 00837, para. 5. For a good overview on how the Article 34 TFEU test developed and was applied over time, see Caro de Sousa, “Through Contact Lenses, Darkly”, supra note 29.

32 Case C-110/05 [Trailers]; Case C-142/05, Mickelson and Roos; see for annotations supra.

33 As Purnhagen shows, since 2006 the Keck formula was under attack from AGs such as Maduro (in Case C-158/04), Kokott (Case C-142/04), Trstenjak (Case C-265/06), and Bot (Case C-110/05); Purnhagen, “Anmerkung zu EuGH – C-456/10”, supra note 3.

34 Snell, Jukka, “The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan”, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010), pp. 437–473, at p. 455Google Scholar.

35 It has already been the most decisive factor in Trailers and Mickelson & Roos. See ibid., p. 456. See also, Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, pp.103–108.

36 Compare for the situation after Trailers and Mickelsson and Roos, Barnard, p. 71.

37 Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at p. 140.

38 Market access has been described as the offspring of KECK. See Caro de Sousa, “Through Contact Lenses, Darkly”, supra note 29, at pp.83–84.

39 See definition in Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, para. 38.

40 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck, para. 16.

41 Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at p. 125.

42 Snell, “The Notion of Market Access”, supra note 34, pp. 446–449.

43 Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, at p. 929.

44 This would mean, to a certain extent, turning back the clock to the pre-Keck ‘Sunday-trading’cases, which were difficult for the CJEU to contain and eventually led to the restriction of the scope of Article 34 TFEU in Keck; see Enchelmaier, Stefan, “Moped Trailers, Mickelson & Rooos, Gysbrechts: The ECJ's Case Law on Goods Keeps on Moving”, 29(1) Yearbook of European Law (2010), pp.190–223, at p. 193CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Horsley, “Anyone for Keck”, supra note 2, at p.2006.

45 ‘Sunday trading’ refers to the line of cases where the Court established that rules prohibiting shops from opening on Sunday would trigger Article 34 TFEU under the Dassonville approach, amounting in turn to an extremely wide interpretation of the scope of that Treaty article. The Court, applying Cassis de Dijon, held that these rules would only be allowed if they are justified by social objectives and proportionate to the said social objectives. These cases were widely regarded as excessive because, as potentially with the marked access developments described in this note, virtually no rule would be outside of the scope of Article 34 TFEU following this interpretation. See, inter alia, Case C-169/91 Stoke on Trent and Nowwhich City Counsil v B&O plc [1992] ECR i-6635, paras. 16–17; Barnard, The substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at pp.120–121. Sunday trading cases and explanation; Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, at p. 929.

46 Enchelmaier, “Moped Trailers, Mickelson & Rooos, Gysbrechts”, supra note 44, at p. 206.

47 Case C-142/05, Mickelson and Roos, paras.24–28; Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, pp.923–925.

48 This takes about one third of the whole judgment, Case C-142/05, Mickelson and Roos, paras.29–43.

49 Enchelmaier, “Moped Trailers, Mickelson & Rooos, Gysbrechts”, supra note 44, pp.212–214.

50 Case C-108/09 Ker-Optica [2010], paras. 57–78.

51 Case C-110/05, Trailers, paras. 64 & 69. See on this, Horsley, “Anyone for Keck”, supra note 2, at pp.2006–2007.

52 Some have argued that Italy got away relatively easy and take this a clear indication that the CJEU is balancing a stricter market access approach with more leeway in the justification of such measures, see de Vries, Sybe A., “Goods Revisited – Nieuwe inzichten in de rechtspraak over het vrij verkeer van goederen”, 4 Nederlandse Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht (2009), p. 128 Google Scholar.

53 Case C-322/01 Doc Morris [2003] ECR I-14887.

54 Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at p. 168.

55 Ibid, at p. 21.

56 Ibid, at p. 25.

57 Ibid, at pp. 86–88. Barnard refers to a host of cases where a rather easy approach to justifications was taken after choosing a quick establishment of a restriction to trade, such as the Walloon Waste Case, Case C-2/90, Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431, wherein the court allowed environmental protection as a reason to apply discriminatory measures; or Case C-524/07 Commission v. Austria [2008] ECR I-187 wherein a clear distinction in place for imported cars was simply called an MEQR, which could be justified.

58 On the issue of justification, see Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, pp.148–192.

59 Ibid., pp.18–19.

60 See the excellent table on cases regarding selling arrangements after Keck, Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, pp.929–932.

61 Enchelmaier, “Moped Trailers, Mickelson & Rooos, Gysbrechts”, supra note 44, at p. 215.

62 As argued in the past by those having problems with Keck as such, see Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, at p.923–924.

63 Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, at p. 924.

64 The Court was clear about the absence of de minimis in the area of the four freedoms; Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government, [2008] ECR I-1683, para. 53, as referred to by Yearbook p. 193. See in addition Snell, “The Notion of Market Access”, supra note 34, at p. 458.

65 This distinguishes the internal market from companies and, in turn, the application of EU competition law with its de minimis rules. Companies are under no such general obligation as private parties, Enchelmaier, “Moped Trailers, Mickelson & Rooos, Gysbrechts”, supra note 44, at p. 215.

66 Case C-20/03 Criminal proceedings against Burmanjer [2005] ECR I-4133, para. 31.See Horsley, “Anyone for Keck”, supra note 2, at p. 2016–2017, referring to Case C-69/88, Krantz [1990] ECR I-583, para. 11; Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para. 24. Snell also refers to cases in the area of free movment of workers and services where the same formulation was used in the assessment of national meausures but also refers to other articles undermining the assumed coherence of case-law in this regard, Article CMLRev. 460–465; referring to for workers, Case C-190/98 Graf [2000] ECR I-493, paras. 23–25 and for services, Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141.

67 Ibid.

68 Snell, “The Notion of Market Access”, supra note 34, at p.469–470.

69 Compare list of cases decided after Keck, Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, pp.929–932.

70 Ibid, p. 929.

71 Goods merge in approach with persons: every infringement has to be justified, see Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at p. 108; see also, Alina Tryfonidou, “Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms”, 35 European Law Review (2010), at p. 36; Yearbook, p. 191; Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, at p. 924–925, see also line of examples from other market freedoms Snell, “The Notion of Market Access”, supra note 34, at p.451–452.

72 Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, supra note 26, at p. 105.

73 Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, supra note 2, at p. 929; Horsley, “Anyone for Keck”, supra note 2, at p.2008–2009.