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Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2018

Peter Viggo Jakobsen ,
Jens Ringsmose  and
Håkon Lunde Saxi
Peter Viggo Jakobsen
Affiliation:
Royal Danish Defence College
Jens Ringsmose*
Affiliation:
Royal Danish Defence College
Håkon Lunde Saxi
Affiliation:
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)
*
*Correspondence to: Dr Jens Ringsmose, Royal Danish Defence College, Ryvangs Allé 1, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark. Author’s email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this article we broaden the conventional understanding of prestige and show that prestige-seeking played a major role in the Danish and Norwegian decisions to provide military support to post-Cold War US-led wars. Both countries made costly military contributions in the hope of increasing their standing and prestige in Washington. Both governments regarded prestige as a form of soft power, which they could later convert into access, influence, and US support. Our findings are far from trivial. They make a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that small powers understand and seek prestige in ways that differ fundamentally from the ways great powers do. They also help to explain why smaller US allies made costly contributions to the Balkan, Afghan, Iraq, and Libyan wars at a time when there was no direct threat to their national security and their security dependence on the United States was low. The high value that small US allies attach to their visibility and prestige in Washington suggests that it is far easier for the United States to obtain military support from smaller allies than Realist studies of burden-sharing and collective action problems would lead us to expect.

Keywords

Coalition-BuildingBurden-SharingDenmarkNorwayPrestigeUS-led Military OperationsSmall StatesRealism
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 256 - 277
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2018 

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32 We thank one of the three reviewers for making this point.

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101 Sofie Prestegård, ‘Utelukker Ikke Skarpe Oppdrag’, Dagsavisen (29 June 2016).

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109 The White House, Fact Sheet: The United States and Norway – NATO Allies and Global Partners (Washington, DC: The White House, 20 October 2011); Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Stoltenberg After Bilateral Meeting (Washington, DC: The White House, 20 October 2011).

110 Quoted in DoD News, ‘Carter Welcomes Norway’s Expansion of Counter-Isil Role’, US Department of Defense (2 May 2016), available at: {http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/747682/carter-welcomes-norways-expansion-of-counter-isil-role} accessed 29 June 2016.

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112 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Kampkraft Og Bærekraft: Langtidsplan for Forsvarssektoren, Proposition to the Storting, No. 151 S (2015–16), pp. 63–5, 68–71.

113 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, Unified Effort (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2015), p. 69.

114 Magnus Lysberg and Simen Tallaksen: ‘Avsløres i hemmelige notater’, Klassekampen (29 August 2016); ‘Advarer mot offensivt forsvar’, Klassekampen (14 September 2016); ‘Hadde ikke penger til alt’, Klassekampen (26 September 2016); Marie Melgård, ’Ikke tatt regningen for Hæren’, Dagsavisen (30 August 2016).

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