Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T11:52:08.517Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Tax Exemption, Moral Reservation, and Regulatory Incentivisation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Roger Brownsword
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper focuses on those parts of the regulatory environment that are designed to encourage scientific and technological innovation. Patent law is the obvious example; but tax law can also signal encouragement for particular activities. The key question is whether regulators will, or should, withhold tax incentives where there are some, but not universal, moral reservations about an innovation. In order to earth this question, three recent cases at the ECJ, two involving the controversial practice of cord-blood banking, are examined. Insofar as these cases offer any evidence of the prevailing regulatory approach, it seems to be similar to that found in patent law – that is, moral reservations do not count against the applicability of a tax exemption so long as they are not universally recognised.

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 219 - 225
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For a framing discussion, see Brownsword, Roger, Rights, Regulationand the Technological Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Brownsword, Roger and Somsen, Han, “Law, Innovation and Technology: Before We Fast Forward–A Forum for Debate”, 1(1) Law, Innovation and Technology (2009), pp. 1–73.Google Scholar

2 See, e.g., The Royal Academy of Engineering, Synthetic Biology:Public Dialogue on Synthetic Biology (London, June 2009).Google ScholarPubMed

3 See, e.g., Brownsword, Roger, supra note 1, chapter 2.Google Scholar

4 See, e.g., Heller, Michael A. and Eisenberg, Rebecca, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research”, 280(5364) Science (1998), pp. 698 et sqq. Google Scholar; and Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (London, 2002).Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Brownsword, Roger, “Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the ‘Dignitarian Alliance’”, 17(1) University of Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy (2003), pp. 15–51 Google Scholar; and “Stem Cells and Cloning: Where the Regulatory Consensus Fails”, 39 New England Law Review (2005), pp. 535 et sqq.Google Scholar

6 For extensive commentary on the WARF case, see the papers in Plomer, Aurora and Torremans, Paul (eds), Embryonic Stem Cell Patents–European Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009).Google Scholar

7 See Beyleveld, Deryck and Brownsword, Roger, Mice, Morality,and Patents (The Oncomouse Application and Article 53(a) of theEuropean Patent Convention) (London: Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property 1993).Google Scholar

8 Seminally, on regulatory modalities, including fiscal instruments, see Lessig, Lawrence, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books 1999)Google Scholar; and, for elaboration, see Brownsword, Roger, “Red Lights and Rogues: Regulating Human Genetics” in Somsen, Han (ed.), The Regulatory Challenge of Biotechnology (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2007), pp. 39 et sqq.Google Scholar

9 Case C-237/09.

10 Case C-262/08.

11 Case C-86/09.

12 See Case C-237/09, at para. 20; Case C-262/08, at para. 26 and Case C-86/09, at para. 30.

13 Case C-237/09, at para. 2.

14 Ibid., at para. 27.

15 Case C-262/08, at para. 15.

16 In addition to the concerns highlighted in the text, there are questions about both property rights in relation to the cord-blood and attention to the welfare of the child: for an excellent discussion, see Dickenson, Donna, Property in the Body (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), esp. chapter 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 See, e.g., the French National Consultative Ethics Committee (CCNE), Opinion No 74 (December 2002), on Umbilical CordBlood Banks for Autologous Use or for Research. The Opinion is available on the Internet at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/english/start.htm.

18 See EGE, Opinion No 19, 16 March 2004, on Ethical Aspects of Umbilical Cord Blood Banking.

19 Ibid., see para. 2.2 of the Opinion.

20 One of the points made in the French Opinion, note 17 above, is precisely that there needs to be a discussion about the contractual enforceability of cord-blood banking transactions.

21 Case C-262/08, at para. 52.

22 Ibid., at para. 36.

23 Ibid., at para. 28.

24 Ibid., at para. 47.

25 Ibid., at para. 48.

26 Directive 2004/23/EC.

27 For consent, see Article 13 of the Directive; and, generally, see Beyleveld, Deryck and Brownsword, Roger, Consent in the Law (Oxford: Hart 2007).Google ScholarPubMed

28 Case C-86/09, paras. 43–45.

29 See Case C-262/08, CopyGene, para. 30.

30 Case C-262/08.

31 Case C-86/09, para. 51.