Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T11:33:43.841Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Sources and Challenges of Norm Generation in Tort Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2018

Maria LEE
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Tort cases apply particular standards of behaviour to defendants and society, often using common-sense sounding benchmarks such as “reasonableness”. This article explores the ways in which courts establish facts, for the purpose of making a decision on appropriate standards of behaviour, by using sources of authority from the world beyond tort. Facts, rather than being separate from and prior to the application of the legal norms, are often inseparably bound with legal judgment in any particular decision. Two areas of tort law are assessed: some of the English asbestos cases, and the Dutch Urgenda climate change case. The facts required for the setting of, and compliance with, the standard of negligence in these cases are found in a range of external sources, including standards, rules and understandings from scientific bodies, regulators, legal and non-legal documents.

Type
Special Issue on Judge-Made Risk Regulation and Tort Law
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 9 , Special Issue 1: Special Issue on Judge-Made Risk Regulation and Tort Law , March 2018 , pp. 34 - 47
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

University College London. I am grateful to the editors, and other participants at the Judge Made Risk Regulation Workshop, Utrecht 9–10 February 2017 for their very helpful comments on this article.

References

1 Sheila Jasanoff’s work on co-production is very useful here. Jasanoff, See S (ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order (Routledge 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weimer, M and de Ruijter, A (eds), Regulating Risks in the EU – The Co-production of Expert and Executive Power (Hart Publishing forthcoming)Google Scholar; Fisher, E, “Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachussets v EPA ” (2013) 35 Law & Policy 236 Google Scholar.

2 Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 24 June 2015, English translation at <uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196>.

3 So I am not writing about the line of case law arising out of Fairchild, but the more routine cases. Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32.

4 But see eg Gardner, J, “The Negligence Standard: Political not Metaphysical” (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lee, M, “Safety, Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context” (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 555 Google Scholar.

5 Para. 4.43.

6 See the discussion in Lee, M, “The public interest in private nuisance: collectives and communities in tort” (2015) 74 Cambridge Law Journal 329 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 See Fairchild, supra, note 3; and for an odd (Lord Hoffmann was prominent in Fairchild and subsequent cases) but revealing glimpse of the backlash, Hoffmann, Lord, “ Fairchild and After” in A Burrows, D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013)Google Scholar. But this is not considered in this article.

8 Eg Lees, M, “Asbestos in Schools” (2016) Journal of Personal Injury Law 1 Google Scholar.

9 The tort of breach of statutory duty has also been important, including in settlements, see eg Wikeley, N, “Turner & Newall: Early Organizational Responses to Litigation Risk” (1997) 24 JLS 252 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Margereson and Hancock v JW Roberts [1996] PIQR 154 (High Court), 171. See also the decision on the first defendant in Jeromson v Shell Tankers UK Ltd; Dawson v The Cherry Tree Machine Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 101, [2001] PIQR 19, discussed below. But on the demise of breach of statutory duty in the future, see now the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.

10 Blythe v Birmingham (1856) 11 Ex 781, Alderson B, 784.

11 Gardner, J, “The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person” (2015) Law Quarterly Review 563 Google Scholar brings out the extreme openness of this standard.

12 See Gardner’s discussion of the fundamental conceptual ambiguity around the openness, ibid.

13 Gilles, SG, “The Emergence of Cost-benefit Balancing in English Negligence Law” (2002) 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1, 8 Google Scholar.

14 Notwithstanding some efforts by government to engage the TUC, see Wikeley, N, “The Asbestos Regulations 1931: A Licence to Kill?” (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 365 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Although even in 1931 the Chief Inspector of factories described the “dust datum” (discussed below) as “clearly provisional”, see Wikeley, supra, note 14, 368.

16 Wikeley, supra, note 14.

17 European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000 (EEA 2002) 56 Google Scholar.

18 It was once a staple of breach of statutory duty, supra, note 9.

19 Williams, G, “The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort” (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 233 Google Scholar; Blamires v Lancs and Yorks Ry (1873) LR 8 Ex 283.

20 Eg Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Company (The Wagon Mound) (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 617 (PC), 643, Lord Reid.

21 For example, Margereson and Hancock v JW Roberts [1996] PIQR 154 (High Court), 167.

22 [1996] Env LR 304 (CA).

23 Supra, note 9.

24 Report on effects of asbestos dust on the lungs and dust suppression in the asbestos industry (HMSO 1930).

25 Para. 42.

26 Maguire v Harland and Wolff Plc [2005] EWCA Civ 01, [2005] PIQR 21, eg [48], [56]–[57]. See also Rice v Secretary of State for the DBERR [2008] EWHC 3216 (QB).

27 See para. 62.

28 Para. 21.

29 Para. 57.

30 Margereson, supra, note 22, p 307.

31 See especially the High Court decision, 175–76.

32 But note the different approach of Maguire and Jeromson. In Maguire, the silence lets the defendant off the hook, in Jeromson, the emphasis is on a general understanding that asbestos is dangerous, and the silence on the existence of any safe level places responsibility on the defendant to take precautions or seek advice.

33 Supra, note 2.

34 On the tricky interaction with EU law, see Suryapratim, R and Woerdman, E, “Situating Urgenda versus the Netherlands within Comparative Climate Change law” (2016) 34 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 165 Google Scholar.

35 For a broader discussion of the case, see the notes cited herein, plus Lin, J, “The First Successful Climate Negligence Case” (2015) 5 Climate Law 65 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; van Zeben, J, “Establishing a governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?” (2015) 4 Transnational Environmental Law 339 Google Scholar.

36 Graaf, KJ and Jans, JH, “The Urgenda decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change” (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 517 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; L Bergkamp, “The Urgenda judgment: a “victory” for the climate that is likely to backfire”, Energypost (9 September 2015), <energypost.eu/urgenda-judgment-victory-climate-likely-backfire/>, visited 4 January 2018.

37 The application of ordinary negligence in this case may be an important factor in the appeal.

38 Para. 4.3.

39 Para. 4.12.

40 Para. 4.18.

41 Para. 4.22.

42 Para. 4.29.

43 Para. 4.84.

44 Para. 4.86.

45 Para. 4.42.

46 Para. 4.42, also on the EU, para. 4.43.

47 Para. 4.54.

48 I borrow the heading from Sarat, A, Douglas, L, Merrill Umphrey, M (eds), How Law Knows (Stanford University Press 2007)Google Scholar.

49 Supra, note 3.

50 Although that might be the way in which this broader material enters the court room.

51 Fisher, supra, note 1, 251.

52 Supra, note 1.

53 Medical negligence cases are also revealing. Rather than simply deferring (or deciding between) experts put forward by the parties, the courts can refer to guidelines are produced by, for example, the Royal Colleges, societies such as the British Society of Dermatology, pharmaceutical companies, and the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, part of the NHS. See Samanta, A et al, “The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift from the Bolam Standard?” (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 321 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Ministry of Justice v Carter [2010] EWCA Civ 604.

54 Para. 4.65; also eg para. 4.84.

55 Steele, J and Wikeley, N, “Dust on the Streets and Liability for Environmental Cancers” (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 265 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 See eg Fisher, E, Scotford, E and Barritt, E, “The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change” (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 173 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Also Gardner, supra, note 4, on fact and law in the “reasonable person”.

58 Para. 4.22.

59 At p 158. See also Mance LJ’s dissenting judgment in Maguire.

60 Sarewitz, D, “How Science Makes Environmental Controversy Worse” (2004) 7 Environmental Science and Policy 385 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 Para. 4.14.

62 Anderson, K and Bows, A, “Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New World” (2011) 309 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 20 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Oreskes, N, “Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got to Do With It?” (2004) 7 Environmental Science & Policy 369 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 Para. 4.12.

65 On which see CA Miller, “Climate Science and the Making of a Global Political Order” in Jasanoff, supra, note 1.

66 Wynne, B “Strange Weather, Again: Climate Science as Political Art” (2010) 27 Theory, Culture & Society 289, 295 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 “This Agreement … aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change … including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C …”.

68 Eg Anderson and Bows, supra, note 62.

69 Paras. 4.77, 4.86.

70 Note again the historical nature of the discussion. In more contemporary cases, reflecting the greater fragmentation of “regulation” / “governance”, the courts are also turning to private standards, see Lee supra, note 4.

71 Supra, note 17.

72 See also Hale LJ in Jeromson, para. 45.

73 Wikeley, supra, note 14.

74 Jasanoff, S, “Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy” (2015) 93 Texas Law Review 1723, 1725 Google Scholar.

75 Supra, note 1.

76 Supra, note 4: “Nuisance and Regulation in the Court of Appeal” (2013) Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 277.

77 I have not raised all of the dilemmas, of course. The costs to gathering and organising all of this information must be acknowledged, as must the real skill in the knowledge generation in the cases discussed here.

78 “Occupying the Field: Tort and the Pre-Emptive Statute” in Steele, J and Arvind, TT (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature (Hart Publishing, 2012)Google Scholar.

79 “Hunter v Canary Wharf” in P Mitchell and C Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (Hart Publishing, 2010).

80 Supra, note 5.

81 See Graaf and Jans, supra, note 14, on whether Urgenda renders meaningless the provisions of the Dutch constitution limiting the rights for individuals in international law.

82 Oreskes, supra, note 63.

83 Jasanoff, S, “A New Climate for Society” (2010) 27 Theory, Culture and Society 233 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84 Gardner, supra, note 4.