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Nothing Ado About Much?
Challenges to Anti–Dumping Measures After the Lisbon Reforms to Art 263(4) TFEU
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
Extract
Standing is a particularly controversial aspect of EU law. In the Lisbon Treaty, a third head was added to Art 263(4) with the aim of liberalising standing for private litigants. This article examines the practical effects of those reforms, by reference to three cases – Bricmate, FESI and SolarWorld – where litigants sought to challenge anti–dumping measures directly before the EU courts. It concludes that the interpretation of the third head is highly unsatisfactory, both on its own terms and in light of the purpose of the third head. The EU Courts have deliberately restricted the third head of standing, to the extent of making it sometimes more difficult to satisfy than the second head. The article fleshes out a model in keeping with the purpose and text of the Lisbon reforms, and critically assesses the argument that the relaxation of standing rules would result in an unmanageable increase in the workload of the EU courts.
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References
1 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:21, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council, at para. 1 describing EU standing rules as having “long been one of the most contentious issues in EU law”
2 See, Bael, Ivo Van and Bellis, Jean–François, EU Anti–dumping and Other Trade Defence Instruments, 5th Ed., (Kluwer, 2011);Google Scholar Vermulst, Edwin, EU Anti–Dumping Law & Practice, 2nd Ed, (Sweet and Maxwell, 2010);Google Scholar Edmond McGovern, EU Anti–Dumping and Trade Defence Law and Practice, §5822, available on internet at http://www.globefield.com/index.html (last accessed 5th May 2016)
3 This would include parties who argue that they have standing on the basis that their procedural rights in the process of imposing anti–dumping duties would be violated, or those who seek to found standing on the basis of the EU anti–dumping regulation itself. See, e.g. Case 191/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:259, FEDIOL v Commission, paras. 29 to 33 (on illegal market practices); Case T-256/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:21, BEUC v Commission Van Bael and Bellis, EU Anti–Dumping, supra note 2, at p. 607 4 See e.g. Commission Decision C(2006) 4350, Art 1 “The following [24] undertakings have infringed Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by using, in their reciprocal representation agreements, the membership restrictions which were contained in Article 11 [paragraph 2] of the model contract … or by de facto applying those membership restrictions” available on the internet at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38698/38698_4567_1.pdf (last accessed 5th May 2016)
5 Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law, Chapter 7(OUP, 2014).
6 Joined Cases C-445/07 and C-455/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:529, Commission v Ente per le Ville Vesuviane, at para 45; Case C-404/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:1998:196, GlencoreGrain v Commission, at para. 41
7 Case C-25/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, Plaumann v Commission; Case C-456/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284 T & L Sugars Ltd and Others v Commission, at para. 63; C-0583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, at para. 72; and Telefónica v Commission, C-274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, at para. 46
8 Joined Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:38, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission, at para. 15; Case C-6/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:913, Federmineraria and Others v Commission, at paras. 11 to 16
9 For example, See Craig, Paul, “Standing, Rights and the Structure of Legal Argument” 9 European Public Law (2003) pp. 493 et sqq., at p. 494 (describing the test of individual concern as rendering it “literally impossible” for an applicant to succeed);Google Scholar Ewa Biernat, “The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230(4) EC and the Principle of Judicial Protection in the European Community”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/03, p. 15 (Describing these rare exceptions as “few and casuistic”)
10 Case C-301/99 P, ECLI:EU:C:2001:72, Area Cova SA, at para. 46 (describing indirect challenges before national courts the “very essence” of effective judicial protection). See also Case C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, at paras. 40 to 46 (“UPA”); Case C-262/03 P ECLI:EU:C:2004:210 Commission v Jégo-Quéré, at paras. 30 to 39
11 See, for example, Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner; Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications; Case C-333/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:764, Société Régie Networks v Direction de Contrôle Fiscal Rhône- Alpes Bourgogne
12 See, e.g. Lenaerts, Koen and Cambien, Nathan “Regions and the European Court: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of the Member States” 35 European Law Rev (2010) pp. 609 et sqq., at p. 617Google Scholar
13 From within the EU judicature, Case T-177/01, ECLI:EU:T:2002:112, Jégo-Quéré v Commission; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council; Opinion of AG Jacobs Case C-358/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:144 Extramet v Council ; Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-491/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:476, British American Tobacco From outside, see: Christopher Brown and John Morijn, “Case C-262/03 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré” 41 Common Market Law Review (2004), p. 1639 et sqq; Anthony Arnull, “April shower for Jégo-Quéré” 29 European Law Review (2004) at p. 287 et sqq; Arnull, Anthony, “1952-2002: plus ca change…” 27 European Law Review (2002), at p. 509, et sqq;Google Scholar Rasmussen, H. “Why is Article 173 Interpreted against Private Plaintiffs?” (1980) 5 European Law Review 112, et sqq. Google Scholar
14 Cover note from the Praesidium to the Convention on the Court of Justice and the High Court, CONV 734/03, at p. 20 (“Members of the circle who were in favour of amending the fourth paragraph of Article 230 stressed in particular the fact that, in certain exceptional cases, an individual could be directly concerned by an act of general application without it entailing an internal implementing measure. In such cases, the individual concerned would currently have to infringe the law to have access to the court”); See also, generally, Koch, Cornelia, “Locus Standi of private applicants under the EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the protection of individuals’ right to an effective remedy”, 32 European Law Review 2005, at p. 511 et sqq.Google Scholar
15 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, Case C-456/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2283, T and L Sugars and Another v Commission, at para. 26
16 Lenaerts and Cambien, “Regions and the European Court”, supra note 12, at p. 617 (“it is far from self-evident that the interpretation given to the original provision as it figured in the EU Constitution can be transposed ipso facto to Art 263 TFEU”); Malleghem, Pieter–Augustijn Van and Baeten, Nils, “Before the law stands a gatekeeper – or what is a “regulatory act” in Article 263(4)”, 51 Common Market Law Review (2014), p. 1187, et sqq., at p. 1204-1213Google Scholar
17 Inuit, supra note 7
18 Ibid, at para. 61
19 Case T-18/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:419, 625 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council, at para. 63
20 Case T-262/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:623, Microban and another v Commission. 21 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (‘basic Regulation’), Art 5
22 ibid, Art 5(4)
23 ibid, Art 5(9), (10), (11); Art 6(5)
24 ibid, Art 8
25 ibid, Art 9
26 Case C-113/77, ECLI:EU:C:1979:91, NTN Toyo Bearing and Others v Council; Case T-170/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:134, Shanghai Bicycle v Council; Edmond McGovern, EU Anti-Dumping supra, note 2, §5822.
27 As to those who initiated the anti–dumping procedures by submitting a complaint to the Commission, they will typically be found to have standing on the basis of their procedural rights that have been affected by, for example, a Commission decision to not pursue the procedure. This falls outside the scope of this article. See supra, note 3
28 Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:68, Allied Corporation and Others v Commission, at paras. 11 to 12; Case C-75/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:279, Gao Yao v Council, at para. 27; Case T-147/97, ECLI:EU:T:1998:266, Champion Stationery and Others v Council, at para. 35 Note that in some of those cases, this is explained on the basis that the party in question will be able to show that they were identified in the measures adopted by the Commission or the Council, or that they were concerned by the preliminary investigations.
29 Case C-205/87, ECLI:EU:C:1987:485, Nuova Ceam v Commission; Joined cases C-133/87 and C-150/87, ECLI:EU:C:1990:115, Nashua Corporation and others v Commission and Council, at para. 15; Case T-7/99, ECLI:EU:T:2000:175, Medici Grimm KG v Council and Commission
30 C-156/87, ECLI:EU:C:1990:116, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission, at paras. 20 to 23; Case T-596/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:53, Bricmate AB v Council, at para. 28 31 Case T-598/97, ECLI:EU:T:2002:52, British Shoe Council and Others v Council, at para. 61; T-301/06, ECLI:EU:T:2008:495, Lemaître Sécurité SAS, para. 22; Bricmate, supra note 30, para. 37
32 See, e.g. Van Bael and Bellis, EU Anti–Dumping, supra at note 2, pp. 607-613
33 Case C-358/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:214, Extramet v Council
34 British Shoe Council, supra note 31, at para. 56
35 Case T-597/97, ECLI:EU:T:2000:157, Euromin v Council, paras. 49 to 52; Case T-598/97, ECLI:EU:T:2002:52, British Shoe Council, supra note 31; Bricmate, supra note 30; Case T-134/10, ECLI:EU:T:2014:143, FESI v Council.
36 Bricmate, supra note 30
37 FESI, supra at note 37
38 Case T-507/13, ECLI:EU:T:2015:23, SolarWorld AG and Others v Commission. The appeal to the CJEU concerned solely the question of direct concern, and, contrary to the decision in the General Court, does not shed light on the notions of “regulatory acts” or “not entailing implementing measures”. Given that it also confirms the General Court's analysis, it is therefore of limited relevance. See Case C-142/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:163 SolarWorld v Commission
39 Bricmate, supra note 30, at para. 36
40 ibid, at para. 48
41 ibid, at para. 59
42 Kornezov, Alexander, “Shaping the new architecture of the EU system of judicial remedies; comment on Inuit”, 39 European Law Review (2014), pp. 251 et sqq, at pp. 256-7;Google Scholar Albors–Lorens, Albertina, “Remedies against the EU institutions after Lisbon: an era of opportunity?” 71 CLJ (2012), pp. 507 et sqq, at pp. 525-526;CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Van Bael and Bellis, EU Anti-Dumping, supra at note 2, at p. 606. 43 Bricmate, supra note 30, see table at para. 2
44 ibid, at para. 65
45 See discussion in Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-0274/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:204, Telefónica SA v European Commission; Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-33/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:409, Mory, para. 167; Case C-33/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:609, Mory, at para. 92 (where the CJEU seems to conclude that the State aid Decision was not of general application because it was addressed solely to the Republic of France, whereas the Advocate General in his Opinion seems to suggested that it was not of general application because the contested measure concerned only the question of economic continuity between Sernam – a business rival of the claimant Mory who was granted State aid – and the third party company that bought it after it went into administration)
46 Bricmate, supra note 30, at paras. 68 to 71
47 ibid, at para. 73
48 FESI, supra at note 37, at para. 75
49 See also Case T-551/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:60, Brugola Service International v Council (French and Italian only)
50 SolarWorld, supra at note 38, at para. 46
51 ibid, at para. 62
52 ibid, at para. 64
53 Case C-553/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:805, Kyocera Mita Europe, at para. 49 (emphasis added). See, also, C-552/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:804, Canon Europa v Commission; C-84/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:517, Forgital Italy v Council and Commission (both failed challenges to customs duties)
54 Case C-456/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284, T and L Sugars and another v Commission, see, infra at note 95 for further discussion of what, precisely, was challenged in the CJEU appeal.
55 ibid, at para. 40
56 Case T-385/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:7, Castelnou; Case T-287/11, ECLI:EU:T:2016:60, Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH; Case T-620/11, ECLI:EU:T:2016:59, GFKL Financial Services AG; Case T-614/13, ECLI:EU:T:2014:835, Romonta v Commission; Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:100, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v European Commission
57 Case T-643/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1076, Crown Equipment; Case T-57/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:102, BP Products
58 See AG Cruz Villalón, supra note 15 .
59 K. Lenaerts, et al., EU Procedural Law, supra at note 5
60 See Opinion of AG Wathlet in Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:335, Stichting Woonpunt and others v Commission, at paras. 69 to 76; Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-274/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:204, Telefónica SA v European Commission, at paras. 60 to 62
61 Bricmate, supra note 30 at para. 74
62 SolarWorld, supra at note 38, at para. 36
63 See also FESI, supra at note 37, at para. 30, Bricmate, supra note 30, at para. 74
64 T and L, supra at note 54, para. 41
65 Bricmate, supra note 30, para. 74
66 Supra at note 26
67 T-155/94, ECLI:EU:T:1996:118, Climax Paper Converters v Council, at para. 53; C-118/77, ECLI:EU:C:1979:92, ISO v Council, at para. 26; Case 121/77 ECLI:EU:C:1979:95 Fujikoshi and Others v Council, at para. 11; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-239/99, ECLI:EU:C:2000:639, Nachi v Council, at para. 73
68 Case C-118/77, ECLI:EU:C:1979:92, Import Standard Office v Council of the European Communities
69 ibid, at para. 26
70 See, infra notes 77 – 112.
71 See, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, supra at note 7, at paras. 99 to 107; Telefónica, supra at note 7; Case T-312/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:472, Federcoopesca and Others v Commission, at paras. 27 to 31; Case T-541/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, ADEDY v Council, at para. 93; Kornezov, “Comment on Inuit”, supra at note 42, at pp 260-261
72 Barents, R., “The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon”, 47 CMLR (2010) pp. 709 et sqq., at p. 725.Google Scholar
73 See also Inuit, supra at note 7, “neither the FEU Treaty nor Article 19 TEU intended to create new remedies before the national courts to ensure the observance of EU law”
74 Opinion of AG Wathlet in Case C-132/12 ECLI:EU:C:2013:335, Stichting Woonpunt and others v Commission (“the duty of genuine cooperation cannot extend so far as to require the Member States to create access to national courts where no State measure is at issue”); Kornezov, supra at note 42, at 28 (noting that this imposes a “formidable task” on national courts)
75 Case C-106/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:395, Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion; Case C-282/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, Dominiguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Others
76 In T and L, supra at note 54 for example, the claimants argued that it was not possible to contest the national application of the EU emergency measures as they were not public (given the confidential business information they were based on) or ultra vires measures (given that they sought to challenge the scheme itself and not its administration). The General Court seems to have accepted that there was no possibility of national redress, see AG Cruz Villalon, supra note 15, at para. 14
77 As Koch, “Locus Standi of Private Applicants”, supra at note 14, at p. 515 notes, there were two “groups” of arguments against the restrictive standing rules. The first focused on situations where there would be a “complete denial of remedy” (as in the dilemma canvassed above). The second argued that the indirect enforcement mechanism was a “denial of an effective remedy”.
78 See CJEU Press Release, “Statistics concerning judicial activity in 2014”. Available on the internet at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-03/cp150027en.pdf (last accessed 12th April 2016); Van Malleghem and Baeten, “Before the Law”, supra at note 16, at p. 1215
79 Case C-314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, Foto–Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck–Ost; Van Malleghem and Baeten, “Before the Law”, supra at note 16, at p. 1214; Koch, “Locus Standi of Private Applicants”, supra at note 14, at p. 515
80 See Morten Broberg and Niels Feuger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice, 2nd Ed., (OUP, 2010), Chapter 6
81 Roberto Mastroianni and Andrea Pezza, Striking the Right Balance: Limits on the Rights to Bring an Action under Article 263(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 30 American University International Law Review (2015) at pp. 743 et sqq, at pp. 771-774
82 Craig, “Structure of Legal Argument”, supra at note 9, at pp. 503-4. Note, also, in the context of anti-dumping, the comment by AG Jacobs in Extramet, supra at note 13, at para. 71 that the EU courts are better equipped to decide the matter in light of their expertise in EU law. See also, infra, notes 91 92.
83 Roberto Mastroianni and Andrea Pezza, supra at note 81, at pp 778-780; See Art 278 TFEU; AG Jacobs in Extramet, supra at note 13, at para. 74
84 Ewa Biernat, “The Locus Standi of Private Applicants”, supra at note 9 at pp. 27-28; Morten Broberg and Niels Feuger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 2010),, at p. 279 (“The preliminary reference procedure does not as such constitute a dispute resolution procedure; rather it is a noncontentious stage in the procedure before the national court. Article [267] does not provide a judicial remedy for the parties to the main proceedings.”); Extramet, supra at note 13, at para. 71 (noting the “serious disadvantages” in the Art 267 procedure)
85 Case C-188/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:90, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
86 See, in particular Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz–Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-346/03 and C-529/03 ECLI:EU:C:2005:256 Atzori and Others v Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, at para. 88 “ The rule in Deggendorf is highly questionable and at some point the Court of Justice must resolve to formulate it more precisely or overrule it, since it is open to significant objections”; Broberg and Feuger, supra at note 84, at pp. 214 – 222 (“Perhaps the better solution would be to consider other ways of preventing circumvention of the time limit laid down in Art 230(5) than that provided by the TWD doctrine”)
87 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-239/99, ECLI:EU:C:2000:639, Nachi v Council, at paras. 55 to 60
88 Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, (OUP, 1999), p. 47; Carol Harlow, “Toward a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice” 12 Yearbook of European Law (1992), at pp 213 et sqq., at p. 248; Mariolina Eliantonio and Nelly Stratieva “From Plaumann, through UPA and Jégo-Quéré, to the Lisbon Treaty: The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Art 263(4) EC Through a Political Lens”, Maastricht Faculty of Law Paper 2009/13; See also Art 10(3) Treaty on the European Union.
89 Note, for example, the well-known argument made by Judge Dehousse in his report on the reforms to the General Court that challenges the extent to which the Courts are overworked. Franklin Dehousse and Benedetta Mariscola, The Reform of the EU Courts: Abandoning the Management Approach by Doubling the General Court, (2016) can be accessed online http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ep83.pdf.pdf (Last retrieved 5th May 2016), in particular 5.1.1 and 5.1.2
90 Art 267 TFEU “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings (…)”
91 Art 256 TFEU; Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of The European Union, OJ C 83/210, Art 56
92 Parliament and Council Regulation 2015/2422 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Art 1
93 Shuibhne, Niamh, “The Court of Justice of the European Union”, in Peterson, John and Shackleton, Michael, eds., The Institutions of the European Union, 3rd Ed (2012, OUP) at p. 149 Google Scholar
94 See Craig, “Structure of Legal Argument”, supra at note 9, at pp. 503-4
95 Case C-456/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284, T and L Sugars and another v Commission
96 Joined Cases C-455/13 P, C-457/13 P and C-460/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:616, Confederazione Cooperative Italiane and Others v Commission
97 ibid, at para. 48. See also Case T-334/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:376, Plantavis; Case T-694/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:915, EREF; Case T-670/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:906, Milchindustrie-Verband (both failed on the grounds of lacking direct concern)
98 See, e.g., Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44
99 See Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-33/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:409, Mory v Commission, paras. 22 to 30
100 Case C-362/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:322, Wunenburger v Commission, at para. 42; Case T-28/02, ECLI:EU:T:2005:357, First Data and Others v Commission, at para. 35 to 38
101 Case T-537/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:514, Cixi Jiangnan Chemical Fiber v Council, at paras. 16 to 19. This was a case concerning whether a party had an interest in the proceedings such that they could act as an intervener in those proceedings under Art 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court 19 June 2013 (OJ L 105 of 23.4.2015, p. 1). However, the test applied was the same as that in relation to whether a party has a sufficient interest in the proceedings to bring the claim (compare with cases in preceding footnote)
102 Case C-653/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:277, Bopp v EUIPO, for an example.
103 Rules of Procedure, supra note 101, Art 106(2)
104 Ibid, Art 14 and Art 29
105 Note that presently, Advocate Generals are allowed four référendaires, but the Judges at the CJEU are only allowed three. See Marc Abenhaïm, “Follow-Up Note on Another Missed Opportunity for the Administration of Justice Across Europe” 16th December 2014, accessible online at http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2014/12/16/follow-up-note-on-another-missed-opportunity-for-the-administration-of-justice-across-europe/ (last retrieved 6th May 2016) 106 Franklin Dehousse and Benedetta Mariscola, supra at note 89, Chapter 5.
107 See, supra, note 56 for cases where the third head was not satisfied, but the second head was.