¹ Communication from the Commission, “EUROPE 2020 A Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (03.03.2010) COM(2010) 2020 final, para. 3.1; Communication from the Commission, “Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence ‘Working together to create new growth’” (13.04.2011) COM(2011) 206 final, para. 2.4; “Boosting confidence and growth by putting consumers at the heart of the Single Market” 22 May 2012, COM(2012) 225 final.

² Schmid, CU, “The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications on A European Contract Law Code” (2005) 1(2) European Review of Contract Law 211, doi <https://doi.org/10.1515/ercl.2005.1.2.211>CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Bartl, M, “Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the Political” (2015) 21 European Law Journal 572 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 582.

⁴ Most of the directives were based on Art 114 TFEU and thus their stated rationale was to combat market fragmentation. Early directives regulated misleading advertising, doorstep selling, consumer credit, package travel, distance selling.See Weatherill, S, “After KECK: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification” (1996) 33(5) Common Market Law Review 887 Google Scholar.

⁵ H-M Micklitz, “The Consumer: Marketised, Fragmentised, Constitutionalised” in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The IMages of the Consumer in EU Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2016) p 21 at p 23; Micklitz, H-W, “An expanded and systemized Community Consumer Law as alternative or complement?” (2002) 13(6) EBLR 583 Google Scholar.

⁶ In cases such as C-238/89, Pall Corp, C-315/92 Clinique, C-470/93 Mars and C-373/90, Procureur de la Republique v X the ECJ condemned national rules allegedly promoting consumer protection as being over-regulatory and relied on the “reasonably circumspect consumer” who is capable of processing information and making informed choices: Case C-373/90 Procureur de la Republique v X, ECLI:EU:C:1992:17 (C-126/91 Yves Rocher, para. 17).

⁷ C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung, ECLI:EU:C:1998:369, paras. 31, 32. See also C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, ECLI:EU:C:2010:660, para. 103.

⁸ Micklitz (2002), supra, note 5, 588.

⁹ After the failures of state interventions of the 1970s to handle the energy crisis, the idea emerged that market forces were better at managing energy markets efficiently to achieve lower prices and economic growth: Duterque, A, “The liberalisation of EU energy markets: A consumer’s perspective” (2013) 2 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 80, 80 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Cseres, KJ, “What Has Competition Done for Consumers in Liberalised Markets?” (2008) 4 (2) Competition Law Review 77 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Larouche, P and Hancher, L, “The coming of age of EU regulation of network industries and services of general economic interest” in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010)Google Scholar.

¹² Reisch, LA and Micklitz, HW, “Consumers and deregulation of the electricity market in Germany” (2006) 29(4) Journal of Consumer Policy 399 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Initially issues connected to consumer protection remained at national level of legislation as the energy systems were still state owned and public service obligations were also determined by Member States: Johnston, A, “Seeking the EU ‘Consumer’ in Services of General Economic Interest” in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2016) 112, 114 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The purpose of liberalising the EU’s electricity and gas sector was to “ensure that EU consumers receive the full benefits of market opening in terms of lower domestic bills for electricity and gas through the introduction of competition and the freeing of all electricity and gas consumers to choose their supplier”. Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for internal market in electricity and natural gas. Brussel: European Commission. COM (2001) 125 final, p 33.

¹⁵ Cseres, supra, note 10.

¹⁶ Benöhr, I, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) 36 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ While this regulatory law addresses consumers, it in fact transcends the internal relationship between producers or service providers and consumers to the external dimension of the well-functioning of markets. See Reich, N, “Harmonisation of European contract law: with special emphasis on consumer law” (2011) 1(1–2) China-EU Law Journal 55, 71 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Where the legal rules do not comply with the pace of market development as a result of eg technologic innovation, regulatory disconnection could result in stifling innovation: Bennett Moses, L, “How to Think about Law, Regulation and Technology: Problems with ‘Technology’ as a Regulatory Target” (2013) 5(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brownsword, R and Goodwin, M, Law and Technologies of the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brownsword, R and Somsen, H, “Law, Innovation and Technology: Before We Fast Forward – A Forum for Debate” (2009) 1 Law, Innovation and Technology 1 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Duterque, A, “The liberalisation of EU energy markets: A consumer’s perspective” (2013) 2 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 80 Google Scholar

²⁰ ibid.

²¹ Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. COM(2015) 80 final, 25 February 2015.

²² While liberalisation pushed energy markets towards centralisation and market integration, the emergence of renewable energy sources created the opposite trend of decentralisation and small-scale energy production. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) 864 final/2, 2016/0380(COD).

²³ Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources OJ L140/16 2009.

²⁴ Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012 regarding energy efficiency, OJ ECL 3152012, pp 1–56.

²⁵ Recitals 6 and 50 of Directive 2009/72/EC.

²⁶ Due to uncertain weather conditions, generation from renewables can only be correctly forecast just before the actual production. Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) 864 final/2, 2016/0380 (COD).

²⁷ Demand side response (DSR) is a voluntary reduction in electricity consumption taken from the grid by retail customers to react to an increase in the power price, or to some form of incentive payment.

²⁸ Upon receiving a scarcity message, in particular a very high day-ahead price at a specified hour, they can decrease their consumption at that hour by disconnecting specific appliances, or use distributed generation equipment and/or rely on storage capabilities. To incentivise demand response, energy prices should vary between peak and off-peak periods according to supply and demand (“dynamic pricing”). CERRE Report, C Crampes, C Waddams, “Empowering electricity consumers in retail and wholesale markets” (19 March 2017), available at <http://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/170309_CERRE_EnergyConsumers_Final.pdf>.

²⁹ Smart energy technology can automatically follow price fluctuations and offer accurate and frequent information to consumers on their consumption and it enables them to adjust their behaviour accordingly to the price signals: Rodrigo, SG, “Changing the Energy Model: Step Back on the Europe 2050 Strategy?” (2016) 25(2) European Energy and Environmental Law Review, 65, 66–67 Google Scholar. Smart metering stimulates awareness and ultimately bring about efficient energy use and energy savings: Pront-van Bommel, S, “A reasonable price for electricity” (2016) 39 Journal of Consumer Policy 141, 154 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) 864 final/2, 2016/0380(COD).

³¹ Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) 864 final/2, 2016/0380(COD).

³² National price regulation and state interventions currently hinder prices from reflecting when electricity is scarce.

³³ Rodrigo, SG, “Changing the Energy Model: Step Back on the Europe 2050 Strategy?” (2016) 25(2) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 65, 66–67 Google Scholar.

³⁴ To incentivise demand response, energy prices should vary between peak and off-peak periods according to supply and demand (“dynamic pricing”). European Parliament, ThinkTank, “New Deal for energy consumers” January 2016, <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573896/EPRS_BRI(2016)573896_EN.pdf>. However, in most Member States, consumers have little or no incentive to change their consumption in response to changing prices in the markets, as real-time price signals are not passed on to final consumers. The obstacles to consumer participation can include a lack of detailed information on costs and consumption; growing charges and levies in energy bills; insufficient competition in many retail markets; obstacles for energy self-generation; and high entry barriers for new competitors in retail markets. Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) 864 final/2, 2016/0380(COD), p.5

³⁵ Toffler, A, The Third Wave (William Morrow 1980)Google Scholar.

³⁶ ibid.

³⁷ Client Earth, “Prosumer Rights: Options for a legal framework post-2020” (May 2016) p 10. Available at <www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2016-06-03-prosumer-rights-options-for-an-eu-legal-framework-post-2020-coll-en.pdf>.

³⁸ See <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593518/EPRS_BRI(2016)593518_EN.pdf>.

³⁹ European Parliament, ThinkTank, “Energy prosumers” (November 2016), available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593518/EPRS_BRI(2016)593518_EN.pdf>.

⁴⁰ They are connected to the distribution network with small to medium installed capacity. National legislation in the various European countries differentiates between different sizes of prosumers, and services provided to prosumers by utilities are also specified based on the scale of activity. Eurelectric, “Prosumers – an integral part of the power system and the market” 2015, p 5.

⁴¹ Prosumers help introduce elements of “energy democracy” (which is why they are sometimes referred to as “energy citizens”). However, prosumers also bring challenges, notably for incumbent players such as electricity producers and grid operators, who might lose revenue as prosumers start buying less energy from the grid because they are producing their own. This could result in lower levels of investment in the grid and could affect consumer bills for those not producing their own power. “Energy prosumers”, supra, note 39.

⁴² Presently, prosumers’ participation in energy markets is hampered by a number of (practical) entry barriers such as low income, and building for end-users or costs, minimum bid size and dependence on aggregators for small businesses. “Prosumer Rights: Options for a legal framework post-2020”, supra, note 37, pp 11–13.

⁴³ Existing energy legislation does include some provisions, such as the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, which requires Member States to provide either priority or guaranteed access to the grid system for all renewable electricity production, big and small. Similar provisions are included in the 2009 Electricity Directive. The Energy Efficiency Directive introduces a similar requirement for small scale and micro-combined heat and power and requires Member States to encourage participation of demand response in wholesale and retail markets and, when necessary, to include aggregators.

⁴⁴ Art 12 TFEU reads “Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union policies and activities”.

⁴⁵ For example, it was invoked by the General Court in Test-Achats, to stress that consumer protection is an interest that, by force of the Treaty, necessarily ought to be taken into account in the implementation of any EU policy and activity, including therefore competition law: Case T-224/10, Association belge des consommateurs test-achats ASBL v Commission, judgment of 12 October 2011, para. 43.

⁴⁶ Case C-92/11 RWE Vetrieb ECLI:EU:C:2013:180 and see also the Opinion of AG Trstenjak, 13 September 2012, paras. 62-69, where she analyses the relationship between Directive 93/13 on unfair contract terms and Directive 2003/55 on the internal market in natural gas.

⁴⁷ Joined Cases C-359/11 and C-400/11, Schulz, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2317.

⁴⁸ Art 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection. Art 38 determines that EU policies ought to ensure a high level of consumer protection, equally invoked by the Court.

⁴⁹ She continued that “The fragmentation that still persists in the Union’s consumer-protection law is the consequence of historical development, in the course of which the Union legislature has gradually regulated individual spheres of life, in line with the acquis, with a view to establishing a genuine internal market for transactions between businesses and consumers”: AG Trstenjak Opinion, 13 September 2012, para. 69 footnote 50.

⁵⁰ See Art 19 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules of the internal market in electricity, OJ L 27/20 and Art 18 of Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, OJ L 204/1.

⁵¹ ibid.

⁵² Arts 2(12) and 21 of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Arts 2(28) and 23 of Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 176/57.

⁵³ Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L 211/55 and Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L 211/94.

⁵⁴ Pront-van Bommel, supra, note 29; Reisch and Micklitz, supra, note 12.

⁵⁵ Proposal for a Directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) 864 (Electricity Directive) and COM(2016) 861 (Electricity Regulation).

⁵⁶ According to recent statistics (June 2017 available at <ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics>) renewable energy in the EU has grown strongly in recent years. The share of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption has almost doubled in the last years, from around 8.5% in 2004 up to 16.7% in 2015. This increase has been the result of mandatory targets set by the Commission in its “Renewable Energy Road Map”, for using renewable energy sources to meet 20% of EU energy consumption needs by 2020, a mandatory target of 10% of transport fuel consumption coming from biofuels by 2020, and the creation of a new legislative framework. The present Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC) also mapped out various mechanisms that Member States can apply in order to reach their targets (support schemes, guarantees of origin, joint projects, cooperation between Member States and third countries), as well as sustainability criteria for biofuels. On 30 November 2016, the Commission published a legislative package entitled “Clean energy for all Europeans”, which includes a proposal for a revised Renewable Energy Directive to make the EU a global leader in renewable energy and to ensure that the target of at least a 27% share of renewables in the total amount of energy consumed in the EU by 2030 is met.

⁵⁷ Digitalisation affects the energy sector at all levels of the value chain, from virtual power generation, digital grid management, and smart metering, to new ways of marketing and selling new products and services. It changes patterns of consumption, introduces new ways of optimising assets, cross-industry partnerships and the greater use of industrial platforms. These technologies are putting data and intelligence at the centre of new business models.

⁵⁸ Proposal for a Directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM(2016) pp 3–4.

⁵⁹ Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity.

⁶⁰ Directive 2003/54/EC, Art 2, para. 9.

⁶¹ Household customers are “customers purchasing electricity for their own household consumption, excluding commercial or professional activities”, whereas non-household customers include “any natural or legal persons purchasing electricity which is not for their own household use and shall include producers and wholesale customers”: Directive 2003/54/EC Art 2, paras. 10–11.

⁶² The Third Electricity Directive contains both universal service and public service obligations in Article 3. The universal service obligation is laid down in Art 3(3) of Directive 2009/72/EC and created the right to be supplied with energy of a specific quality at a reasonable price, which can be imposed on a supplier of last resort.

⁶³ Pront-van Bommel, supra, note 29, 149.

⁶⁴ Micklitz, H-W, “Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A Thought-Provoking Impulse” (2013) 32(1) Yearbook of European Law 266 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Grundmann, S, “Targeted Consumer Protection” in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Oxford Hart Publishing 2016) 223 Google Scholar; C Mak and others, “Analysis of the applicable legal frameworks and suggestions for the contours of a model system of consumer protection in relation to digital content contracts. - Final report: Comparative analysis, law – economics analysis, assessment and development of recommendations for possible future rules on digital content contracts” (2011) University of Amsterdam, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law.

⁶⁵ In Di Pinto the ECJ interpreted, for the purposes of the Directive on doorstep selling, the notion of consumer in a narrower sense, noting that a trader canvassed with a view to the sale of his business is not to be regarded as a consumer protected by the Directive and explained that the Directive does not afford protection to legal persons even if they are in a position similar to that of a consumer. Case C-361/89, Di Pinto (judgment of 14 March 1991).

⁶⁶ Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

⁶⁷ Tonner, K and Fangerow, K, “Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights: a new approach to European consumer law?” (2012) EUVR 02/2012, pp 67–81 Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ C-45/96, Bayerische Hypotheken (judgment of 17 March 1998).

⁶⁹ Case C-464/01, Gruber (judgment of 20 January 2005).

⁷⁰ However, it stressed that the predominance of the private element is by itself irrelevant. According to the same ruling, a person cannot claim the status of consumer if they have negligently created the impression that they were acting in the course of a business (eg by using a company letterhead or address).

⁷¹ Directive 2011/83/EU.

⁷² The DCFR contains principles, definitions and model rules of European private law as distilled from the acquis communautaire of contract law and the private laws of the Member States. It covers both general contract law rules as well as specific ones such as rules of consumer contracts. DCFR is available at <ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-law_en.pdf>.

⁷³ “Any natural person who is acting primarily for purposes which are not related to his or her trade, business or profession”. Definitions are given in Annex 1, which is referred to in Art I.–1:103(1) of the DCFR.

⁷⁴ The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) has defined the prosumer as “a consumer who is equipped with self-generation and /or batteries”. CEER, 2015, “Position paper on well-functioning retail energy markets”, C15-SC-36-03, 14 October 2015. The European Commission has defined prosumers as “producers and consumers of RES”. European Commission, Staff Working Document, “Best Practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption” COM(2015) 339 final.

⁷⁵ The evolution of the “consumer” to “prosumer” has the potential to make State aid laws applicable to a large group of new market participants. Considering that the successful integration of prosumers into the energy market will probably also depend on Member State policies to incentivise them, it is likely that some of these policies will entail subsidies or other financial advantages. Given that the core of the prosumer concept is that they participate in the market and thus engage in an economic activity, they will most certainly be considered as an undertaking and all subsidies and financial advantages they receive will be scrutinised under State aid law. “Prosumer Rights: Options for a legal framework post-2020”, supra, note 37, pp 14–16.

⁷⁶ “Prosumer Rights: Options for a legal framework post-2020”, supra, note 37, p 24.

⁷⁷ See supra, note 27 for a definition of demand side response.

⁷⁸ “Prosumer Rights: Options for a legal framework post-2020”, supra, note 37, pp 25–28.

⁷⁹ Art 15(8) of the Energy Efficiency Directive stipulates that Member States must ensure that national energy regulatory authorities encourage DSR to participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail markets. Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency.

⁸⁰ Directive 2003/54/EC Annex A.

⁸¹ Johnston, supra, note 13, 114–115.

⁸² Recital 50 Directive 2009/72/EC.

⁸³ Recital 55 Directive 2009/72/EC, Art 3(11).

⁸⁴ An aggregator is any organisation or individual that brings retail energy customers together as a group in order to obtain better prices, service, or other benefits when acquiring energy or related services. An aggregator is a market participant that combines multiple customer loads or generated electricity for sale, for purchase or auction in any organised energy market. They play an important role as intermediaries between customer groups and the market.

⁸⁵ DSO is the abbreviation for distribution system operator, which means a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the distribution system in a given area and, where applicable, its interconnections with other systems and for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution of electricity, Art 2(6) of Directive 2009/72; SACM Lavrijssen, “Power to the energy consumer” (2017) TILEC Papers, 2017(12).

⁸⁶ In the telecommunications sector, end-user, subscriber is also used. In postal sector the term user is applied.

⁸⁷ Micklitz, supra, note 64.

⁸⁸ Pront-van Bommel, S, “Smart Energy Grids within the Framework of the Third Energy Package” (2011) 20(2) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 32, 36 Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Micklitz argued that this conceptual uncertainty is related to the fact that the process of liberalisation has been advancing in small steps and while markets exist, they are not really completely developed: Micklitz, supra, note 64.

⁹⁰ Deller, D and Vantaggiato, F, “Revisiting the Regulatory State: A Multidisciplinary Review Establishing a New Research Agenda”, CCP Working Paper 14-19 Google Scholar, p 8.

⁹¹ ibid.

⁹² Waterson, M, “The role of consumers in competition and competition policy” (2003) 21 (1) International Journal of Industrial Organization 129 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹³ Littlechild, S, “Spot pricing of electricity: Arguments and prospects” (1988) 16 (4) Energy Policy 398 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newbery, DM and Pollitt, MG, “The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain’s CEGB—Was It Worth It?” (1997) 45 (3) The Journal of Industrial Economics 269 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁴ Deller, D and Vantaggiato, F Google Scholar, “Revisiting the Regulatory State: A Multidisciplinary Review Establishing a New Research Agenda”, CCP Working Paper 14-9, p 8.

⁹⁵ Deller and Vantaggiato argue that the balance between the interests of customers and consumers in the Regulatory State should be further investigated: ibid.

⁹⁶ Decker, C, “Concepts of the consumer in competition, regulatory and consumer protection policies” (2017) 13(1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 151 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁷ However, unlike competition policy, there has typically been a greater awareness of the needs of specific groups of consumers to be protected, such as those on low incomes or who are otherwise “vulnerable”.

⁹⁸ Waddams Price, C and Zhu, M, “Empirical Evidence of Consumer Response in Regulated Markets” (2016) 12(1) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 113 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hviid, M and Waddams Price, C, “Well-functioning markets in retail energy” (2014) 10(1) European Competition Journal 167 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁹ Therefore, consumers leave a considerable amount of money on the table. Consumers’ inaction has especially policy relevance when it is those who are vulnerable, who society may feel are in need of some protection or assistance, who are failing to benefit from better deals available in the market. Crampes and Waddams, supra, note 28.

¹⁰⁰ According to the CEER Report on barriers to switching (2016) the average switching rates (to a different supplier) in the EU Member States were 6.3% for electricity and 5.5% for gas. The CEER Report suggested that there are four main reasons for consumer inactivity. There are insufficient gains available (or anticipated by consumers); lack of trust in the process or the players in the market; a complex process of switching (or that consumers expect such complexity); and loyalty to existing suppliers. Council of European Energy Regulators (2016), Commercial Barriers to Council of European report on commercial barriers to supplier switching in EU retail energy markets, C15-CEM-80-04 CEER Report on commercial barriers to supplier switching in EU retail energy markets pp 11–12.

¹⁰¹ Lavrijssen, supra, note 85, ACER Monitoring Report 2014, CERRE 2017.