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When Anti-Politics Becomes Political: What can the Italian Five Star Movement Tell us about the Relationship Between Populism and Legalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2019

Lucia Corso
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Abstract

Populist politicians have to deal with a foundational paradox, i.e. ruling without being contaminated by the corrupting influence of power - Strategies to shield populists’ political actions from the accusations that populist parties have flung against pre-existing elites – The Italian Five Star Movement as a populist political discourse resorting to legalist strategies – Legalism as a way of introducing political reforms as mandatory actions, required by some sort of exclusionary, pre-existing legal rule rather than the product of ideological confrontation and political compromise – Populism as an anti-political response to factionalism – Lottery system, absolute neutrality and the end of politics

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Articles
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 462 - 487
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© 2019 The Authors 

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Footnotes

*

Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of Enna ‘Kore’, Sicily.

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40 The so-called Decreto Sicurezza and Decreto Sicurezza bis, see also Law n. 132, 1 December 2018.

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43 Although there are several reasons for the substantial slow-down of public procurements in cities throughout Italy, the situation of the Municipality of Rome, which is governed by a Five Star Mayor, has become particularly serious.

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57 The internal regulations of each House of the Parliament currently provide that any Bill presented pursuant to Art. 71 must be taken into consideration. The Senate regulation even prescribes a timeline, see Reg. Camera, Art. 104, co. 4; Reg. Senato, Art. 74, co. 2 e 3.

58 A.C. n. 3124.

59 Report accompanying the reform, 〈documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg18/lavori/stampati/pdf/18PDL0028960.pdf〉, visisted 12 August 2019.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 See 〈www.lacostituzione.info/index.php/2019/05/16/riforma-della-costituzione-lintroduzione-del-referendum-propositivo-invito-al-dibattito/〉, visited 12 August 2019.

63 M. Luciani, ‘Referendum e forma di governo’, in Associazione per gli studi e le ricerche parlamentari, Quaderno n. 7, Seminario 1996, Torino, Giappichelli, 1997, p. 97.

64 S. Rodriguez, ‘I limiti della democrazia diretta. L’iniziativa popolare nell’esperienza svizzera e statunitense, con uno sguardo all’Italia’, Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. (2017) p. 451.

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66 R. Bin, ‘Riforma della Costituzione: l’introduzione del referendum propositivo’, in Itinerari Costituzionali, at 〈www.lacostituzione.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Incontro-cattolica-RB.mp3〉, visited 22 August 2019.

67 I am referring to the so-called caso Diciotti, see 〈questionegiustizia.it/doc/trib_catania_decreto_salvini.pdf〉, visited 12 August 2019.

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72 Paul Blokker makes the opposite argument with regard to right-wing populist movements in Eastern-Central Europe. Blokker argues that populist engagement with the law in Eastern-Central Europe includes a reaction to what is portrayed as legal fundamentalism or an excessive juridification of society: Blokker, supra n. 47. I will take such a diversity of opinions to be evidence of the variety of populist movements’ performance in power.

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76 Matthew 5:3.

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88 See, for example, the debates on the concept of the people, which result from the conference called Sum, organised on a yearly basis by Casaleggio and Associati. For Sum#03, see 〈www.gianrobertocasaleggio.com/sum-2019/〉, visited 12 August 2019.

89 H. Kelsen, La democrazia [1929] (Il Mulino 1981).

90 Urbinati, supra n. 36.

91 Krygier, supra n. 14.

92 The literature on the inner morality of law is ample. For formal morality, see L Fuller, The Inner Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1965); for the opinion that the rule of law incorporates thicker moral principles, see, for example, T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books 2011); see also the Rule of Law Checklists issued by the Venice Commission in March 2016, 〈www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)007-e〉, visited 12 August 2019.

93 Krygier, supra n. 14; see also Krygier, supra n. 45.

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