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Lawyering compliance with international law: Legal advisers in the ‘War on Terror’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2016

Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz
Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz*
Affiliation:
McGill University
*
*Correspondence to: Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Leacock Building 414, Montreal, QC, H3A 2T7, Canada. Author’s email: [email protected]
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Abstract

According to rationalists and constructivists, compliance with international law occurs to the extent that states see non-compliance as unreasonable or wrong, respectively. An alternative account of compliance points to the practical difficulty of deciding to act contrary to international law. Here non-compliance is blocked rather than morally or instrumentally deterred. This article advances an organisational-process theory of this third kind. The explanatory mechanism lies in the constitutive rules of foreign policymaking, and points to the institutional function of legal advising. Under certain structural conditions (namely, lawyerised decision-making) legal advisers operate as the principal ‘agents of compliance’ within the state, bringing international law into the policymaking process and thus bridging the gap between foreign policy and legal expectations. The theory is applied to the interrogation programme implemented by the United States in the early years of the ‘War on Terror’ (2001–5). While initially violative of international legal standards, the programme eventually shifted towards compliance. Using process tracing, the case study provides fine-grained evidence that corroborates the explanatory power of organisational factors, in general, and legal advising, in particular.

Keywords

International Law ComplianceLegal AdvisersInternational Humanitarian LawWar on Terrorism
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 215 - 238
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2016 

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References

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11 To use Eckstein’s terminology, this is a ‘crucial case study’ – see Eckstein, Harry, ‘Case study and theory in political science’, in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds), The Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79–138Google Scholar.

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14 More on this in the ‘theoretical assumptions’ section later in the article.

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29 Memorandum from John Yoo and Robert Delahunty to William Haynes, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (draft) (9 January 2002), reprinted in Greenberg, Karen and Dratel, Joshua, The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 49Google Scholar.

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35 Memorandum from Jay Bybee to John Rizzo (CIA Acting General Counsel), Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (1 August 2002).

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37 United States Senate (Committee on Armed Services), Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (20 November 2008), pp. xv–xvi.

38 Briefly stated for the purpose of this study, the doctrine asserts that, in times of war, the Commander-in-Chief powers vested in the President by the US Constitution cannot be curtailed by laws inferior to the Constitution – such as federal legislation or international law.

39 Interrogation I, p. 203.

40 Ibid., p. 204. This is contrary to well-established principles of criminal responsibility set forth at Nuremberg (see, for example, US v. Ohlendorf, et al., 1948) and codified in the CAT (art. 2(3)).

41 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, p. 144.

42 US Senate, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. xvii.

43 Memorandum from Jerald Phifer to Michael Dunlavey, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies (11 October 2002), reprinted in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, pp. 227–8.

44 Memorandum from James Hill to Richard Myers, Counter-Resistance Techniques (25 October 2002), reprinted in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, pp. 223–4.

45 Memorandum from William Haynes to Donald Rumsfeld, Counter-Resistance Techniques (27 November 2002), approved by Rumsfeld on 2 December 2002, reprinted in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, p. 237.

46 Ibid., p. 237.

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49 Ibid., p. xix.

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51 Mora memo, pp. 7–8.

52 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld to James Hill, Counter-Resistance Techniques (15 January 2003), and Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld to William Haynes, Detainee Interrogations (15 January 2003), both reprinted in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, pp. 238–9. Also US Senate, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. xxi.

53 Memorandum from John Yoo to William Haynes, Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (314 March 2003) (hereinafter Interrogation II).

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55 Air Force JAG memo I, paras 2 and 3; Air Force JAG memo II, para. 1.c; Marine Corps JAG memo, para. 3.b.

56 Air Force JAG memo I, para. 4; Air Force JAG memo II, para. 2; Marine Corps JAG memo, para. 3.c. Also memorandum from Major General Thomas Romig to Mary Walker, Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (3 March 2003), para. 4; memorandum from Rear Admiral Michael Lohr to Mary Walker, Working Group Recommendations Relating to Interrogation of Detainees (6 February 2003) (hereinafter Navy JAG memo I), para. 3.

57 Air Force JAG memo I, para. 5; Air Force JAG memo II, para. 1.b; Marine Corps JAG memo, para. 3.d; Navy JAG memo I, para. 4.

58 Mora memo, p. 20.

59 Mayer, The Dark Side, pp. 233–4.

60 Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (6 March 2003) (hereinafter Working Group Report), reprinted in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, pp. 241–359. The list of recommended techniques excluded waterboarding.

61 Mora memo, p. 21, fn. 15.

62 Working Group Report, p. 241.

63 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld to James Hill, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (16 April 2003), reprinted in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, pp. 360–5.

64 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, p. 154.

65 Mora memo, p. 21.

66 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, p. 21.

67 See, for example, Bradley, Curtis and Goldsmith, Jack, ‘Customary international law as federal common law: a critique of the modern position’, Harvard Law Review, 110:4 (1997), pp. 815–876CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldsmith, Jack, ‘Should international human rights law trump US domestic law?’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 1:2 (2000), pp. 327–339Google Scholar; Goldsmith, Jack, ‘Liberal democracy and cosmopolitan duty’, Stanford Law Review, 55:5 (2003), pp. 1667–1696Google Scholar.

68 This is not to deny significant differences between Jack Goldsmith and John Yoo on constitutional law, for example in relation to Presidential powers vis-à-vis Congress.

69 Goldsmith The Terror Presidency, p. 167.

70 Ibid., pp. 148–9.

71 Ibid., p. 151.

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73 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, p. 146.

74 Ibid., pp. 157–8.

75 Ibid., p. 153.

76 Letter from Jack Goldsmith to Scott Muller (27 May 2004).

77 US Senate, Committee Study, Executive Summary, pp. 116, 134–9.

78 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, pp. 161–4.

79 Memorandum from Daniel Levin to James Comey, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (30 December 2004) (hereinafter Interrogation III).

80 Interrogation III, p. 17.

81 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, p. 130.

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84 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, establishing the applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Guantánamo detainees. The initial ruling (District Court of Columbia) is from November 2004, still later than the policy reversal.

85 Mayer, The Dark Side, p. 213.

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