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The Rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial Review of EU Legislation in Vertical Competence Disputes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2017

Jacob Öberg
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Abstract

EU Law–Vertical competence review of EU secondary law–Court of Justice control of the exercise of EU legislative powers–Strict procedural review of EU legislation–Standard of judicial review and intensity of judicial review–Judicial review as a safeguard of federalism–Constitutional review of EU legislation–Proportionality, subsidiarity and principle of conferral–Balance between the EU legislator’s prerogatives and the need to ensure that EU legislation conforms to the precepts of EU law–Distribution of competences between Member States and the EU

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Articles
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 248 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2017 

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Footnotes

*

Associate Professor in Law, Örebro University. This article is the outcome of a discussion with many academic colleagues and friends throughout the last three years. I would wish to particularly acknowledge the valuable comments and constructive criticisms from Giorgio Monti, Loïc Azoulai, Damian Chalmers, Stephen Coutts, Christian Ayerst, Thomas Poole, Valsamis Mitsilegas and Carl-Fredrik Bergström. The editors of the European Constitutional Law Review and the anonymous reviewers deserve a special acknowledgment, as their comments and proposals really helped in improving the final form of the article. I furthermore owe intellectual debt to Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Koen Lenaerts and Ernest A. Young for their work on procedural review and federalism in the EU.

References

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3 Craig, P., ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: a Conceptual Analysis’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 395 at p. 396-397, 410Google Scholar; Weatherill, S., ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonisation Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law Has Become a “Drafting Guide”’, 12 German Law Journal (2011) p. 827 at p. 851CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Komesar, N., ‘A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society’, 86 Michigan Law Review (1988) p. 658 at p. 659Google Scholar.

5 Ibid., p. 690-699.

6 Art. 5 TEU.

7 19 Journal of European Public Policy (2012) Special Issue: ‘Perpetual Momentum? Reconsidering the Power of the European Court of Justice’; Stone Sweet, A., The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weiler, J.H.H., ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) p. 2403 at p. 2433-2447Google Scholar.

8 Weatherill, supra n. 3, p. 850-852.

9 ECJ 4 May 2016, Case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands, paras. 107-125, 127-136. See, for equally deferential review in relation to Art.114 TFEU: ECJ 10 December 2002, Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paras. 81-88; ECJ 14 December 2004, Case C-210/03, Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paras. 35-40; ECJ 8 June 2010, Case C-58/08, Vodafone [2010] ECR I-04999, paras. 38-47; 9 October 2001, Case C-377/98, Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-07079, paras. 14-18, 20-22, 24-25, 27-29.

10 Philip Morris Brands, supra n. 9, paras. 165-166. This light proportionality review of EU legislation is consistent with the Court’s previous case law: ECJ 12 March 2002, Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, Omega Air and other joined cases [2000] ECR I-2569, paras. 63-64; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, supra n. 10, para. 123; ECJ 12 November 1996, C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-05755, para. 58.

11 Philip Morris Brands, supra n. 9, paras. 171-191; Swedish Match, supra n. 9, paras. 48-57; ECJ 12 May 2011, Case C-176/09, Luxembourg v Parliament and Council [2011] ECR I-03727; paras. 62-72.

12 Philip Morris Brands, supra n. 9, paras. 220-226. See also ECJ 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-06451, paras. 104-107; ECJ 13 May 1997, Case C-233/94, Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-02405, paras. 26-28; Vodafone, supra n. 9, paras. 72-80, for the Court’s low intensity review of subsidiarity.

13 I.e. legislation such as directives and regulations that is generally binding for everyone: see Art. 288 TFEU.

14 The distinction between these two forms of review is outlined below in the section ‘The case for strict procedural review’.

15 Craig, P., EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 400-445 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 See, for the general institutional argument against judicial review, Komesar, supra n. 4, p. 665, 668-690, 697; Daly, P., A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (Cambridge University Press 2012) p. 70-137 Google Scholar.

17 Scott, J. and Sturm, S., ‘Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law (2007) p. 565 at p. 569Google Scholar.

18 Gerards, J.H., ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’, 17 European Law Journal (2011) p. 80 at p. 86; Waldron, supra n. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Schütze, R., From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford University Press 2009) p. 136-139 Google Scholar.

20 Davies, G., ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’, 21 European Law Journal (2015) p. 2 at p. 4, 6; doi:10.1111/eulj.120794 Google Scholar.

21 Lindberg, L.N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford University Press 1963) p. 284 Google Scholar, 290, 293.

22 Weatherill, S., ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’, 23 Yearbook of European Law (2004) p. 1 at p. 13-17, 25, 27, 46, 49; Schütze, supra n. 19, p. 136-156CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Pescatore, P., Law of Integration: Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International Relations, Based on the Experience of the European Communities (Springer 1974, English translation) p. 40-43 Google Scholar, 50-51.

24 Azoulai, L., ‘Introduction: the Question of Competence’, in L. Azoulai (ed.), The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 2 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 5-6.

25 See the literature in n. 7 supra for support of this point.

26 Swedish Match, supra n. 9, paras. 33-34; Vodafone, supra n. 9, para. 35.

27 See the cases referred to in n. 9 supra.

28 Bermann, G.A. ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously’, 94 Columbia Law Review (1994) p. 332 at p. 337, 385-386, 391-394,400Google Scholar; Estrella, A., The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique (Oxford University Press 2002) p. 139 Google Scholar, 147, 165, 176.

29 See n. 12 supra for references to relevant case law.

30 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 592-593, 600-604, 629-630, 639.

31 See the cases in n. 11 supra for support.

32 Alemanno, A. ‘The Emergence of Evidence-based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s Semiprocedural Review’, 1 The Theory and Practice of Legislation (2013) p. 327 Google Scholar; Coenen, D.T., ‘The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” Constitutional Rules’, 77 Fordham Law Review (2008–2009) p. 2835 Google Scholar; Bar-Siman-Tov, I., ‘Semiprocedural Judicial Review’, 6 Legisprudence (2012) p. 271 Google Scholar.

33 Case C- 310/04, Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-07285, paras. 122-123.

34 Lenaerts, K., ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review’, 31 Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 3 Google Scholar, 4, 15.

35 Bar-Siman-Tov, supra n. 32, p. 272, 275, 279–280; Alemanno, supra n. 32, p. 332, 334-335.

36 See above text to nn. 16-19.

37 Lenaerts, supra n. 34, p. 15-16; Scott and Sturm, supra n. 17, p. 575.

38 See above in the section ‘Institutional and conceptual problems of vertical competence review’ for an outline of this problem.

39 Scott and Sturm, supra n. 17, p. 582, 586, 588, 590; Alemanno, supra n. 32, p. 333-336, 338.

40 See Art 296 TFEU.

41 See Shapiro, M., ‘The Giving Reasons Requirement’, University of Chicago Legal Forum (1992) p. 179 at p. 179 Google Scholar, 184-186, 188-189, 202, 206, 209-210, 218; Bryant, C. and Simeone, T.J., ‘Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes’, 86 Cornell Law Review (2001) p. 328 at p. 395-396Google Scholar.

42 See Lenaerts, supra n. 34, p. 4, 15; Hammond, E. and Markell, D.L., ‘Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-out’, 37 Harvard Environmental Law Review (2013) p. 313 Google Scholar, 316, 321-326; Scott and Sturm, supra n. 17, p. 590-591.

43 See ECJ 12 July 2001, Case C-189/01, Jippes v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2001] ECR I-5689, para. 83.

44 ECJ 11 July 1985, Case 42/84, Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545; Shapiro, supra n. 41, p. 214.

45 Remia BV and Others v Commission, supra n. 44, paras. 34-36.

46 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 617-618.

47 Ibid., p. 629-630, 636-639; ECJ 11 December 2011, Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, paras. 77-90. See, however, ECJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767, paras. 101-111 for the problematic distinction between ‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ of proportionality within the context of preliminary ruling procedures.

48 Lenaerts, K., ‘Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution – The Case of the European Union’, 21 Fordham International Law Journal (1997) p. 746 at p. 795-797Google Scholar.

49 Kumm, M., ‘Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union’, 12 European Law Journal (2006) p. 503 at p. 528CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davies, G., ‘Subsidiarity: the Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) p. 63 at p. 68-69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 Bryant and Simeone, supra n. 41, p. 383-388, 391-392; Frickey, P.P. and Smith, S.S., ‘Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: an Interdisciplinary Critique’, 111 Yale Law Journal (2002) p. 1707 at p. 1740-1744, 1750, 1754Google Scholar.

51 See above text to n. 18 for the general democratic argument against judicial review.

52 Neubome, B., ‘Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States’, 57 New York University Law Review (1982) p. 363 at p. 364-367Google Scholar; Wellington, H.H., ‘The Nature of Judicial Review’, 91 Yale Law Journal (1982) p. 486 at p. 504-505Google Scholar.

53 Walen, A., ‘Judicial Review in Review: A Four-Part Defense of Legal Constitutionalism. A Review Essay on Political Constitutionalism, by Richard Bellamy’, 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2009) p. 329 Google Scholar; Lever, A., ‘Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really Incompatible?’, 7 Perspectives on Politics (2009) p. 805 for general arguments in favour of judicial review on democratic groundsGoogle Scholar.

54 It is open to discussion if this is a fair comparison: see Craig, P., ‘Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment’, 3 European Law Journal (1997) p. 105 at p. 114-119, for a more nuanced assessment of the nature of democracy in the UnionGoogle Scholar.

55 Waldron, , supra n. 1, p. 1361-1362 Google Scholar.

56 Craig, P., The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 73-74 Google Scholar; Young, E.A., ‘Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism’, 77 New York University Law Review (2002) p. 1612 at p. 1638-1639Google Scholar.

57 De Búrca, G., ‘The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union’, 59 Modern Law Review (1996) p. 349 at p. 367-376, for earlier assessments of the state of legitimacy in the UnionCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 The European Ombudsman, ‘Annual Report 2011’ (2011) p. 6 <www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces;jsessionid=36BB77F9D3E8B63EDAAE9C73470AA169>, visited 27 March 2017. See also European Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 397 – Corruption’ (2014), <ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_397_en.pdf>, visited 27 March 2017, for the continuous transparency problems.

59 Hofmann, H.C.H. et al., Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 170-171 Google Scholar; Craig, supra n. 54, p. 110-111.

60 Gangl, A., ‘Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process’, 25 Political Behavior (2003) p. 119 at p. 119-132Google Scholar; Bar-Siman-Tov, I., ‘The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process’, 91 Buffalo Law Review (2011) p. 1915 at p. 1927-1931Google Scholar; Tyler, T.R., ‘Governing amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decision-making Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government’, 28 Law & Society Review (1994) p. 809 at p. 809-811, 813, 818-826Google Scholar; Delli Carpini, M.X. et al., ‘Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature’, 7 Annual Review of Political Science (2004) p. 315 at p. 320, 327, 336CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 Social legitimacy, as defined here, suggests that decisions are legitimate if the relevant public sees them as deserving support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions: see Fallon, R.H., ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’, 118 Harvard Law Review (2005) p. 1787 at p. 1794-1801Google Scholar.

62 Leczykiewicz, D., ‘“Constitutional Justice” and Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts’, (2013) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 95/2013, p. 2-3, <ssrn.com/abstract=2355961>, visited 27 March 2017Google Scholar.

63 ECJ 4 July 1096, Case 24/62, Germany v Commission [1963] ECR 131, 69; Alliance for Natural Health and Others, supra n. 12, para. 133; Scott and Sturm, supra n. 17, p. 572.

64 Legal legitimacy depends on adherence to rules and suggests that decision of a public body is illegitimate if it transgresses some norm itself considered authoritative when it exercises its powers: see Fallon, supra n. 61.

65 Poole, T., ‘Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review’, 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2005) p. 697 at p. 713-717, 722, 725Google Scholar; Hammond, and Markell, , supra n. 42, p. 316 Google Scholar, 321-326.

66 Scott, and Sturm, , supra n. 17, p. 570-571 Google Scholar, 582-583; Kumm, M., ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights based Proportionality Review’, 4 Law and Ethics of Human Rights (2010) p. 142 at p. 153, 160-164.Google Scholar

67 Poole, supra n. 65, p. 719, 724. See Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) p. 176-276 for an examination of the concept of ‘integrity’ in the lawGoogle Scholar.

68 Alemanno, A., ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment and European Courts: When Ex Ante Evaluation Meets Ex Post Judicial Control’, 17 European Public Law (2011) p. 485, 499-503; Lenaerts, supra n. 34, p. 4-10; Schütze, supra n. 19, p. 255-256Google Scholar.

69 There are other intriguing cases on intense procedural review such as ECJ 9 November 2010, Case C-92/09, Volker und Martin Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063 and ECJ 1 March 2011, Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others [2011] ECR I-00773 concerned with procedural review and fundamental rights. Whilst these judgments potentially may have implications for the general allocation of powers between the Member States and the EU, they cannot be characterised as ‘competence disputes’ which is the main focus of this article.

70 Germany v Parliament and Council, supra n. 12.

71 Ibid., paras. 27-28.

72 Netherlands v Parliament and Council, supra n. 9, para. 33; Philip Morris Brands, supra n. 9, paras. 225-226 for equally feeble application of procedural subsidiarity.

73 See also the fundamental rights case law mentioned in n. 69.

74 Spain v Council, supra n. 33.

75 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, (EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) No 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, (EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001 [2003] OJ 2003 L 270/1, inserted by Art. 1(20) of Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2004 of 29 April 2004 [2004] OJ 2004 L 161/48.

76 The case is discussed meticulously in the following sections.

77 Spain v Council, supra n. 33, paras. 122-135

78 Groussout, X. and Bogojevic, S., ‘Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism’, in Azoulai (ed.), supra n. 24, p. 246 Google Scholar, 252 for this observation. The Court referred to the impact assessments and explanatory memorandum in no less than eight paragraphs: see Vodafone, supra n. 9, paras. 39, 43, 45, 55, 58, 59, 63, 65.

79 Spain v Council, supra n. 33, para. 122.

80 Vodafone, supra n. 9, paras. 68-69; Brenncke, M., ‘Case note on European Court of Justice, C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Re’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) p. 1793 at p. 1809-1810CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

81 Brenncke, supra n. 80, p. 1801.

82 Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC [2009] OJ 2009 L 140/88, Art. 1(8).

83 ECJ 8 July 2010, Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical [2010] ECR I-07027, para. 34.

84 Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl; see Directive 2009/30/EC, supra n. 82, recital 35.

85 Afton Chemical, supra n. 83, paras. 30 36-42, 56-69.

86 See below in the subsection ‘Spain v Council expresses a general standard of “adequate reasoning” and “relevant information”’.

87 Spain v Council, supra n. 33; Vodafone, supra n. 9; Afton Chemical, supra n. 83.

88 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 389-390; Scott and Sturm, supra n. 17, p. 570-575.

89 See above in the section ‘Institutional and conceptual problems of vertical competence review’.

90 See in particular United States v Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v Morrisson 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which are seminal judgments on the scope of the Commerce Clause, the US equivalent of Art. 114 TFEU.

91 Vodafone, supra n. 9; Luxembourg v Parliament and Council, supra n. 11.

92 Spain v Council, supra n. 33, paras. 96-99, 104-105.

93 Ibid., paras. 120-123.

94 Ibid., paras. 102, 131-135.

95 Groussout, X., ‘Judgment C-310/04, Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union’, 44 Common Market Law Review (2007) p. 761 at p. 777-782; Alemanno, supra n. 68, p. 501Google Scholar.

96 See n. 69 supra for reference to Court judgments on fundamental rights reflecting high intensity review.

97 See, however, Jippes v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, supra n. 43, paras. 80-101, 113-122, for an exception of more searching proportionality review.

98 Now referred to as the ‘General Court’.

99 ECJ 11 September 2002, Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR II-03305, paras. 166-170.

100 ECJ 25 October 2002, Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-04381, paras. 119, 140-141, 197-199, 224, 283, 308, 335-336; ECJ 15 February 2005, Case C-12/03P, Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-00987, paras. 38-39.

101 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 416-424, 427-430, 438-439.

102 Council Regulation (EC) No 2821/98 of 17 December 1998 amending, as regards withdrawal of the authorisation of certain antibiotics, Directive 70/524/EEC concerning additives in feeding stuffs [1998] OJ 1998 L 351/4.

103 Art. 263(3) TFEU; Pfizer Animal Health v Council, supra n. 99, paras. 42, 81-87, 89-106, 171-172.

104 Tetra Laval v Commission, supra n. 100, paras. 89-90.

105 Lenaerts, supra n. 34, p. 7-9, 15.

106 ECJ 13 November 1990, Case 331/88, R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p FEDESA [1990] ECR I-04023, para. 14; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, supra n. 9, paras. 123, 130, 140.

107 Spain v Council, supra n. 33, paras. 110, 113-119, 131, 132-133.

108 Ibid., paras. 105-111, 116-118, 124-129, 131.

109 Ibid., paras. 108-111.

110 Ibid., paras. 112-118, 126, 128-132.

111 See n. 42 for this expression.

112 ECJ 18 July 2013, Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P, Commission v Kadi (‘Kadi II’), para. 130.

113 See, for example, Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation’, COM (2011) 654 final, 3, 5, recital 7.

114 Asp, P., The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU—Towards an Area of Freedom, Security & Justice—Part 1 (Jure 2013) p. 130-132 Google Scholar; Whelan, P., ‘Contemplating the Future: Personal Criminal Sanctions for Infringement of EC Competition Law’, 19 King’s Law Journal (2008) p. 364 at p. 370-371CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

115 Spain v Council, supra n. 33, para. 122.

116 See a similar formula for the assessment of proportionality; Vodafone, supra n. 9, para. 52.

117 See the discussion above in the section ‘The case for strict procedural review’ of the risk that the Court’s review of the legislator’s reasoning is transformed into substantive review.

118 Kadi II, supra n. 112, paras. 119 and 124, 130. This standard for the ‘evidence ‘requirement is also supported by the Court’s ruling in Commission v Tetra Laval, supra n. 100, para. 39; ‘Not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.’

119 Alemanno, supra n. 32, p. 333-335, 338.

120 Kadi II, supra n. 112, paras. 118-119, 124.

121 See n. 114 for reference to literature supporting this point.

122 See Kadi II, supra n. 112, paras. 151-162 for the application of the evidence standard. What the Court does is to monitor whether any of the reasons submitted, which can support the decision, is supported by sufficient evidence (para. 162). This is the same method that the Court should apply in cases of review of EU legislation.

123 Art. 5 TEU.

124 Scott and Sturm, supra n. 17, p. 592-593. This test is, however, wider than the ‘rationality’ review used in some jurisdictions, which seems, within the realm of EU law, to be confined to questions primarily addressed by proportionality review, see further Craig, P., ‘Judicial Review and Questions of Law: A Comparative Perspective’, Legal Research Paper Series No 56/2009 October 2009, p. 7-8 Google Scholar, 11-12, 21-22, 26.

125 Art. 19 TEU; Shapiro, supra n. 41, p. 218-220.

126 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 434-436.

127 See above in the subsection ‘Spain v Council expresses a general standard of “adequate reasoning” and “relevant information”’.

128 See, for example, Kadi II, supra n. 112, paras. 119, 121, 122, 130; ECJ 12 May 2013, Case T-392/11, Iran Transfo v Council, paras. 34, 44; ECJ 29 June 2010, Case C-550/09, E and F [2010] ECR I-06213, para. 57.

129 See the cases referred to in nn. 99-100.

130 See n. 128 for reference to the relevant case law.

131 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 438-439.

132 Where EU fundamental rights have been used to challenge common policies, review has traditionally tended to be deferential: see eg British American Tobacco, supra n. 9, paras. 149-152; ECJ 9 September 2004, Cases C-184 and 223/02, Spain and Finland v European Parliament and Council [2004] ECR I-7789.

133 See above in the section ‘Analysis – why does Spain v Council provide an appropriate standard of review?’.

134 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 437-438, 592-593.

135 This division seems to be generally accepted for courts engaged in judicial review: see A.L. Young, ‘In Defence of Due Deference’, 72 Modern Law Review (2009) p. 554, 556-559.

136 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 434-436.

137 Art. 13(2) TEU.

138 Coenen, supra n. 32, p. 2887-2888.

139 See Toth, AG, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’, 19 European Law Review (1994) p. 269 Google Scholar, 283-284, for an argument on how the application of subsidiarity may result in substitution of judgment.

140 Craig, supra n. 15, p. 433-34.

141 See above in the section ‘Analysis – why does Spain v Council provide an appropriate standard of review?’.

142 ECJ 5 October 2000, Case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419, paras. 84, 86, 98-99, 106-107.

143 Volker und Martin Schecke and Eifert, supra n. 69, paras. 65-89.

144 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats, supra n. 69, paras. 25-32.

145 See n. 49 for reference to literature supporting this proposition.

146 Baker, L.A. and Young, E.A., ‘Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review’, 51 Duke Law Journal (2001) p. 75, 133-162 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

147 Kaiafa-Gbandi, M., ‘The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for a European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’, 1 European Criminal Law Review (2011) p. 7 at p. 17-21Google Scholar; Melander, S., ‘Ultima Ratio in European Criminal Law’, 3 European Criminal Law Review (2013) p. 45 at p. 52Google Scholar.

148 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, supra n. 9, paras. 68-73, 84-87, 124, 134-135, 181-184; ECJ 12 December 2006, Case C-380/03, Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573 paras. 46-48, 62, 66, 85-86; ECJ 10 February 2009, Case C-301/06, Ireland v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-00593, paras. 66-72, 83.

149 Germany v Parliament and Council, supra n. 12, paras. 26-28.

150 Swedish Match, supra n. 9, paras. 36-41.

151 Vodafone, supra n. 9, paras. 38-47, 76-79.

152 Alliance for Natural Health, supra n. 14, paras. 35-40, 105-107.

153 Alemanno, supra n. 68, p. 501.

154 See the Court of Justice’s case-law referred to in n. 11.

155 ECJ 15 November 2007, Case T-310/06, Hungary v Commission [2007] ECR II-4619, paras. 144-167; ECJ 14 May 2002, Case T-126/99, Graphischer Maschinenbau GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR II-2427; Craig, supra n. 15, p. 425, 438-439, 442.

156 Bar-Siman-Tov, supra n. 32, p. 287-288; Craig, supra n. 15, p. 439-440.

157 Leczykiewicz, supra n. 62, p. 12-13.

158 See above in the section ‘Analysis – why does Spain v Council provide an appropriate standard of review?’.

159 ECJ 1 October 2009, Case C-370/07, Commission v Council [2009] ECR I-8917, paras. 46-49; A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’, in A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009) p. 279 at p. 301.

160 Azoulai, supra n. 24, p. 2, 5-6; Weatherill, supra n. 3, p. 863.

161 See text to nn. 57-67 supra.

162 Herzog, R. and Gerken, L., ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 September 2008 Google Scholar; Beck, G., ‘The Court of Justice, Legal Reasoning, and the Pringle Case: Law as Continuation of Politics by Other Means’, 39 European Law Review (2014) p. 236 Google Scholar, 238, 244.

163 Leczykiewicz, supra n. 62, p. 4, 8, 12-13.

164 Protocol (No 1) On the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union OJ [2010] C 83/203.

165 Protocol (No 2) On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality OJ [2010] C 83/206.

166 Art. 4(2) TEU.

167 In addition to Art. 5(2) TEU, there are a number of other provisions which expressly or implicitly reinforce the principle of conferral: Art. 1(1) TEU; Art. 3(6) TEU; Art. 4(1) TEU; Art. 13(2) TEU; Art. 48(6) TEU; Art. 2(1) TFEU; Art. 2(2) TFEU; Art. 4(1) TFEU; Art. 7 TFEU; Art. 19 TFEU; Art. 130 TFEU; Art. 207(6) TFEU; Art. 226 TFEU; Art. 314(10) TFEU; Art. 351(3) TFEU.

168 Azoulai, supra n. 24, p. 10-11.

169 Bermann, supra n. 28, p. 340-344; Kumm, supra n. 49, p. 518; Young, E.A., ‘Two Cheers for Process Federalism’, 46 Villanova Law Review (2001) p. 1349 Google Scholar, 1354, 1370-1374, 1387-88.

170 Young, supra n. 169, p. 1391.

171 Art. 5 TEU.

172 Young, supra n. 56, p. 1631, 1641; Lenaerts, supra n. 48, p. 747.

173 Tobacco Advertising, supra n. 142, para. 84.

174 Young, supra n. 169, p. 1367-1373

175 Lenaerts, supra n. 34, p. 3-4, 15-16; Hart Ely, J., Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press 1980); United States v Carolene Products Company Google Scholar, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) n. 4.

176 Young, supra n. 169, p. 1354, 1358, 1366; Young, supra n. 56, p. 1646-1653.

177 Schütze, supra n. 19, p. 261-262, 266; Tribe, L.H., ‘The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories’, 89 Yale Law Journal (1980) p. 1063 Google Scholar.