¹ ECtHR 23 February 2016, Case No. 44883/09, Nasr and Ghali v Italy.

² Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’, Executive Summary, 3 December 2014 (approved on 13 December 2012; updated for release on 3 April 2014), <www.fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf>, visited 22 December 2016. See Central Intelligence Agency, Memo to the Department of Justice Command Centre, ‘Background Paper on CIA’s Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques’, 30 December 2004, <www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc97.pdf>, visited 22 December 2016. Upon taking office, President Obama ordered a thorough review of interrogation techniques used by US federal officials against suspected terrorists: see Executive Order No. 13491 (74 Fed. Reg. 4893), 22 January 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov>, visited 22 December 2016.

³ ECtHR 13 December 2012, Case No. 39630/09, El-Masri v Macedonia [Grand Chamber].

⁴ In general, on extraordinary renditions and related judicial outcomes, see Vedaschi, A., ‘Extraordinary Renditions: esiste una giustizia transnazionale?’ [Extraordinary Renditions: Does a Transnational Justice Exist?], 4 Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo (2013) p. 1255 Google Scholar at p. 1292 and doctrine cited therein; Fisher, L., ‘Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy’, 57 American University Law Review (2008) p. 1405 Google Scholar at 1421; Satterthwaite, M.L., ‘Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law’, 75 George Washington Law Review (2007) p. 1333 Google Scholar at p. 1355; Weissbrodt, D. and Bergquist, A., ‘Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention’, 46 Virginia Journal of International Law (2006) p. 585 at p. 593 Google Scholar; Weissbrodt, D. and Bergquist, A., ‘Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis’, 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2006) p. 123 Google Scholar at p. 128.

⁵ D. Jenkins, ‘The Long Decade’, and Scheinin, M., ‘Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from a Long Decade’, both in D. Jenkins et al. (eds.), The Long Decade (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 3 Google Scholar and p. 289 respectively; Vedaschi, A., ‘Has the Balancing of Rights Given Way to a Hierarchy of Values?’, 1 Comparative Law Review (2010) p. 1 Google Scholar at p. 34; T. Groppi (ed.), Democrazia e terrorismo. Diritti fondamentali e sicurezza dopo l’11 settembre 2001 [Democracy and Terrorism. Fundamental Rights and Security Post-9/11] (Editoriale Scientifica 2006).

⁶ Open Society, ‘Globalizing Torture. CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition’, New York, Open Society Foundation, 2013, <www.opensocietyfoundations.org>, visited 22 December 2016; Amnesty International, ‘Open Secret. Mounting Evidence of Europe’s Complicity in Rendition and Secret Detention’, London, Amnesty International Publications, 2010; Amnesty International, ‘Torture and Secret Detention: Testimony of the “Disappeared” in the “War on Terror”’, August 2005, AI Index: AMR 51/108/2005, <www.amnesty.ie>, visited 22 December 2016.

⁷ Tribunal of Milan, criminal section IV, decision 4 November 2009, No. 12428. In the Italian framework, prosecution is compulsory, so that, when crimes exist, public prosecutors – who are independent from the government – have the duty to initiate criminal proceedings (Art. 112 of the Italian Constitution).

⁸ Law 3 August 2007, No. 124 on Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic and New Provisions Governing State Secret Privilege, in Official Journal, 13 August 2007, No. 187. The Act in force was amended by Law No. 133/2012. See Art. 40(2-5) of Law No. 124/2007 and Art. 202 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code. If the Prime Minister denies the existence of any state secret (or lets the 30-day deadline lapse without responding to a request made by judicial authorities), material useful to the case can be used as evidence at the criminal trial. See Art. 41(3 and 5) of Law No. 124/2007.

⁹ See Art. 134 of the Italian Constitution, which calls upon the Constitutional Court to resolve disputes concerning the allocation of powers between the branches of government. See infra n. 18.

¹⁰ Italian Constitutional Court, decision 11 March 2009, No. 106.

¹¹ Court of Appeal of Milan, criminal section III, decision 15 December 2010, No. 3688.

¹² Nonetheless, per Art. 17(2) of Law No. 24/2007, actions committed by intelligence services that involve ‘endangering or injuring the life, physical integrity, personal dignity, personal freedom, moral freedom, health or safety of one or more persons’ are never included in any special reasons of exoneration of responsibility.

¹³ Court of Cassation, criminal section V, decision 19 September 2012, No. 46340. See Vedaschi, A., ‘La Cassazione solleva il “sipario nero” calato dalla Consulta: il caso Abu Omar si riapre’ [The Court of Cassation Lifts the Curtain Placed by the Constitutional Court: the Abu Omar Case Reopens], 1 Percorsi costituzionali (2013) p. 163 Google Scholar at p. 194.

¹⁴ Court of Appeal of Milan, criminal section IV, decision 3 April 2013, No. 985.

¹⁵ Italian Constitutional Court, decision 19 February 2014, No. 24. Vedaschi, A., ‘Il segreto di Stato resta senza giudice’ [The State Secret Privilege Remains Without a Judge], 1 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (2014) p. 394 Google Scholar at p. 400. See also decision 21 November 2011, No. 40.

¹⁶ Pace, A., ‘Le due Corti e il caso Abu Omar’ [The Two Courts and the Abu Omar Case], 1 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (2014) p. 389 Google Scholar at p. 394.

¹⁷ A. Spataro, ‘Abuse of State Secrecy and National Security’, Tbilisi Report, 16 September 2010, <www.assembly.coe.int>, visited 22 December 2016; T. Scovazzi, ‘Considerazioni in tema di segreto di Stato e gravi violazioni dei diritti umani’ [Considerations on State Secret Privilege and Gross Violations of Human Rights], in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Individuals Rights and International Justice (Giuffrè 2009) p. 885.

¹⁸ Pursuant to Art. 134 of the Italian Constitution, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to settle those conflicts that may arise – inter alia – between different ‘powers’ within the constitutional structure of the state (e.g. the executive branch and the judiciary). Where one of these ‘powers’ considers that another one did, in fact, violate or interfere with its own competences under the Constitution, it may ask the Court for a ruling intended to cause such violation or interference to cease. Disputes between the executive power and judicial authorities are generally rare and – in any case – they usually appear once within a sole judicial proceeding. By contrast, within the Abu Omar case, ‘conflicts of powers’ were raised (by the judiciary against the executive branch and vice versa) seven times within a sole criminal proceeding. This circumstance underlines the sensitive nature of the issues at stake. See supra n. 9.

¹⁹ In general, defendants may easily resort to their constitutional right ‘to remain silent’ pursuant to Art. 208 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 361/1998.

²⁰ See infra n. 29.

²¹ See supra n. 12. By Italian law, when agents of intelligence services endanger or injure ‘life, physical integrity, personal dignity, personal freedom …’ they are never exonerated from their responsibility, since such actions can, under no circumstance, be authorised legitimately.

²² Italian Constitutional Court, decision 11 March 2009, No. 106, ‘Considerato in diritto’ para. 3.

²³ Law No. 124/2007 replaced Law No. 801/1977, which was adopted following the Italian Constitutional Court, decisions No. 82/1976 and No. 86/1977.

²⁴ Supra n. 23.

²⁵ Constitutional case law of the 1970s insists on Art. 52 of the Italian Constitution (marginally Arts. 87 and 126), then touches on Arts. 1 and 5 of the Italian Constitution, before explicitly referring to a set of articles and not only on one article. Italian constitutional scholars are divided on the issue of the constitutional basis of the state secret privilege. For a general overview, see Vedaschi, A., ‘ Arcana Imperii and Salus Rei Publicae: State Secrets Privilege and the Italian Legal Framework’, in D. Cole et al., Secrecy, National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Elgar 2013) p. 95 Google Scholar at p. 97.

²⁶ Art. 40 of Law No. 124/2007 and Art. 202(8) of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code.

²⁷ Italian Constitutional Court, decision 11 March 2009, No. 106, ‘Considerato in diritto’ paras. 8.1-8.4, 12.5. See Art. 39(1) of Law No. 124/2007: ‘The records, documents, information, activities and every other thing the disclosure of which may be used to damage the integrity of the Republic (including in relation to international agreements, the defence of its underlying institutions as established by the Constitution, the State’s independence vis à vis other states and its relations with them, as well as its military preparation and defence), shall have State-secret status’.

²⁸ Art. 39(11) of Law No. 124/2007, which expressly forbids placing the seal of state secrecy on documents, information or matters relating to acts of terrorism or acts that may endanger the constitutional order: ‘In no circumstances shall information, documents or matters relating to acts of terrorism, acts subverting the constitutional order or acts constituting the criminal offences referred to under articles 285, 416-bis, 416-ter and 422 of the Criminal Code, have State-secret status’.

²⁹ A number of supranational bodies, such as the ECtHR (see infra n. 33), the European Parliament (see Temporary Committee on the ‘alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners’, Fava Report, <www.europarl.europa.eu>, visited 22 December 2016) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States’, AS/Jur (2006) 16 Part II, 12 June 2006, PACE Doc. 10957-Marty Report I; and ‘Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States’, AS/Jur (2007) 36, 11 June 2007, PACE Doc. 11302-Marty Report II, <www.assembly.coe.int>, visited 22 December 2016) have repeatedly classified such practice as a serious violation of fundamental human rights and human dignity in particular.

³⁰ A. Pace, ‘I “fatti eversivi dell’ordine costituzionale” nella legge n. 801 del 1977 e nella legge n. 124 del 2007’ [The Facts Contrary to the Constitutional Order in the Law No. 801 of 1977 and in the Law No. 124 of 2007], 2 Costituzionalismo.it (2009), <www.costituzionalismo.it>, visited 22 December 2016. Contra Anzon, A., ‘Il segreto di Stato ancora una volta tra Presidente del Consiglio, autorità giudiziaria e Corte Costituzionale’ [The Return of the State Secret Privilege Between Prime Minister, Judicial Authority and Constitutional Court], 2 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (2009) p. 1020 Google Scholar at p. 1031.

³¹ See Vedaschi, A., ‘Il segreto di Stato tra tradizione e innovazione: novità normative e recenti evoluzioni giurisprudenziali’ [The State Secret Privilege Between Tradition and Innovation: Developments in Legislative News and Recent Case Laws], 3 Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo (2012) p. 978 Google Scholar at p. 995. See also ECtHR 9 September 2009, Case No. 72094/01, Kavasanica v Slovakia, § 79 and ECtHR 22 October 2009, Case No. 69519/01, Pasko v Russia.

³² The Parliamentary Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services – a political body made up of five deputies and five senators and presided over by a member of the opposition – submits a report to the plenary Assembly of Parliament in order to call for its oversight on state secrecy: Arts. 30 and 31, Law No. 124/2007 as modified by Law No. 133/2012.

³³ El-Masri v Macedonia [Grand Chamber] supra n. 3; see also ECtHR 27 April 2014, Case No. 28761/11, Al-Nashiri v Poland; ECtHR 24 July 2014, Case No. 7511/13, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland. Those decisions embrace the stance of the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly on this controversial counter-terrorism measure, see supra n. 29.

³⁴ As the Court has already done in other cases of extraordinary renditions, it derogated from the rule by which the burden of proof is on the claimant (affirmanti incumbit probatio) since in such circumstances it should be easier for national authorities to defend themselves against the alleged violations of the Convention. When there is substantial, precise and consistent evidence in favour of the version of the claimant and in the lack of a convincing explanation provided by national authorities, the Court shall embrace the victim’s version.

³⁵ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy, supra n. 1, § 286.

³⁶ See ECtHR 17 January 2012, Case No. 8139/09, Othman v the United Kingdom, § 233.

³⁷ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy, supra n. 1, § 242-243 and 288. In the Court’s words: 242 ‘Selon la jurisprudence constante de la Cour, la décision d’un État contractant de renvoyer un fugitif – et a fortiori le renvoi lui-même – peut soulever un problème au regard de l’article 3, et donc engager la responsabilité de l’État en cause au titre de la Convention, lorsqu’il y a des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire que l’intéressé, si on le renvoie vers le pays de destination, y courra un risque réel d’être soumis à un traitement contraire à cette disposition […]. 243. Dans le contexte des affaires similaires relatives à des opérations de “remise extraordinaire” […] la Cour a aussi souligné que, lorsqu’il est établi que l’État qui renvoie savait, ou aurait dû savoir, à l’époque des faits que la personne renvoyée du territoire faisait l’objet d’une “remise extraordinaire” […], la possibilité d’une violation de l’article 3 est sérieuse et doit être considérée comme un élément intrinsèque du transfert’. Similarly, in El Masri v Macedonia (supra n. 3, § 218), the Court held that ‘[…] there were serious reasons to believe that, if the applicant was to be transferred into US custody under the “rendition” programme, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. Consequently, it must be concluded that the Macedonian authorities knew or ought to have known, at the relevant time, that there was a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.’

³⁸ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy, supra n. 1, § 289-290.

³⁹ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy, supra n. 1, § 288.

⁴⁰ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy, supra n. 1, §§ 265 and 267.

⁴¹ Despite the existence of a dedicated agreement between the US and Italy itself: on 13 October 1983 Italy and the US signed a bilateral agreement on mutual extradition, which on 3 May 2006 was modified and subsequently ratified. However, on 5 October 2015 the CIA agent, Sabrina De Sousa, was arrested in Portugal on the grounds of a European arrest warrant forwarded by the Public Prosecutor of Milan. On 12 January 2016, the Court of Appeal of Lisbon ruled in favour of her extradition to Italy and the decision was upheld by the Portuguese Supreme Court on 11 April 2016. De Sousa’s final appeal to the Constitutional Court of Portugal was rejected on 8 June 2016.

⁴² See ECtHR 9 February 1995, Case No. 16616/90, Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v the Netherlands; ECtHR 24 July 2008, Case No. 1365/07, C.G. v Bulgaria, § 40. Cf. ECtHR 10 December 2007, Case No. 69698/01, Stoll v Switzerland [Grand Chamber], §§ 107 and 111.

⁴³ Vedaschi, A., ‘Globalization of Human Rights and Mutual Influence between Courts: the Innovative Reverse Path of the Right to the Truth’, in S. Shetreet (ed.), Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace (Nijhoff-Brill 2014) p. 107 Google Scholar at p. 114; Fabbrini, F., ‘The European Court of Human Rights, Extraordinary Renditions and the Right to the Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations Committed in the Fight Against Terrorism’, 14 Human Rights Law Review (2014) p. 85 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 99.

⁴⁴ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy supra n. 1, § 268. A. Vedaschi, ‘Cronaca di una condanna annunciata: Abu Omar a Strasburgo, l’ultimo atto’ [Chronicle of a Conviction Foretold: Abu Omar at Strasbourg, the Ultimate Ruling], in 1 DPCE online (2016), <www.dpce.it/dpceonline12016/>, visited 22 December 2016; Scovazzi, T., ‘Segreto di Stato e diritti umani: il sipario nero sul caso “Abu Omar”’ [State Secret Privilege and Human Rights: the Black Curtain over the Abu Omar Case], 1 Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale (2016) p. 157 Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Nasr and Ghali v Italy supra n. 1, § 269.

⁴⁶ It is worth noting that the Guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stressed that ‘impunity must be fought for as a matter of justice for the victims, as a deterrent to prevent new violations and to uphold the rule of law and public trust in the justice system’: Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law, ‘Eradicating Impunity for Serious Human Rights Violations’, H/Inf(2011)7’, <www.coe.int/justice>, visited 3 September 2016.

⁴⁷ See Nasr and Ghali v Italy supra n. 1, § 272.

⁴⁸ More precisely, on 5 April 2013 the President of the Republic pardoned one of the convicted American officers (Colonel Joseph L. Romano). On 23 December 2015, the other convicted US citizens were pardoned (Betnie Medero for the entire sanction and Robert S. Lady for two years, so that his punishment was reduced from nine to seven years’ imprisonment).