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Expert Evidence, “Naked Statistics” and Standards of Proof

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Tony Ward
Tony Ward*
Affiliation:
Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne
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Abstract

In the context of the UK Supreme Court decision in Sienkiewicz v Greif (2011) this article discusses the question whether so-called “naked statistical evidence” can satisfy the civil standard of proof in English law, the “balance of probabilities”. It argues that what is required to satisfy the standard is a judicial belief that causation is more likely than not, rather than a categorical belief that causation occurred. Whether such a belief is justified depends on the weight of the evidence as well as the degree of probability it purports to establish, but there is no reason of principle why epidemiological evidence alone should not satisfy this standard.

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 580 - 587
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016

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References

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