Constituent power of the courts, in dialogue, accommodation or even collaboration, has become undeniable. It raises at least two points for scholarship to contemplate. First, what is the foundation of this power in terms of classical constitutional theory? Second, instead of or apart from the courts and their interactions: what is the relationship, in this constituent activity, between the courts and the political institutions, including the people?

We as constitutionalists owe it to ourselves and even to the 500 million other citizens of a member state and of the Union at the same time, to come up with a legally and constitutionally readable understanding of the situation. It must not be one suffering from the split between international and domestic public law. It must not mystify the Union as a completely original structure, intelligible only in its own terms. Such understanding should encompass not only the limits but also the logic of the situation; not only its mechanics but also its evolution. It should be intelligible for the public. It should allow for the multiple dualities of loyalty, of function, of legitimacy. It should allow for shared authority. Constitutional thought is well equipped to deal with actual duality and ambivalence. These characteristics of the Union are real and are here to stay.

The first punctual question arising is how, in its (single) constitutional being, a body such as the Union combines its constituent roots in the original founding authorities (the states) with those, autonomous, in its own institutions. These are the ECJ for interpretation; the political institutions for practice and convention. In other words, what is the actual relationship, under the urge of change, between the states as treaty masters and the European Council, the Council, the Parliament and the Court? Secondly, there is the question as to how these shared constituent roots reflect not on constitutional change but on the day-to-day legislative and executive functioning of the Union's body politic. The coming constitutional settlement on the euro's financial support mechanism will not only consist of a new treaty. It will also take the form of secondary legislation and case-law. A third, most fundamental, question is how this ever-unfinished constitutional situation, imperfect by definition, will ultimately allow the development of a sound relationship between the authorities and the people, a relationship which is at the heart of any constitutional settlement. The last question (for now) sends us back to the one put in a previous editorial (in issue 1 of this year). It is: how to account for this incomplete and urged situation in a single and coherent constitutional reading?

ECtHR in Lautsi v. Italy: Mandatory display of crucifix in public schools violates Convention – Secularism and semi-secularism in the Italian Constitution – Italian High Administrative Court: Display of crucifix affirms principle of secularism – Exclusionary effect of display – ECtHR, religious freedom and margin of appreciation: dark side of consensus – ECtHR finally veritably counter-majoritarian.

1958: a priori review of parliamentary legislation to keep Parliament within its limited legislative competences – 2008: a posteriori review to protect citizens' rights and freedoms – Varieties of concrete review – Originality of the new French procedure – An indirect constitutional complaint: raised by a litigating party, transmitted by an ordinary court and decided by the Constitutional Council – Obstacle to transmission: declaration of conformity in the motives of an earlier decision by Constitutional Council – Conceptual, logical and legal reasons for a strict distinction between normative content and justificatory discourse in judgments – Setting on par of motives and operative part transforms French legal system into a specific form of common law and weakens the Rule of Law

Council Decision of July 2010 to authorize enhanced cooperation for the first time – Planned Regulation on conflicts of law in divorce – Analysis of the application of the substantive and procedural rules applying to the authorization of enhanced cooperation in this case – Links between the planned legislation on this issue and other EU or international rules on related topics – Broader impact of the decision upon the EU legal order

Leipzig 1989: dissolution of the East German state people or Staatsvolk – Karlsruhe 2020: dissolution of the German people – Courts and the people as a neglected constitutional relationship – Bundesverfassungsgericht's versions of the people – Analysis of the concept of people – Forms of action – Political people breaks down into two: original and electoral people – Marbury v. Madison – Duality as a matter of doctrine and principle – Duality in Lissabon Urteil – Conflation and reduction of authority to vote – Subordination of electoral to original people – The Court's logic pushed into motion – Exposing the constitution

Rule of law – Constitutional principle – Meaning – Scope of Application – Justiciability – Audit of the European Union's Constitutional Framework – Lisbon Treaty

Process of EU-driven constitutionalisation – Decision of Romanian Constitutional Court post-EU accession – Nullification of the Lustration Law to pre-accession judiciary reform processes – Lustration elsewhere considered a matter of collective guilt of confrontation with the past – Lustration in Romania related to legislative attempts to reform the judiciary

Services Directive – Peculiar harmonisation technique – Unusual design – Key provisions giving rise to constitutional problems – Special derogation system – Freezing of the Rule of Reason – (In)compatibility with EU primary law – Appropriate legal basis? – Non–transposition by several member states – Arguments for a benign assessment of the Commission and the Court – Problematic enforcement in horizontal situations – Possible solutions and their shortcomings – Overall need for a flexible approach

Nation-state formation – Holy Roman Empire – Dissolution and realignment – Spain, fragmented – Reconquista – Charles V – Wars of succession – Centralisation under house of Bourbon – Napoleon – Spanish war of independence – History of the Cortes – Constitution of Cádiz – Weakness of Spanish Constitutionalism – German Confederation – Monarchical principle in Vienna Final Act – Old and new ideas of sovereignty – Metternich and fear of revolution – March revolution – Bismarckian empire as constitutional monarchy – Degeneration of the Reich – Exit the Kings – Enter Juan Carlos

‘Foreign relations power’ (auswärtige Gewalt) in the Federal Republic of Germany strongly centralised by the Lindau Agreement in 1957 – Although the German Länder still retain some rights to act at an international level, the Federal Government is the dominant player in the foreign relations of the state – Introduction of Länder participation in European Union law-making and policy-making; new opportunities for them to perform a role in external relations – Cooperative character of German federalism confirmed

Modern age technology spurs legal development – Temporal coincidence of conflicting national and Union legislative processes triggers interdependence between EU and member states – French Loi Hadopi cuts Internet without recourse to a court – Conseil constitutionnel enshrines Internet as fundamental freedom – EU telecoms reform incorporates several French fundamental rights safeguards

On 22 December 2009, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: the Court) issued a judgment on the applications filed by two citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Dervo Sejdić and Mr Jakob Finci. It found a violation of their rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and under the Protocols to the Convention. Bosnia and Herzegovina had violated the applicants' rights under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Arcelor ruling – Legal pluralism in European integration – Judicial law-making transcending hierarchy – Role of courts for legal unity – Autonomy of courts under different mandates – Joint responsibility for legal coherence – Councils of State Report 2008 – Reversal of method of reference – Cilfit and Köbler prevent headway – Horizontal cooperation between national judges

On 4 March 2010 the Court of Justice of the European Union issued its first judgment on the conformity with EU law of national provisions implementing Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification. In the case Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken the Court had to rule on the Dutch implementing measures concerning resource requirements and the concepts of family reunification and family formation.

Broad concept of constitutional jurisdiction – Triangle between Karlsruhe, Strasbourg and Luxembourg – European vocation of the German Constitutional Court and Basic Law – European Convention on Human Rights – Karlsruhe decisions can be reviewed in Strasbourg – Human rights-related constitutional court – European Court of Justice developed into constitutional court of the Union – Verbund between three courts – No simplistic hierarchy – Verbund techniques – Dialogue in Human Rights; Interplay in Integration – Federal Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights functionally comparable – Both Courts seek substantive coherence as Verbund technique – Federal Constitutional Court commits all German authorities to the Convention – Federal Constitutional Court and ECJ – Principle of openness to European Law – Sharing and assigning responsibilities in complex system – Solange, ultra vires and identity review – Responsibility for integration, due by Court and other German bodies – Federal Court contributes to common European Constitutional order – Europe-wide discursive struggle and ‘Lernverbund’

Five language rights models: human rights model, ‘old’ minority rights model, ‘new’ minority rights model, indigenous peoples rights model, and official-language rights model – Different philosophical and legal foundations and very different concerns: personal autonomy and development, social integration and cohesion, ethnocultural preservation, and political integration – Sociological and historical context of each state is key factor in the type of linguistic accommodation sought by minorities

For over 30 years the French Conseil d'Etat has maintained that it is impossible to rely on EC Directives before French administrative courts in a complaint filed against an individual administrative act. This in spite of the Court of Justice's well known case-law that directives under certain conditions can have direct effect, as was first recognized in SpA SACE v Finance Minister of the Italian Republic of 17 December 1970 and confirmed by Van Duyn v Home Office of 4 December 1974.

On 22 November 2005 the European Court of Justice (hereafter, the Court) rendered its Mangold-ruling on Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (hereafter, Directive 2000/78). The most striking part of this judgment, rendered in a private dispute, was the following conclusion:

Community law and, more particularly, Article 6(1) of (…) Directive 2000/78/EC (…) must be interpreted as precluding a provision of domestic law such as that at issue in the main proceedings (…) It is the responsibility of the national court to guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with Community law, even where the period prescribed for transposition of that directive has not yet expired.

The judgment evoked a great amount of criticism from the media, academia, several advocates general and the member states.