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Bridging the Risk-Hazard Divide

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Mikael Karlsson
Mikael Karlsson*
Affiliation:
Södertörn University, Sweden
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Extract

The often referred to risk-hazard divide is commonly exaggerated. With some exceptions, few in the risk camp argue against hazard classification as basis for labelling of e.g. carcinogenic substances (which has been the case for decades) and few in the hazard camp criticise the use of risk assessments, once they are established. Agencies and politicians commonly look at both sides of the coin in practise. However, improved chemicals management would benefit from further bridging the risk-hazard divide. Professor Lofstedt does a good job in arguing from a risk perspective, but he leaves out much of the other side of the coin, so in the following, I will discuss his perspectives and try to complement his recommendations.

Type
Symposium on Risk versus Hazard
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 2011 , pp. 187 - 189
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

1 Council Directive 67/548/EEC on dangerous substances, OJ 1967 196/1.

2 Beronius, A., Rudén, C., Håkansson, H. and Hanberg, A., “Risk to All or None? A Comparative Analysis of Controversies in the Health Risk Assessment of Bisphenol A”, 29 Reproductive Toxicology (2010), pp. 132–146 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

3 See Eriksson, J., Karlsson, M., and Reuter, M., “Technocracy, Politicization, and Non-Involvement: Politics of Expertise in the European Regulation of Chemicals”, 27 Review of Policy Research (2010), pp. 167–185 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 European Commission, EU Risk Assessment Report, Diphenylether, pentabromoderivate, Volume 5 (Luxembourg: European Communities 2001)Google Scholar; European Commission, EU Risk Assessment Report, Diphenylether, octabromoderivate, Volume 16 (Luxembourg: European Communities 2003)Google Scholar.

5 European Commission, EU Risk Assessment Report, Bis(pentabromodiphenyl) ether, Volume 17 (Luxembourg: European Communities 2002)Google Scholar; see also Rudén, C. and Gilek, M., “Scientific Uncertainty and Science-Policy Interactions in the Risk Assessment Process”, in Eriksson, J., Gilek, M. and Rudén, C. (eds), Regulating Chemical Risks: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on European and Global Challenges (Dordrecht: Springer 2010)Google Scholar.

6 SCHER, Opinion on ‘Update of the risk assessment of bis(pentabromophenyl) ether’ (European Commission: SCHER 2005).

7 Swedish Chemicals Agency, Dekabromdifenyleter – underlag till ett nationellt forbud (Stockholm: SCA 2004)Google Scholar.

8 Directive 2003/11/EC on restrictions of dangerous substances and preparations, OJ L42/45.

9 The ban was annulled in 2008.

10 Confer U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers, Action Plan (Washington: EPA 2009)Google Scholar.

11 Karlsson, M., “The Precautionary Principle, Swedish Chemicals Policy and Sustainable Development”, 9 Journal of Risk Research (2006), pp. 337–360 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Eriksson et al. (2010), supra note 3.

12 U.S. EPA 2009, supra note 10; quote from S. Owens, EPA, “DecaBDE Phase-out Initiative”, 2009, available on the Internet at <http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/existingchemicals/pubs/actionplans/deccabde.html> (last accessed on 29 March 2011). One reason for the voluntary line may be the strong burden of proof placed on the EPA under the Toxic Substances Control Act, see Karlsson, M., “The Precautionary Principle in EU and U.S. Chemicals Policy: A Comparison of Industrial Chemicals Legislation”, in Eriksson, J., Gilek, M., and Rudén, C. (eds), Regulating Chemical Risks: European and Global Challenges (Dordrecht: Springer 2010)Google Scholar.

13 See Karlsson (2006 and 2010), supra notes 11 and 12.

14 The SCHER is an obvious example, see Eriksson, J., Karlsson, M., and Reuter, M., “Scientific Committees and EU Policy: The Case of SCHER”, in Eriksson, J., Gilek, M., and Rudén, C. (eds), Regulating Chemical Risks: European and Global Challenges (Dordrecht: Springer 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, COM(2000)1.

16 Ibid., p. 13, “The principle is relevant only in the event of a potential risk, even if this risk cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified …”.

17 See Karlsson (2006 and 2010), supra notes 11 and 12, and references therein.