1 The pulp mills were sited in Uruguay chiefly because of the availability of wood pulp supplied by the conversion of Uruguay's original grasslands to industrial Eucalyptus forests, at the rate of about 1.5 % of the total area of Uruguay between 1969 and 1999. Bettucci, Lina, Alonso, Raquel and Tiscornia, Susana, “ Endophytic mycobiota of healthy twigs and the assemblage of species associated with twig lesions of Eucalyptus globulus and E. grandis in Uruguay”, 103(4) Mycological Research 468 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Although Argentina did argue that the plantations had a harmful impact on the river, it apparently submitted no evidence in support. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 April 2010, paras. 178–80 [hereinafter Judgment].

2 Id.

3 Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg. Art. 60, para. 1, Feb. 26, 1975, 1982 U.N.T.S. 339, in force 18 September 1976, available on the Internet at <http://www.espaciosjuridicos.com.ar/datos/OTROS%20TRATADOS/ESTATUTORIOURUGUAY.htm> (last accessed on 22 April 2010). See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36(1), 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 1031.

4 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures Order, 13 July 2006, available on the Internet at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/11235.pdf> (last accessed on 22 April 2010) [hereinafter Order July 2006].

5 Louise Egan, “Argentina, Uruguay Split over Planned Pulp Mills”, The Washington Post, DC, 14 August 2005, at p. A16.

6 Order July 2006, supra note 4, para. 48.

7 The IFC is a division of the World Bank Group which finances private sector investment, facilitating access to capital in international financial markets and advising businesses and governments. IFC projects are located in developing countries. See International Finance Corporation, available on the Internet at <http://www.ifc.org>. The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman is an independent recourse mechanism for the IFC, reporting directly to the President of the World Bank Group. It can use mediation, audits of social and environmental project performance, and advice to the President to address complaints from affected communities. See Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, available on the Internet at <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/>.

8 IFC-World Bank Group, Orion Pulp Mill – Uruguay, available on the Internet at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/disclosure.nsf/content/Uruguay_Pulp_Mills>.

9 International Finance Corporation, Environmental and Social Standards, available on the Internet at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/EnvSocStandards>.

10 Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, CEDHA, is an Argentinean nongovernmental organization promoting access to justice and human rights for victims of environmental degradation and non-sustainable management of natural resources. Available on the Internet at <http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/>.

11 The Equator Principles are intended to improve social and environmental impacts of project financing. They have been adopted by nearly 70 major international financial institutions. See Equator Principles, available on the Internet at <http://www.equator-principles.com>.

12 See Center for Human Rights and Environment, Compliance Complaint Regarding ING Loan Consideration to Botnia and/or ENCE for Paper Pulp Mill Production in Uruguay, available on the Internet at <http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/complaint-letterto-ing-eng.pdf> (the complaint letter was sent by CEDHA to Michel Tilmant, CEO of ING of the Netherlands, and others). See also CEDHA Petition against Uruguay to the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights (Sept. 19, 2005), available on the Internet at <http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/peticion-cidh-final.doc>.

13 Art. 41(1) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 3 states that the Court has the power “to indicate, if it considers that the circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.” The Court indicates provisional measures “only if there is an urgent need to prevent irreparable prejudice to the rights that are the subject of the dispute before the Court has had an opportunity to render its decision.” See Order January 2007, infra note 22, para. 32. Cf. Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, Order January 2007 (the Court has the power to indicate two kinds of provisional measures). See also Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, 1991 I.C.J. 17, para. 23 [hereinafter Great Belt Order].

14 Id., para. 33.

15 Order July 2006, supra note 4, para. 14.

16 Id.

17 Id., paras. 71–78.

18 Id., para. 78 (citing Great Belt Order, supra note 13, at p. 19, para. 31).

19 See Great Belt Order, supra note 13, at p. 19. Cf. MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), paras. 74, 81 (Provisional Measures Order of Dec. 3, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 405 (2002).

20 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Dissenting Opinion (2010), para. 26 (“the conclusion whereby non-compliance with the pertinent procedural obligations has eventually had no effect on compliance with the substantive obligations is a proposition that cannot be easily accepted. For example, had there been compliance with the steps laid down in Arts. 7 to 12 of the 1975 Statute, this could have led to the choice of a more suitable site for the pulp mills. Conversely, in the absence of such compliance, the situation that obtained was obviously no different from a fait accompli.”).

21 The day before the ICJ decision was released, the IFC published an environmental monitoring report on the project that concluded “all indications are that the mill is performing to the high environmental standards predicted in the [Environmental Impact Assessment] and [Cumulative Impact Study], and in compliance with Uruguayan and IFC standards.” EcoMetrix Incorporated, UPM S.A., Orion Pulp Mill, Uruguay – Independent Performance Monitoring, at ii (19 April 2010), available on the Internet at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/disclosure.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/<Uruguay_Orion_EcoMetrix_Monitoring_Report_English_2009/$FILE/<Uruguay_Orion_EcoMetrix_Monitoring_Report_English_2009.pdf>.

22 Daniel Schweimler, “River Row Divides Former Friends”, BBC News, Feb. 15, 2006, available on the Internet at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4716036.stm>; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures Order, 23 January 2007, at para. 8, available on the Internet at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/13615.pdf> (last accessed on 22 April 2010) [hereinafter Order January 2007].

23 Treaty between Arg.–Braz.–Para.–Uru. Establishing a Common Market [Mercado Comun del Sur or Mercosur], Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991) (entered into force Dec. 31, 1994); Protocolo de Olivos [PO], firmado el 18 de febrero de 2002 y vigente desde el 1 de enero de 2004; Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur [Protocol of Ouro Preto], Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1994). See Granger, C. Leah, “The Role of International Tribunals in Natural Resource Disputes in Latin America”, 28 Ecology L.Q. (2008), pp. 1297, 1343.Google Scholar

24 Decision of the Mercosur Arbitral Tribunal ad hoc (Uruguay v. Argentina) (Sept. 6, 2006).

25 See Order January 2007, supra note 22. The July 2006 and the January 2007 ICJ provisional measures orders have taken longer than the ICJ's average for ruling on provisional measures. In his Insight on this case, Pieter Bekker noted that “[i]n the past decade, the ICJ has taken between one and 49 days to rule on a request for provisional measures”; Pieter Bekker, “Argentina-Uruguay Environmental Border Dispute before the World Court”, Am. Soc. Int’l L. Insights (2006), available on the Internet at <http://www.asil.org/insights060516.cfm>.

26 Alejandro Rebossio, “Gualeguaychú levanta el bloqueo con Uruguay”, ELPAIS.COMInternacional, 18 June 2010, available on the Internet at <http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gualeguaychu/levanta/bloqueo/Uruguay/elpepuint/20100618elpepuint_1/Tes> (last accessed on 4 July 2010).

27 Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Uruguay/Orion-02/Gualeguaychú- Argentina, available on the Internet at <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=152>.

28 Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, International Finance Corporation/Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Ombudsman Assessment Report, Regarding Community and Civil Society Concerns in Relation to Activities of IFC Project Orion, Uruguay (Dec. 2009), available on the Internet at <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org> (last accessed on 22 April 2010).

29 Order, para. 59.

30 Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 52, 264.

31 Order July 2006, supra note 4, paras. 1–6.

32 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 40.

33 Id., para. 152; Cf. Lac Lanoux Arb. (Fr. v. Spain), 16 November 1957, 24 I.L.R. 101, paras. 5, 11, 16.

34 Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 104–7.

35 Id., para. 122.

36 Id., paras. 177, 185 (citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 78, paras. 140, 193 (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 241–242, para. 29); and para. 186.

37 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (neither Argentina nor Uruguay has signed the Convention), Art. 5, May 21, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/ RES/51/869, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). Art. 5 reads: “Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation

1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.

2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.”

38 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 170.

39 Id., paras. 171, 175–77.

40 Id., paras. 181–89.

41 Id., para. 22.

42 Id.

43 Id., para. 192.

44 Id., para. 193 (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 33, at pp. 241–242, para. 29).

45 Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 62, 191. The conventions invoked were: 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (the “CITES Convention”), the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (the “Ramsar Convention”), the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter the “Biodiversity Convention”), and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (hereinafter the “POPs Convention”). See Judgment, supra note 1, para. 56.

46 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 200.

47 See Dissent, supra note 20, paras. 20–22.

48 Id., paras. 22–24.

49 Judgment, para. 204. Argentina had referenced two relevant instruments, the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in a Transboundary Context of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 (Argentina and Uruguay are not parties) [hereinafter Espoo Convention]; and the 1987 Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment of the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP/WG.152/4 Annex (1987) (adopted by UNEP Governing Council, 14th Sess., Dec. 14–25, 1987) [hereinafter UNEP Goals and Principles]. See Judgment, supra note 1, para. 203.

50 Id., para. 205.

51 Espoo Convention, supra note 43; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999), available on the Internet at <http://www.unece.org/env/pp> [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].

52 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 219.

53 Id., para. 160.

54 Id., paras. 160–64.

55 See supra note 47.

56 Id., paras. 220–28.

57 Id., paras. 229–64.

58 Id., para. 231.

59 Id., para. 265.

60 Statute of the Court, supra note 3, Art. 51; and Rules of Court Arts. 63–65.

61 Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 165–68.

62 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 247; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America) Appointment of Expert, Order of 30 March 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 165).

63 See Dissent, supra note 20, para. 6.

64 Id., para. 12; cf. Judgment, para. 236 (“the Court will principally weigh and evaluate the data, rather than the conflicting interpretations given to it by the Parties or their experts and consultants”).

65 Id., para. 5.

66 Id., para. 13.

67 Id., para. 14.

68 Dissent, para. 7.

69 Id., para. 8; Rules of Court, Art. 50.

70 Dissent, para. 16. The United Nations Compensation Commission, established to provide compensation for losses resulting from the 1990–91 Gulf War, made extensive use of outside experts to assist its review of complex scientific and technical evidence, including review of claims awarding over US$ 5 billion for environmental damage. See, e.g., Report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the third instalment of “F4” claims, UN Doc. S/AC.26/2003/31, paras. 51–53 (18 December 2003); 43 I.L.M. 704, 714–15 (May 2004).

71 Dissent, para. 15; see Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Arbitral Award (17 September 2007); Procedural Order No. 6 of the Tribunal, 27 November 2006; Order No. 7 of the Tribunal (12 March 2007).

72 Dissent, para. 15; see Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium v. Netherlands), Arbitral Award (24 May 2005).