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The size and structure of the European Commission: legal issues surrounding project teams and a (future) reduced College

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 March 2018

Robert Böttner
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Abstract

European Commission – Size of the Commission – Presidentialisation – President’s power of organisation – Principle of collegiality – Responsibility of the College at large – Reorganisation of the Commission – Balance between efficiency and member state representation – Legality of project teams – Rotation of voting rights in EU law – System of rotation for the European Commission

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Articles
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 37 - 61
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Copyright © The Authors 2018 

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Footnotes

*

Dipl.-Jur. Robert Böttner, BA, LLM, Research Fellow at the German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, at the Chair for Public Law, European Law and Public International Law. The author would like to thank the reviewers as well as Professor Dr Michael W. Bauer (University of Speyer) and his team for their helpful comments to an earlier version of this article.

References

1 I.e., the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and their successors.

2 See Art. 4(1) of Protocol No. 10 on the enlargement of the European Union, O.J. 2001 C 80/49. In fact, the ECSC Treaty as well as the Merger Treaty already provided for this option.

3 Art. 4(2) of Protocol No. 10.

4 Fifteen was long considered the ideal number of Commissioners. See Schmidt, F. and Schmitt von Sydow, H., ‘Artikel 17 EUV’, in H. von der Groeben et al. (eds.), Europäisches Unionsrecht, 7th edn. (Nomos 2015) para. 107 Google Scholar, with further references.

5 From a critical viewpoint Craig, P., ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance’, 33(2) European Law Review (2008) p. 137 Google Scholar at p. 155; cf also Ponzano, P., ‘La Commissione europea; composizione e ruolo nel sistema istituzionale dell’Unione’, Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea (2004) p. 501 at p. 502Google Scholar.

6 Commission Communication, A Constitution for the Union – Opinion of the Commission, pursuant to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Conference of representatives of the Member States’ governments convened to revise the Treaties, COM(2003) 548 final, p. 5.

7 See Martenczuk, B., ‘Artikel 17 EUV’, in E. Grabitz et al. (eds.), Das Recht der EU (CH Beck 2016) para. 80 with further referenceGoogle Scholar.

8 European Council, 11-12 December 2008 (Doc. 17271/1/08) and 18-19 June 2009 (Doc. 11225/2/09).

9 European Council Decision 2013/272/EU of 22 May 2013 concerning the number of members of the European Commission, OJ 2013 L 165/98. Interestingly, compared to the system foreseen by the Treaty of Nice, the European Council could (theoretically) even decide on a number of Commissioners that exceeds the number of Member States.

10 Szapiro, M., The European Commission – A Practical Guide (John Harper Publishing 2013) p. 36 Google Scholar.

11 Cf Bertoncini, Y. and Vitorino, A., ‘The Commission Reform: Between Efficiency and Legitimacy’, Notre Europe Policy Paper 115 (2014) p. 4 Google Scholar.

12 Szapiro, supra n. 10, at p. 38.

13 Schmidt and Schmitt von Sydow, supra n. 4, at para. 109; see also Dougan, M., ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts’, 45 Common Market Law Review (2008) p. 617 at p. 695Google Scholar; Müller-Graff, P.-C., ‘Der Vertrag von Lissabon auf der Systemspur des Europäischen Primärrechts’, 2 integration (2008) p. 123 at p. 129Google Scholar; Braukmann, P., Die EU-Kommissare (Peter Lang 2015) p. 32 Google Scholar.

14 Temple Lang, J., ‘How much do the smaller Member States need the European Commission?, The role of the Commission in a changing Europe’, 39 Common Market Law Review (2002) p. 315 at p. 319Google Scholar; Stancanelli, P., ‘La Commission et le traité de Lisbonne’, 1 Revue des affaires européennes (2009-2010) p. 11 at p. 19Google Scholar; Bertoncini, Y. and Vitorino, A., ‘Reforming Europe’s Governance for a more legitimate and effective Federation of Nation States’, 105 Notre Europe Studies & Reports (2014) p. 48 Google Scholar; Ponzano, supra n. 5, at p. 514.

15 de Schoutheete, P., ‘Institutional Reform in the EU’, 19 European Policy Brief (2014) p. 6 Google Scholar.

16 Schmidt and Schmitt von Sydow, supra n. 4, at para. 107; see also Di Bucci, V. and Martenczuk, B., ‘Articolo 17 TUE’, in C. Curti Gialdino (ed.), Codice dell’Unione europea operativo. TUE e TFUE commentati articolo per articolo (Simone 2012) p. 214 Google Scholar; Frenz, W., Handbuch Europarecht, Vol. 6 (Springer 2011) para. 1103 Google Scholar; Nugent, N. and Rhinhard, M., The European Commission (Palgrave 2015) p. 98 Google Scholar.

17 Schmidt and Schmitt von Sydow, supra n. 4, at para. 108.

18 See Frenz, supra n. 16, at para. 1104, with further reference.

19 Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 97.

20 Cf also Di Bucci and Martenczuk, supra n. 16, at p. 214.

21 ECJ 11 July 2006, Case C-432/04, Cresson, ECLI:EU:C:2006:455, para. 71.

22 In this context, it may be misleading that some language versions of the Treaties in Art. 244 TFEU speak of the Commissioners ‘mandates’ (DE: Mandate; FR: mandats; ES: mandatos; IT: mandati); the English version more precisely refers to ‘terms of office’.

23 See, among others, Calliess, C., Die neue Europäische Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon (Mohr Siebeck 2010) p. 144 Google Scholar; Hatje, A. and von Förster, S., ‘§ 10 Organordnung der Europäischen Union’, in A. Hatje and P.-C. Müller-Graff (eds.), Enzyklopädie Europarecht, Band I: Europäisches Organisations- und Verfassungsrecht (Nomos 2014) para. 132 Google Scholar; Epping, V., ‘Artikel 244 AEUV’, in R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 2nd edn. (CH Beck 2011) para. 2 Google Scholar; see also Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 96.

24 Ponzano, supra n. 5, at p. 503.

25 Bertoncini and Vitorino, supra n. 11, at p. 6; Szapiro, supra n. 10, at p. 38.

26 Cf Nemitz, P.F., ‘Artikel 17 EUV’, in J. Schwarze et al. (eds.), EU-Kommentar, 3rd edn. (Nomos 2012) para. 59 Google Scholar; Ponzano, supra n. 5, at p. 512; however, Frenz, supra n. 16, at para. 1101, points out that a comparison with national governments is only of limited value as they are structurally different.

27 de Schoutheete, supra n. 15, at p. 5.

28 Commission Communication, supra n. 6, at p. 5 ff.

29 Commission Communication, supra n. 6, at p. 6.

30 Christiansen, T., ‘The European Commission: the European executive between continuity and change’, in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union – Power and Policy Making, 3rd edn. (Routledge 2006) p. 99 at p. 114Google Scholar.

31 Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 121.

32 Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 98. On the idea, see also Bertoncini and Vitorino, supra n. 14, at p. 43 ff.

33 See Press Release IP/14/984 of 10 September 2014, Annex 2, and MEMO/14/523 of 10 September 2014, p. 3 ff.

34 Cf Bertoncini and Vitorino, supra n. 14, at p. 46; Borchardt, M., ‘A political European Commission through a new organisation – ‘This time it’s different’. Really?’, 180 Notre Europe Policy Paper (2016) p. 6 Google Scholar.

35 Cf Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 3.

36 Letter from President-elect of the European Commission J.-C. Juncker to EP President M. Schulz of 25 September 2014, p. 1.

37 Cf Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 11.

38 Letter from President-elect of the European Commission J.-C. Juncker to EP President M. Schulz of 25 September 2014; on the new structure see also Brauneck, J., ‘EU-Kommission: Ist die neue Macht der Vizepräsidenten unionsrechtswidrig?’, 21 Die öffentliche Verwaltung (2015) p. 904 at p. 904Google Scholar, with examples of how this new design would affect the Commission’s functioning.

39 Communication from the President to the Commission of 11 November 2014, The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019, C(2014) 9004, p. 5; see also A. Hofmann, ‘Europäische Kommission’, in Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration (Nomos 2015) p. 95 at p. 96. It should be noted that the Work Programme is established by the Commission at large, but only in accordance with the President’s political guidelines (Art. 2 of the Rules of Procedure). The agenda is adopted by the President alone (Art. 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure).

40 Cf Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 5.

41 Bürgin, A., ‘Intra- and Inter-Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President: An Assessment of Juncker’s Organizational Reform’, Journal of Common Market Studies (2017) p. 1 at p. 7-9Google Scholar.

42 See also Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 16.

43 Schmidt and Schmitt von Sydow, supra n. 4, at para. 117; cf also Bauer, M.W. and Becker, S., ‘Die Europäische Kommission unter Jean-Claude Juncker – Eine Zwischenbilanz’, 38(4) integration (2015) p. 292 at p. 299)Google Scholar.

44 Martenczuk, supra n. 7, at para. 93.

45 More precisely, the second subparagraph of Art. 17(6) TEU provides: ‘A member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests’.

46 Rules of Procedure of the Commission, C(2000) 3614, OJ 2000 L 308/26, as amended by Commission Decision 2011/737 of 9 November 2011, OJ 2011 L 296/58.

47 C(2014) 9004 of 11 November 2014.

48 Martenczuk, supra n. 7, at para. 99a.

49 Nemitz, supra n. 26, at para. 65.

50 Adam, R., ‘Articolo 17 TUE’, in A. Tizzano (ed.), Trattati dell’Unione europea (Cedam 2014)Google Scholar point IX.4; cf also E. Gianfrancesco, in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds.), The Treaty on European Union (TEU) – A Commentary (Springer 2013) para. 125 ff.

51 Szapiro, supra n. 10, at p. 28.

52 See Rule 118 and Annex XVI of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

53 Cf Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 117; Mistò, M., ‘La collégialité de la Commission europénne’, 1 Revue du Droit de l’Union Europénne (2003) p. 189 at p. 212 ffGoogle Scholar.

54 Thiele, C., Regeln und Verfahren der Entscheidungsfindung innerhalb von Staaten und Staatenverbindungen (Springer 2008) p. 139 Google Scholar.

55 Martenczuk, supra n. 7, at para. 94.

56 With a different point of view Nemitz, P.F., ‘Europäische Kommission: Vom Kollegialprinzip zum Präsidialregime?’, 5 Europarecht (1999) p. 678 at p. 681Google Scholar.

57 ECJ 23 September 1986, Case 5/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1986:328, para. 30; ECJ 15 June 1994, Case C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1994:247, paras. 62-63; ECJ 29 September 1998, Case C-191/95, Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1998:441, para. 39; ECJ 13 December 2001, Case C-1/00, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2001:687, para. 79; CFI 2 October 2009, Case T-324/05, Estonia v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:381, para. 65 ff.; see also A. Haratsch, ‘Artikel 17 EUV’, in M. Pechstein et al. (eds.), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV (Mohr Siebeck 2017) para. 36; Braukmann, supra n. 13, at p. 43.

58 See Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 127.

59 For that reason, Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 5, claims that ‘collegiality is dead but it died a long time ago and has not been killed by the new structure’, while admitting that ‘in a formalistic sense [it] is still alive and used to refer to the modus operandi of the College’s functioning’.

60 See also Thiele, supra n. 54, at p. 139.

61 Verheugen, G., ‘Erfahrungen, Entwicklungen und Perspektiven’, in M. Knauff and T. Oppelland (eds.), Die Europäische Kommission zwischen Technokratie und Politisierung (BWV-Verlag 2016) p. 23 at p. 26Google Scholar; Szapiro, supra n. 10, at p. 29; cf also Nugent and Rhinhard, supra n. 16, at p. 116.

62 See also Brauneck, supra n. 38, at p. 912.

63 Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 6; Szapiro, supra n. 10, at p. 30; Mistò, supra n. 53, at p. 219; Braukmann, supra n. 13, at p. 45.

64 Cf Thiele, supra n. 54, at p. 63-65.

65 Lipsius, J., ‘The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, 20(3) European Law Review (1995) p. 235 at p. 251Google Scholar.

66 Schwarze, J., ‘Ein pragmatischer Verfassungsentwurf’, 38(4) Europarecht (2003) p. 535 at p. 550Google Scholar.

67 Kugelmann, D., ‘Artikel 244 AEUV’, in R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 2nd edn. (CH Beck 2011) paras. 11, 13 Google Scholar.

68 See ECJ 23 September 1986, Case 5/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1986:328, para. 37; CFI 27 April 1995, Case T-442/93, AAC and others v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1995:80, para. 84; CFI 2 October 2009, Case T-324/05, Estonia v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:381, para. 65 ff.; cf also Mistò, supra n. 53, at p. 234 ff.

69 See ECJ 23 September 1986, Case 5/85, AKZO Chemie v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1986:328, para. 33.

70 With the same view Martenczuk, B., ‘Artikel 248 AEUV’, in E. Grabitz et al. (eds.), Das Recht der EU (CH Beck 2016) para. 9 Google Scholar; Braukmann, supra n. 13, at p. 145 ff; with a slightly different view Ruffert, M., ‘Artikel 17 EUV’, in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV , 6th edn. (CH Beck 2016) para. 30 Google Scholar; Haratsch, A., ‘Artikel 248 AEUV’, in M. Pechstein et al. (eds.), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV (Mohr Siebeck 2017) para. 6 Google Scholar.

71 See the last sentence of Art. 248 TFEU, which provides that ‘[t]he Members of the Commission shall carry out the duties devolved upon them by the President under his authority’. See also Brauneck, supra n. 38, at p. 913.

72 Cf Kotzur, M., ‘Rechtliche Ausgestaltung der Organstellung: Aktionsmöglichkeiten und Grenzen’, in M. Knauff and T. Oppelland (eds.), Die Europäische Kommission zwischen Technokratie und Politisierung (BWV-Verlag 2016) p. 103 at p. 112Google Scholar; Martenczuk, supra n. 7, at para. 91; Haratsch, supra n. 57, at para. 34; with a different view Nemitz, supra n. 26, at para. 60.

73 Bauer, M.W. and Ege, J., ‘Politicization within the European Commission’s Bureaucracy’, 78 International Review of Administrative Sciences (2012) p. 403 at p. 405Google Scholar.

74 Cf also Coutron, L., ‘Le principe de collégialité au sein de la Commission européenne après le Traité de Nice’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2003) p. 247 at p. 258Google Scholar.

75 With the same view Verheugen, supra n. 61, at p. 36 ff.

76 See, with regard to past needs for reform, O’Sullivan, D., ‘La réforme de la Commission européenne’, Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne (2000) p. 723 Google Scholar.

77 See also Haratsch, supra n. 57, at para. 37; Brauneck, supra n. 38, at p. 908; Hofmann, supra n. 39, at p. 97; Lübbig, T., ‘Die Europäische Kommission: Auch in Zukunft ein Kollegialorgan’, 20 fireu Newsletter (2014) p. 2 ff Google Scholar.

78 See also Brauneck, supra n. 38, at p. 912; with a different view Borchardt, supra n. 34, at p. 5 ff, claiming that the fact that proposals need to pass through several filters ‘pertains more to the procedural than the hierarchical in the sense that it is a tool to streamline the internal process on the 10 priorities’; differently also Report of the CEPS High Level Group, Shifting EU Institutional Reform into High Gear, 2014, p. 8.

79 This was already suggested by the Commission itself when it delivered its opinion on the Constitutional Convention’s draft, see Commission Communication, supra n. 6, at p. 6.

80 Commission Communication, supra n. 6, Annex 3.

81 Cf also Brauneck, supra n. 38, at p. 913.

82 Lübbig, supra n. 77, at p. 4.

83 Commission Communication, supra n. 6, Annex 3.

84 Decision 2003/223/EC of the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government of 21 March 2003 on an amendment to Article 10.2, OJ 2003 L 83/66.

85 Decision of the European Central Bank of 18 December 2008 to postpone the start of the rotation system in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank(ECB/2008/29), OJ 2009 L 3/4.

86 Council Decision 2014/509/EU of 23 July 2014 on the adoption by Lithuania of the euro on 1 January 2015, OJ 2014 L 228/29.

87 In first stage, the first group shall be composed of five governors (four votes) and the second group of the remaining governors (eleven votes). In the second stage, the first group shall be composed of five governors (four votes), the second group shall be composed of half of the total number of governors, with any fraction rounded up to the nearest integer (eight votes), and the third group shall be composed of the remaining governors (three votes). Currently, the first group includes Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. The second group includes Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland.

88 Size of the share of their national central bank’s Member State in the aggregate gross domestic product at market prices (weighed by 5/6) and in the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions of the Member States whose currency is the euro (weighed by 1/6).

89 See also Hahn, H.J. and Häde, U., Währungsrecht, 2nd edn. (CH Beck 2010)Google Scholar § 16 para. 56.

90 Steven, C., ‘Artikel 10 ESZB’, in H. Siekmann (ed.), Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion (Mohr Siebeck 2013) para. 29 Google Scholar.

91 Cf Steven, supra n. 90, para. 19.

92 Zilioli, C. and Gruber, G., ‘Artikel 10 ESZB’, in H. von der Groeben et al. (eds.), Europäisches Unionsrecht, 7th edn. (Nomos 2015) para. 19 Google Scholar; ECB, Monthly Report, May 2003, p. 82.

93 Council Decision 2013/336/EU of 25 June 2013 increasing the number of Advocates-General of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ 2013 L 179/92.

94 Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and Poland.

95 In fact, the reform that abolished the Tribunal also entailed an increase in the number of judges at the Court, which follows the ‘one judge per Member State’ rule. The transfer of Civil Service Tribunal jurisdiction back to the Court plus a general increase in workload over the last couple of years justified a doubling of judges at the Court. However, this does not mean that rotation is to be abandoned as a principle for good. Future specialised courts may again be set up with a small number of judges and rotation among the Member States.

96 The number of judges can be amended through the ordinary legislative procedure, see Art. 257(2) TFEU.

97 See on this also Nemitz, supra n. 26, at para. 56.

98 Martenczuk, B., ‘Artikel 244 AEUV’, in E. Grabitz et al. (eds.), Das Recht der EU (CH Beck 2016) para. 4 Google Scholar; Schmidt, F. and Schmitt von Sydow, H., ‘Artikel 244 AEUV’, in H. von der Groeben et al. (eds.), Europäisches Unionsrecht , 7th edn. (Nomos 2015) para. 4 Google Scholar.

99 Cf also Frenz, supra n. 16, at para. 1107.

100 Haratsch, A., ‘Artikel 244 AEUV’, in M. Pechstein et al. (eds.), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV (Mohr Siebeck 2017) para. 5 Google Scholar; Martenczuk, supra n. 98, at para. 4.

101 ‘Subject to point (a)’, as Article 244(b) TFEU stipulates (DE: vorbehaltlich des Buchstabens a; FR: sous réserve du point a).

102 Martenczuk, supra n. 98, at para. 6; Haratsch, supra n. 100, at para. 7; with a different view Breier, S., ‘Artikel 244 AEUV’, in C.-O. Lenz and K. D. Borchardt (eds.), EU-Verträge Kommentar, 6th edn. (Bundesanzeiger 2012) para. 4 Google Scholar.

103 DE: Spektrum; FR: éventail; IT: molteplicità; ES: diversidad.

104 Cf Scafarto, N., ‘Articolo 244 TFUE’, in C. Curti Gialdino (ed.), Codice dell’Unione europea operativo. TUE e TFUE commentati articolo per articolo (Simone 2012)Google Scholar point 2 (p. 1718).

105 Regulation No. 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC) laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 1962 P 45/1385.

106 See ECJ 30 June 1983, Case 85/82, Schloh v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1983:179, para. 26; CFI 18 December 1997, Case T-142/95, Delvaux v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1997:212, para. 102; CFI 19 September 2000, Joined Cases T-101/98 and T-200/98, Stodtmeister v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2000:211, para. 77; see also Scafarto, supra n. 104, at point 2 (p. 1718 ff.).

107 Schmidt and Schmitt von Sydow, supra n. 98, at para. 5.

108 Schmidt and Schmitt von Sydow, supra n. 98, at para. 6.

109 See V. Edjaharian, ‘Article 15’, in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds.), The Treaty on European Union (TEU) – A Commentary (Springer 2013) para. 11.

110 Martenczuk, supra n. 98, at para. 8.

111 DE: auf zufrieden stellende Weise zum Ausdruck kommt; FR: refléter d’une manière satisfaisante.

112 Haratsch, supra n. 100, at para. 8.

113 Kugelmann, supra n. 67, at para. 13 ff.

114 See on this J. Schoo, ‘Das neue institutionelle Gefüge der EU’, Europarecht 2009, Supplement No. 1, p. 51 at p. 65; with a different view Frenz, supra n. 16, at para. 1106.

115 Emphasis added.

116 Cf Nemitz, supra n. 26, at para. 59.