¹ E.g. Richmond, C., ‘Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European Law’, 16 Law and Philosophy (1997) p. 377 Google Scholar ; Schilling, T., ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations’, 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996) p. 389 Google Scholar ; Peters, A., ‘Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der Verhältnisse’, ZÖR (2010) p. 3 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Barber, N.W., ‘Legal Pluralism and the European Union’, 12 ELJ (2006) p. 306 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Schroeder, W., Das Gemeinschaftsrechtssystem (Mohr Siebeck 2002)Google Scholar .

² A few classic landmark decisions involving perspectivist approaches are: ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL; ECJ 17 December 1970, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft; ECJ 9 March 1978, Case 106/77, Simmenthal II; Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 11 May 2005, Case K 18/04; Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 8 March 2006, Case Pl. US. 50/04; German Constitutional Court, decision of 30 June 2009, Case 2 BvE 2/08; Spanish Constitutional Court, declaration of 13 December 2004, Case DTC 1/2004; Belgian Council of State, decision of 5 November 1996, Case n. 62.922; Italian Constitutional Court, decision of 18 December 1973, Case n. 183/1973; Lithuanian Constitutional Court decision of 14 March 2006, Joint Cases 17/02-24/03-22/04; French Conseil d’État, decision of 3 December 2001, Case n. 226514.

³ For a detailed analysis of the EU law and the domestic law perspective, see Burchardt, D., Die Rangfrage im europäischen Normenverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2015) p. 66-147 Google Scholar .

⁴ On European jurisprudence being ‘locked in sterile opposition’, Giorgi, F. and Triart, N., ‘Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to a Journey through the Looking-glass – On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter-systemic Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle’, 14 ELJ (2008) p. 693 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 694. Talking about a ‘conflit radical’, Ritleng, D., ‘Le principe de primauté du droit de l’Union’, 41 RTDE (2005) p. 285 at p. 293Google Scholar .

⁵ Besson, S., ‘How international is the European legal order?’, 5 NoFo (2008) p. 50 Google Scholar at p. 60. Arguing against perspectivism, Tietje, A., ‘Autonomie und Bindung der Rechtsetzung in gestuften Rechtsordnungen’, 66 VVDStRL (2007) p. 45 at p. 51Google Scholar .

⁶ Opposing claims have been qualified as ‘inimical to the very spirit of integration’ by Baquero Cruz, J., ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’, 14 ELJ (2008) p. 389 at p. 415CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

⁷ Kumm, M., ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’, in J. Dunoff and J. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2009) p. 258 at p. 310CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

⁸ E.g. Kumm, supra n. 7; MacCormick, N., ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’, 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1998) p. 517 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; M.P. Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’, in Dunoff and Trachtman, supra n. 7, p. 356; Walker, N., ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 MLR (2002) p. 317 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Walker, N., ‘Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union’, 4 ELJ (1998) p. 355 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

⁹ See e.g. Mayer, F. and Wendel, M., ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism’, in M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 127 Google Scholar ; Pernice, I., ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel constitutionalism in action’, 15 Columbia Journal of European Law (2009) p. 349 Google Scholar . See also R. Barents, ‘The Fallacy of European Multilevel Constitutionalism’, in Avbelj and Komárek ibid., p. 153.

¹⁰ This (mis)understanding seems to be at the basis of the critical consideration by M. Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalism’, 9 German Law Journal (2008) p. 1 at p. 19-20. On the compound idea being an ordering and organisational concept, E. Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Einleitung’, in E Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2005) p. 1 at p. 7.

¹¹ In German scholarship on EU law, the term ‘Verbund’ (compound) has been used in various contexts including with regard to the interrelation of constitutions, administrative actors and structures and of constitutional courts. E.g. I. Pernice, ‘Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht’, 60 VVDStRL (2001) p. 148; Schmidt-Aßmann, supra n. 10; A. Voßkuhle, ‘Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’, NVwZ (2010) p. 1.

¹² Schilling, supra n. 1; Peters, supra n. 1, p. 31 ff.

¹³ For such attempts, see e.g. Richmond, supra n. 1; W. Grussmann, ‘Grundnorm und Supranationalität’, in T. von Danwitz et al. (eds.), Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Staatlichkeit (Boorberg 1993) p. 47. Critical Burchardt, supra n. 3, p. 156-168.

¹⁴ On the cognitive nature of the kelsenian approach, see Richmond, supra n. 1, p. 408.

¹⁵ M. Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2011) p. 8.

¹⁶ This link is also expressed both by the terms ‘bridging mechanism’ and ‘métissage’: Walker, supra n. 8, p. 375; Raducu, I. and Levrat, N., ‘Le métissage des ordres juridiques européens’, 43 Cahiers de droit européen (2007) p. 111 Google Scholar . On ‘interlegality’: de Sousa Santos, B., ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law’, 14 Journal of Law and Society (1987) p. 279 at p. 298CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

¹⁷ That is the reason for this concept to be grounded on legal pluralism; see Mayer and Wendel, supra n. 9, p. 133.

¹⁸ Pernice, supra n. 11, p. 175; see also Calliess, C., Die neue Europäische Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon (Mohr Siebeck 2010) p. 69 Google Scholar .

¹⁹ E.g. Sydow, G., Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union (Mohr Siebeck 2004) p. 118 Google Scholar ff.

²⁰ E.g. Pernice, supra n. 9, p. 379 ff.

²¹ E.g. Kingreen, T., ‘Grundfreiheiten’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2nd edn (Springer 2009) p. 705 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 725; Pernice, supra n. 11, p. 175.

²² Siegel, T., Entscheidungsfindung im Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2009) p. 37 ff, p. 320 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar .

²³ Besson, supra n. 5, p. 54; Wendel, supra n. 15, p. 14. More generally MacCormick, N., ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, 56 MLR (1993) p. 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Weiler, J.H.H., ‘The Reformation of European Constitutionalism’, 35 JCMS (1997) p. 97 Google Scholar ; Eleftheriadis, P., ‘Begging the Constitutional Question’, 36 JCMS (1998) p. 255 Google Scholar .

²⁴ Using the term ‘normes métisses’, Raducu and Levrat, supra n. 16, p. 113.

²⁵ H. Kelsen, ‘Der Begriff der Rechtsordnung’, in Hans R. Klecatsky et al. (eds), Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule (vol. 2, 1968) p. 1395 and p. 1400. See also M. Jestaedt, ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund’, in R. Krause et al. (eds.), Recht der Wirtschaft und der Arbeit in Europa (Duncker & Humblot 2004) p. 637 and p. 658. Similarly, the approaches by Hart and Raz are order-related as well: a principle of authoritative recognition determines whether a legal norm belongs to a specific legal order and therefore whether it is valid. See Raz, J., The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford University Press 1970) p. 190 Google Scholar ; Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1965) p. 92 at p. 97 ffGoogle Scholar .

²⁶ Some constitutional courts of the Member States have hinted at such a differentiated understanding of norm-creation in the European context, see e.g. the Czech Constitutional Court in its decision of 8 March 2006 – Pl. US. 50/04, part VI. A: ‘(T)he Constitutional Court cannot entirely overlook the impact of Community law on the formation, application, and interpretation of national law, all the more so in a field of law where the creation, operation, and aim of its provisions is immediately bound up with Community law. In other words, in this field the Constitutional Court interprets constitutional law taking into account the principles arising from Community law’.

²⁷ However, there can be disagreement about whether an imperative set by an EU law norm requires an ‘enabling’ basis of competence stemming from domestic law or whether this competence is rather part of the EU norm.

²⁸ It should be stressed that it is the actual legal norm and not ‘merely’ the legal space which is characterised by hybridity. On the ‘hybridity of legal spaces’: P. Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2007) p. 1155.

²⁹ On this mechanism, see Lenaerts, K. and Corthaut, T., ‘Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy in invoking norms of EU law’, 31 ELRev (2006) p. 287 Google Scholar at p. 292 ff; ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, para. 26; ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 79/83, Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH, para. 26. The legal basis for an obligation to an interpretation of domestic law in line with EU law can be seen in Art. 4(3) TEU and Art. 288 TFEU and is complemented in some domestic legal orders by a constitutional obligation of this kind. See e.g. Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 3 May 2006, Pl. ÚS 66/04, para. 61: ‘A constitutional principle can be derived from Article 1 para. 2 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 of the EC Treaty, according to which domestic legal enactments, including the constitution, should be interpreted in conformity with the principles of European integration and the cooperation between Community and Member State organs’.

³⁰ See Peters, A., Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Duncker & Humblot 2001) p. 289 Google Scholar ff. With respect to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 52(4) explicitly stipulates an interpretative obligation. For a general obligation regarding the whole of EU law, the discussed foundations include Art. 4(2) and (3) TEU, Art. 5(3) TEU, Art. 19(1) TFEU as well as Art. 167(1) and (4) TFEU.

³¹ On this effect, see also Raducu and Levrat, supra n. 16, p. 118; Oeter, S, ‘Rechtsprechungskonkurrenz zwischen nationalen Verfassungsgerichten, Europäischem Gerichtshof und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte’, 66 VVDStRL (2007) p. 361 at p. 382Google Scholar .

³² ECJ 12 July 1957, Joint Cases 7/56 and 3/57 - 7/57 Algera and Others v Assemblée commune.

³³ On the necessity of concretisation, see Wendel, supra n. 15, p. 542.

³⁴ As Advocate General Roemer has put it: ‘[A] process of assessment in which above all the particular objectives of the Treaty and the peculiarities of the Community structure must be taken into account’: Opinion of 13 July 1971, Case 5/71, Schöppenstedt.

³⁵ On this integrative function, see Sobotta, C., Transparenz in den Rechtsetzungsverfahren der Europäischen Union (Nomos 2001) p. 305 Google Scholar .

³⁶ Spanish Constitutional Court, declaration DTC 1/2004 of 13 December 2004. Critical of this distinction, Baquero Cruz, supra n. 6, p. 415.

³⁷ See on this distinction M. Avbelj, ‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law – (Why) Does it Matter?’, 17 ELJ (2011) p. 744.

³⁸ Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 11 May 2005, K 18/04; German Constitutional Court, decision of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 334.

³⁹ ECJ 22 October 1998, Joint Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97, Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE. ‘90, para. 21.

⁴⁰ Jestaedt, supra n. 25, p. 658.

⁴¹ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra n. 2, para. 3.

⁴² On a concept of autonomy related to the freedom of interference from external norms, see Peters, supra n. 30, p. 274 ff.

⁴³ Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE. ‘90, supra n. 39, para. 21.

⁴⁴ It should be noted, however, that the terms ‘direct effect’ and ‘direct applicability’ are used by some authors in the inverse sense. This paper opts for a use of these terms that better reflects their content. On the problematic terminological blurriness, see also Wendel, supra n. 15, p. 377.

⁴⁵ Simmenthal II, supra n. 2, para. 14/16.

⁴⁶ See also Besson, supra n. 5, p. 62-63.

⁴⁷ ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos.

⁴⁸ ECJ 21 February 1991, Joint Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen, para. 26; ECJ 5 March 1996, Joint Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du pêcheur, para. 33. Barents even describes the uniform applicability as ‘raison d’être’ of EU law, see Barents, R., The Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer 2004) p. 183 Google Scholar .

⁴⁹ ECJ 6 June 1972, Case 94/71, Schlüter and Maack, para. 11.

⁵⁰ See also Huber, P., ‘Differenzierte Integration und Flexibilität als neues Ordnungsmuster der Europäischen Union?’, 31 EuR (1996) p. 347 Google Scholar .

⁵¹ ECJ 21 September 1983, Joint Cases 205/82 -215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH, para. 19.

⁵² Raducu and Levrat, supra n. 16, p. 135.

⁵³ On the normative dimension of multilevel constitutionalism, Mayer and Wendel, supra n. 9, p. 138.

⁵⁴ By accepting the ranking dimension as one of the components of the relationship between EU law and domestic law, the approach suggested in this paper takes an explicitly different stance from those approaches to legal pluralism that categorically deny the possibility of hierarchical elements, see G. Itzcovich, ‘Legal Order, Legal Pluralism, Fundamental Principles. Europe and Its Law in Three Concepts’, 18 ELJ (2012) p. 358 at p. 370.

⁵⁵ This corresponds to the concept of ‘EU law primacy’ as developed in an application-related manner by the ECJ and taken up by some domestic constitutional courts. See e.g. Estonian High Court, opinion Nr. 3-4-1-3-06 of 11 May 2006, para. 16; German Constitutional Court, decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, para. 53; Spanish Constitutional Court, decision of 13 December 2004, DTC 1/2004; Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 8 March 2006, Pl. US. 50/04, part VI. A; Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 11 May 2005, K 18/04, paras. 4.2, 6.4, 10.2; Lithuanian Constitutional Court, decision of 14 March 2006, Joint Cases 17/02-24/03-22/04, section III, para. 9.4.

⁵⁶ There is a controversy as to whether the primacy of EU law requires direct applicability. However, this debate relates to diverging concepts of what primacy actually means. E.g. contra: Lenaerts and Corthaut, supra n. 29, p. 290 ff; pro e.g.: Kruis, T., Der Anwendungsvorrang des EU-Rechts in Theorie und Praxis (Mohr Siebeck 2013) p. 49-50 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

⁵⁷ For more general approaches based on structural principals, Besson, supra n. 5, p. 65; M. Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism’, in Avbelj and Komárek, supra n. 9, p. 39 at p. 55 ff. For a discussion of why principles such as legality, subsidiarity, human rights protection and democracy do not provide sufficient guidance in the European constitutional setting, see Burchardt, D., Die Rangfrage im europäischen Normenverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2015) p. 266-276 Google Scholar .

⁵⁸ On the link between the uniformity principle and harmonisation, see also van der Schyff, G., ‘The Constitutional Relationship between the European Union and its Member States: The Role of National Identity in Article 4(2) TEU’, 37 ELRev (2012) p. 563 at p. 582Google Scholar .

⁵⁹ On the aspect of uniform effect and application of law as guarantee for the equality of legal subjects, see M. Nettesheim, ‘Der Grundsatz der einheitlichen Wirksamkeit des Gemeinschaftsrechts’, in A. Randelzhofer et al. (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift Grabitz (CH Beck 1995) p. 447 at p. 448 ff.

⁶⁰ Maduro, M.P., ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) p. 501 at p. 527Google Scholar .

⁶¹ On such an absolute understanding of the unity of EU law being ‘the very essence’ of EU law, see Barents, supra n. 48, p. 213-214.

⁶² This aspect is also reflected in the order of 23 November 2016, n. 24/2017 of the Italian Constitutional Court: ‘The primacy of EU law (…) reflects the conviction that the objective of unity, within the context of a legal order that ensures peace and justice between nations, justifies the renunciation of areas of sovereignty, even if defined through constitutional law’.

⁶³ Estonian Constitutional Court, decision n. 3-3-1-33-06 of 5 October 2006; German Constitutional Court, decision of 13 March 2007, BvF 1/05, para. 69. A slightly different approach that, however, takes the hybrid nature of norms resulting from the implementation of directives into account, can be found in the jurisprudence of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, decision of 8 May 2007, Case 47/04, section II.

⁶⁴ Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 10 June 2004, n. 2004-496 DC, considérants 8-9.

⁶⁵ Conseil d’État (Ass.), decision of 8 February 2007, n. 287110.

⁶⁶ ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para. 29; ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 60.

⁶⁷ Kumm, supra n. 57, p. 45.

⁶⁸ On the critique of a self-referential approach, see Burchardt, supra n. 3, p. 152-154, p. 179-181.

⁶⁹ Domestic law provisions of that kind are, for instance, Art. 88-1 of the French Constitution, Art. 29(4) n 4 and 5 of the Irish Constitution, Art. 7(5) and (6) of the Portuguese Constitution, Art. 23 of the German Constitution, article E of the Hungarian Constitution, Art. 143 of the Croatian Constitution, the Constitutional Act of the Republic of Lithuania on membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union; rudimentarily also chapter 10, Art. 6 of the Swedish constitutional act ‘Instrument of Government’, Art. 4(3) of the Bulgarian Constitution.

⁷⁰ For the scholarly debate about constitutional identity, see e.g. Besselink, L., ‘National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’, 6 Utrecht LR (2010) p. 36 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Beneyto, J.M. and Pernice, I. (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Faraguna, P., ‘Constitutional Identity in the EU–A Shield or a Sword?’, 18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 1617 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Konstadinides, T., ‘Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement’, 13 Cambridge Ybk European Legal Studies (2010-2011) p. 195 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Körtvélyesi, Z. and Majtényi, B., ‘Game of Values: The Threat of Exclusive Constitutional Identity, the EU and Hungary’, 18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 1721 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Kovács, K., ‘The Rise of an Ethnocultural Constitutional Identity in the Jurisprudence of the East Central European Courts’, 18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 1703 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Millet, X., L’Union européenne et l’identité constitutionnelle des États membres (LGDJ 2013)Google Scholar ; Polzin, M., ‘Constitutional Identity as a Constructed Reality and a Restless Soul’, 18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 1595 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Reestman, J.-H., ‘The Franco-German Constitutional Divide – Reflections on National and Constitutional Identity’, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 374 Google Scholar ; Saiz Arnaiz, A. and Alcoberro Llivina, C. (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013)Google Scholar ; Wischmeyer, T., ‘Nationale Identität und Verfassungsidentität. Schutzgehalte, Instrumente, Perspektiven’, 140 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (2015) p. 415 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

⁷¹ E.g. Kumm, supra n. 7, p. 303; von Bogdandy, A. and Schill, S., ‘Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty’, 28 CMLR (2011) p. 1417 Google Scholar ; criticising these approaches van der Schyff, supra n. 58, p. 572-573; see also Advocate General Maduro, Opinion 8 October 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki, paras. 32-33. Critical on Art. 4(2) TEU as limit to primacy, M. Claes, ‘National Identity: Trump Card or up for Negotiation?’, in Saiz Arnaiz and Alcoberro Llivina, supra n. 70, p. 109.

⁷² See e.g. German Constitutional Court, order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14; French Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 27 July 2006, n. 2006-540 DC, considérant 19; Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 24 November 2010, K 32/09, section 2.1; Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 26 November 2008, Pl. US. 19/08; Italian Constitutional Court, order of 23 November 2016, n. 24/2017, §6; Hungarian Constitutional Court, decision of 30 November 2016, 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB; in an obiter dictum: Belgian Constitutional Court No. 62/2016, 28 April 2016, B.8.7.

⁷³ The ECJ, however, has been reluctant to refer to the concept of national identity although it had been discussed in the respective Opinions of the Advocate Generals: judgment of 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler; judgment of 13 March 2017, Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita; judgement of 5 December 2017, Case C-42/17, Taricco II.

⁷⁴ On the rising approach of an ‘ethnocultural’ constitutional identity in East Central Europe, see Kovács, supra n. 70.

⁷⁵ On using constitutional identity as a ‘shield or a sword’, see Faraguna, supra n. 70; Konstadinides, supra n. 70.

⁷⁶ Von Bogdandy and Schill, supra n. 71, p. 1441; van der Schyff, supra n. 58, p. 579 ff; similar Advocate General Maduro, Opinion in Michaniki, supra n. 71, at para. 33; as well as Kumm, supra n. 7, p. 303. On the French conception of a relative constitutional identity see Reestman, supra n. 70, p. 388.

⁷⁷ On an exclusively domestic law-related argumentation for the absolute nature of constitutional identity, see German Constitutional Court, Order of 14 January 2014 - 2 BvR 2728/13, at para. 29: ‘Since Art. 79 sec. 3 GG also sets an “ultimate limit” … to the applicability of Union law within the German jurisdiction under the Basic Law, the principles which are stipulated therein may not be balanced against other legal interests …’.

⁷⁸ Critical about an absolute limit: Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Opinion in Gauweiler, supra n. 73, at para. 59: ‘[I]t seems to me an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the discretion of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category described as “constitutional identity”’. Similarly, Advocate General Kokott pointed out in his Opinion in Samira Achbita, supra n. 73, at para. 32: ‘The European Union’s obligation under Article 4(2) TEU to respect the national identities of its Member States does not in itself support the inference that certain subject areas or areas of activity are entirely removed from the scope of Directive 2000/78. … National identity does not therefore limit the scope of the Directive as such, but must be duly taken into account in [its] interpretation’. See also Advocate General Bot in Opinion of 18 July 2017, Case C-42/17, Taricco II, para. 180.

⁷⁹ The holistic nature of this structural principle differs from approaches that suggest an EU law principle of constitutional identity, see Millet, supra n. 70, part 2.

⁸⁰ Unilaterally focused on the European perspective: Wendel, M., ‘Lisbon before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives’, in J.M. Beneyto and I. Pernice (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011) p. 65 Google Scholar at p. 103. On the problematic use of the concept by Hungary, see G. Halmai, ‘National(ist) constitutional identity? Hungary’s road to abuse constitutional pluralism’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2017/08.

⁸¹ On the question of an EU constitutional identity, see W. Sadurski, ‘European Constitutional Identity?’, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/33. On the idea of a European compound structure of identity formed by the EU and its Member States, see E. Pache, ‘Europäische und nationale Identität: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht?’, 117 DVBl (2002) p. 1154 at p. 1167.

⁸² Maduro, supra n. 60, p. 526. A similar approach is taken by the Polish Constitutional Court regarding its reservation for constitutional identity (although primarily with regard to the relationship amongst Member States), see K 32/09 (Lisbon Treaty), decision of 24/11/2010, section 2.1: ‘The idea of confirming one’s national identity in solidarity with other nations, and not against them, constitutes the main axiological basis of the European Union, in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon’.

⁸³ On the necessity to respect such principles that protect diversity, see A. von Bogdandy, ‘Grundprinzipien’, in von Bogdandy and Bast, supra n. 21, p. 13 at p. 52 ff; Tietje, supra n. 5, p. 51.

⁸⁴ Similarly, van der Schyff, supra n. 58, p. 582.

⁸⁵ On the secondary law-making procedures, de Witte, B., ‘Legal Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon Treaty’, in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008) p. 79 at p. 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

⁸⁶ On mechanism of taking constitutional identity into account during EU law creation, see Millet, supra n. 70, part 2.

⁸⁷ Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 9 June 2011, n. 2011-631 DC, para. 45.

⁸⁸ See on this aspect, Maduro, supra n. 60, p. 526.

⁸⁹ R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Suhrkamp 1985) p. 71 ff.

⁹⁰ ECJ 14 October 2004, Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs.

⁹¹ ECJ 16 December 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki.

⁹² Besselink, supra n. 70, p. 48-49; Pollicino, O., ‘New Emerging Judicial Dynamics of the Relationship Between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe’, 29 YEL (2010) p. 65 at p. 95-96Google Scholar .

⁹³ ECJ 5 December 2017, Case C-42/17, at 51.

⁹⁴ ECJ 22 December 2010, Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, in particular paras. 92 ff.

⁹⁵ ECJ 12 May 2011, Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn, paras. 83 ff.

⁹⁶ Other decisions on this issue include ECJ 12 June 2014, Case C-156/13, Digibet and Albers, at para. 34; ECJ 16 April 2013, Case C-202/11, Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV, at para. 26.

⁹⁷ See e.g. Italian Constitutional Court, order of 23 November 2016, n. 24/2017; German Constitutional Court, order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, in particular paras. 40-50; order of 14 January 2014, 2 BvE 13/13, at 29

⁹⁸ On involving the ECJ in this determining process, see also Claes, supra n. 71, p. 109; C. Grewe, ‘Methods of Identification of National Constitutional Identity’, in Saiz Arnaiz and Alcoberro Llivina, supra n. 70, p. 37.

⁹⁹ Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Opinion of 14 January 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al., at p. 59. A similar approach is taken by Advocate General Bot, Opinion in Taricco II, supra n. 78, at 180.

¹⁰⁰ Regarding Art. 4(2) TEU, some have even claimed that only elements of national identity which respect the fundamental values of the EU can be considered under European law, see J.-P. Jacqué, ‘L’évolution des rapports entre le droit de l’Union et le droit national du point de vue de l’Union’, in J. Schwarze (ed.), Das Verhältnis von nationalem Recht und Europarecht im Wandel der Zeit (tome 1, Nomos 2012) p. 33 at p. 36.

¹⁰¹ Also emphasising dialogue in this context, Claes, supra n. 71.

¹⁰² A. Arnull and D. Wyatt, European Union Law, 5^th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) p. 142.

¹⁰³ Concurring opinion by Judge Béla Pokol to Hungarian Constitutional Court Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB: ‘the constitutional courts’ abstract right of resistance against the legal acts of the Union’ (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁴ On this aspect of the conflict, see also Spanish Constitutional Court, declaration of 13 December 2004, DTC 1/2004.

¹⁰⁵ Some suggest an ‘Identity Committee’ as ad hoc body in cases concerning constitutional identity, see J. Villotti, ‘National Constitutional Identity and the Legitimacy of the European Union – Two Sides of the European Coin’, 18 ZEuS (2015) p. 475.

¹⁰⁶ On this danger, see also Pollicino, supra n. 92, p. 97.