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Sharing Energy

Dealing with Regulatory Disconnection in Dutch Energy Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Anna Butenko
Anna Butenko*
Affiliation:
Energy Law and Economics, Amsterdam Center for Energy, University of Amsterdam and Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University, [email protected].
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Abstract

The sharing economy has become a reality in many sectors, including energy. Energy consumers are increasingly able and willing not only to produce their own energy and thus become prosumers, but also to sell this energy on the local or national energy market along with ‘traditional’ energy market players. Thus, the role of prosumers is de facto extended as to include the parallel roles of consumers, producers, suppliers and traders. Against this background, this article inquires whether it is possible for prosumers to share energy under the current Dutch regulatory framework. This question has been evaluated from the theoretical perspective of the regulatory disconnection between innovation and regulation.

Type
Special Issue on the Risks and Opportunities of the Sharing Economy
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 701 - 716
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016

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28- Self-consumption usually does not exceed 30% for small and medium consumers in the absence of local energy storage. Visie lokale energie (n25), at p. 3.

29- Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption (n16), at p.2.

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31- Congestion is addressed by the distribution system operators (DSO), who finance the grid expansion and renovation though the socialized network tariffs paid by the energy consumers as part of their energy bill.

32- Pront-van Bommel and Buist (n30).

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56- Butenko and Larouche (n19).

57- Butenko and Larouche (n19).

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60- Ranchordás (n49).

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68- Visie op lokale energie (n25) at 3.Total electricity demand in the Netherlands amounted to 412,47 PJ in 2013 according to CBS, see <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=70846NED>, accessed 2 November 2016

69- Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei (n16).

70- This is a policy vision statement of the government, and it therefore does not have the status of a legal document. Visie Lokale Energie (n25).

71- Rijksoverheid, Kamerbrief over visie op locale energie, 8 November 2013, available online (in Dutch) at <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2013/11/08/visie-lokale-energie>, accessed 2 November 2016.

72- Kamerbrief over visie op locale energie (n71).

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76- See Article 95a of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998, and Article 43 of the Dutch Gas Act 2000.

77- See <https://www.acm.nl/nl/onderwerpen/energie/energiebedrijven/vergunning-aanvragen-bij-acm/>, accessed 2 November 2016.

78- See Article 95d.1 of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998.

79- See Article 95b.1 of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998.

80- Futility outcome is described as ‘no change to the existing problem […] regardless of regulatory intervention’. See Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (n52) at 73; Hirschman (n51).

81- See Article 1.1.c of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998, and Article 1.1.o of the Dutch Gas Act 2000.

82- See Article 1.1.g of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998, and Article 1.1.ag of the Dutch Gas Act 2000.

83- See Article 31.1.h and Article 28.3 of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998. This echoes Recital 36 of the Directive 2009/72/EC, which states that ‘transmission and distribution tariffs [should be] non-discriminatory and cost-reflective, and should take account of the long-term, marginal, avoided network costs from distributed generation and demand-side management measures’. See Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC.

84- See Article 1.1.f of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998, and Article 1.1.ah of the Dutch Gas Act 2000.

85- See Article 1.1.h of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998, and Article 1.1.ai of the Dutch Gas Act 2000.

86- See Article 1.7 and Article 1.8 of Regulation 1227/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency.

87- Article 1.1.o of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998.

88- Large market parties usually solve the imbalances created by the injection in the grid of locally produced sustainable electricity by the means of their (usually large) portfolio optimization. Individual prosumers do not have such a portfolio, and therefore could not effectively fulfil the role of a program-responsible party. See Pront-van Bommel and Buist (n31).

89- Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption (n16) at 9-10.

90- See Article 31c of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998.

91- Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption (n16) at 10.

92- See <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/kennis/zelflevering-en-saldering/zelflevering-saldering>, accessed 2 November 2016.

93- See Article 31c of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998.

94- See <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/kennis/zelflevering-en-saldering/zelflevering-saldering>, accessed 2 November 2016.

95- See <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/kennis/verlaagd-tarief-financiering-zonneparken-zelflevering-en-saldering/money-money-money>, accessed 2 November 2016.

96- See <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/kennis/verlaagd-tarief-financiering-zonneparken-zelflevering-en-saldering/money-money-money> (accessed 2 November 2016).

97- Visie op lokale energie (n16), at 18.

98- Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (n52), at 73.

99- Visie op lokale energie (n16).

100- See <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/faq-page#n2305>, accessed 2 November 2016.<http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/initiatieven>, accessed 2 November 2016.

101- Oteman, Marieke, Wiering, Mark and Helderman, Jan-Kees, ‘The institutional space of community initiatives for renewable energy: a comparative case study of the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark’ (2014) 4(11) Energy, Sustainability and Society 7 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; De Proeftuin ‘Decentrale Duurzame Collectieven’ (n25) at 11.

102- See for example <http://www.windvogel.nl/?page_id=5042>, accessed 2 November 2016.

103- See Article 59 of the Dutch Environmental Taxes Act; see also <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/kennis/verlaagd-tarief/de-regeling-het-kort>, accessed 2 November 2016.

104- See Article 59 of the Dutch Environmental Taxes Act; see also <http://www.hieropgewekt.nl/kennis/verlaagd-tarief/de-regeling-het-kort>, accessed 2 November 2016.

105- See <http://040energie.nl/zon/zon-collectief/flinke-terugslag-collectief-salderen/>, accessed 2 November 2016.

106- Visie op lokale energie (n25).

107- Visie op lokale energie (n25) at 18.

108- See Article 7a of the Dutch Electricity Act 1998.

109- Besluit experimenten decentrale duurzame elektriciteitsopwekking, 28 February 2015, available online (in Dutch) at <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0036385>, accessed 2 November 2016.

110- Visie op lokale energie (n25).

111- Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei (n16).

112- Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei (n16), at 84-85.

113- Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei (n16), at 84-85.

114- See Article 7.i., Besluit experimenten decentrale duurzame elektriciteitsopwekking (nl 10).

115- The first category concerns the projects where the distribution network in question remains in the hands of the regional system operators (DSOs). The second category concerns the so called ‘project networks’, owned and operated by the cooperation or association in question. See Article 1, Article 2.1., Article 7.g. Besluit experimenten decentrale duurzame elektriciteitsopwekking (n109).

116- See Articles 10-14, Besluit experimenten decentrale duurzame elektriciteitsopwekking (n109).

117- See Article 6, Besluit experimenten decentrale duurzame elektriciteitsopwekking (n109).

118- See <http://www.rvo.nl/subsidies-regelingen/experimenten-elektriciteitswet/besluiten-ontheffingen>, accessed 2 November 2016.