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Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2015

Jasper Krommendijk
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Abstract

Historical background of the inclusion of social rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Distinction between rights and principles – Similarities between the conditions for direct effect and the criteria for distinguishing between Charter rights and principles – Implications of this distinction for the possibilities of judicial review – Reluctance of the ECJ to explicitly deal with the distinction until Glatzel, as illustrated by its earlier judgments in Dominguez and AMS.

Keywords

EU Charterfounding principlesECJ
Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , September 2015 , pp. 321 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Assistant professor of EU law, Radboud University Nijmegen. I would like to thank Dr Katarina Eisele, Prof Janneke Gerards, Dr John Morijn, Dr Elise Muir and Prof Henri de Waele as well as the peer reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. Any errors obviously remain the sole responsibility of the author.

References

1 Burgorgue-Larsen, L., ‘Article II-112’ in Burgorgue-Larsen et al. (eds.), Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe Partie II. La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union. Commentaire article par article (Bruylant 2005) p. 687Google Scholar.

2 These cases were selected because the distinction between rights and principles played a role in the Opinion of the A.G. (Dominguez, AMS and Pohotovost) or the judgment of the ECJ (Glatzel). Kamberaj was included because several scholars noted that the provision at play, Art. 34(3), is most likely a principle. See n. 128 infra.

3 ECJ 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10, Dominguez.

4 ECJ 24 April 2012, Case C-571/10, Kamberaj.

5 ECJ 15 January, Case C-176/12, AMS.

6 ECJ 27 February 2014, Case C-470/12, Pohotovost’ s.r.o. v Miroslaw Vašuta.

7 ECJ 22 May 2014, Case C-356/12, Glatzel.

8 O.J. 2007, C 303/32. The Explanations do not have the ‘status of law’, but they are a ‘valuable tool of interpretation’ as the preamble of the Charter makes clear as well. Art. 6(1), third sentence TFEU furthermore provides: ‘The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted […] with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter.’ See also Art. 52(7) of the Charter.

9 For a description of the history of social rights in the EU, see Kenner, J., ‘Economic and Social Rights in the EU Legal Order: the Mirage of Indivisibility’, in T.K. Hervey and J. Kenner (eds.), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Legal Perspective (Hart 2003) p. 1Google Scholar at p. 7-15.

10 O.J. 1989, C 323/44.

11 Comité des Sages, For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1996) p. 6.

12 1999/2064(COS) - 04/06/1999.

13 Several of the preparatory documents and NGO contributions can be accessed via the website of the First Convention, <www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm>, visited 3 March 2015.

14 Jacqué, J.P., ‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Aspects juridiques généraux’, 14 ERLP/REDP (2002) p. 107Google Scholar at p. 112. De Schutter, O., ‘La garantie des droits et principes sociaux dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne’, in J. Carlier and O. De Schutter (eds.), La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union. Son apport à la protection des droits de l’homme en Europe (Bruylant 2002) p. 117Google Scholar at p. 118.

15 For an overview of the Dutch reservations towards social rights more generally, see Krommendijk, J., The domestic impact and effectiveness of the process of state reporting under UN human rights treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland. Paper pushing or policy prompting? (Intersentia 2014) p. 154-158Google Scholar.

16 Braibant, G., La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Témoignage et commentaires (Seuil 2001) p. 252Google Scholar. Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 683. Prechal, S., ‘Rights v. principles, or how to remove fundamental rights from the jurisdiction of the courts’, in J.W. De Zwaan et al. (eds.), The European Union: An ongoing process of integration – Liber amicorum Alfred E. Kellerman (Asser Press 2004) p. 177 at p. 178-179Google Scholar.

17 QC, Lord Goldsmith, ‘A charter of rights, freedoms and principles’, 38 CML Rev. (2001) p. 1206 at p. 1212-1213Google Scholar. Jacqué, supra n. 14, p. 112-113. UK representative on the Second Convention, Peter Hain, likewise argued that the inclusion of social rights could result in the UK’s ‘domestic legislation being disregarded on social matters’. Menéndez, A.G., ‘The sinews of peace: rights to solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, 16 Ratio Juris (2003) p. 373CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 393.

18 Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 46.

19 The Times, 1 June 2000, p. 4.

20 The UK representative during the Second Convention, Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal, referred to the ‘aspirational character’ of principles; Working Group II, WD 16, 13 September 2002, p. 4.

21 This argument was already visible in the defence of the UK in Defrenne II dealing with equal pay (Art. 159 TFEU, ex 119 EEC). The UK argued that ‘such a ‘general statement of principle’ primarily requires legislative action on the part of the Member States’; ECJ, 8 April 1976, Case C-43/75, Defrenne v Sabena, p. 459-460.

22 Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1212.

23 UK representative during the Second Convention, Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal, for example, regretted Art. 31(2) of the Charter because of its impact on national politics and finance. Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, S., ‘Les droits sociaux: droits proclamés ou droits invocables? Un appel à la vigilance’, in B. Favreau (ed.), La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne après le traité de Lisbonne (Bruylant 2010) p. 265Google Scholar at p. 288.

24 Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1213. Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 179.

25 Ladenburger, C., ‘Artikel 52 Abs. 5’, in P.J. Tettinger and K. Stern (eds.), Kölner Gemeinschafts-Kommentar Europäische Grundrechte-Charta (Verlag C.H. Beck 2006)Google Scholar para 7.

26 Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 45. Braibant’s proposal included the current Articles 27, 28, 31(2), 34(3), 36-38. EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Commentary of the Charter’, <ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf>, visited 29 October 2014, at p. 405-406.

27 Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 46.

28 Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 684. Jacqué, supra n. 14, p. 114.

29 A.G. Cruz-Villalón, Opinion 18 July 2013, Case C-176/12, AMS, para 48.

30 CONTRIB 258/4.7.2000, ‘Proposition relative aux droits économiques et sociaux fondamentaux’, 13 June 2000, <ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do?docId=8807&cardId=8807>, visited 3 March 2015. Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 45. EU Network, supra n. 26, p. 406.

31 CHARTE 4414/00 as referred to in Menéndez, supra n. 17, p. 386.

32 See the general report of Seminar of Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions held in the Hague on 24 November 2011, <www.aca-europe.eu/images/media_kit/seminars/DenHaag2011/Gen_Report_en.pdf>, visited 22 July 2014, para E9.

33 CONV 354/02, ‘Final Report of Working Group II’, p. 8. C. Ladenburger, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon’, FIDE 2012, < www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88>, visited 28 April 2014, p. 31.

34 Almost all the preparatory and negotiation documents can be accessed via <european-convention.europa.eu/>, visited 3 March 2015.

35 Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 7.

36 CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8.

37 Ibid., p. 4.

38 Ibid., p. 8. Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 7 and 10.

39 Prechal, supra n. 17, p. 179.

40 The question as to whether this Protocol has any legal implications is much contested. The ECJ interpreted the legal implications of Art. 1(1) Protocol restrictively and argued that it ‘does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the United Kingdom from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter’. The ECJ did not give any interpretation of Art. 1(2) or the rest of the Protocol, since the rights invoked in the proceedings did not deal with Title IV of the Charter. ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S and M.E., para 116-122. See also A.G. Kokott, Opinion 15 December 2011, Case C-489/10, Bonda, para 21-23. Peers, S., ‘The “Opt-out” that Fell to Earth: The British and Polish Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 14 HRLR (2012) p. 1Google Scholar. Barnard, C., ‘EU “social” policy: from employment law to labour market reform’, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The evolution of EU law (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 641Google Scholar at p. 659.

41 The ECJ already held in Defrenne that ‘this term [principle] is specifically used in order to indicate the fundamental nature of certain provisions’. Defrenne, supra n. 21, para 26. The changed use of principles in Art. 52(5) is thus ‘somewhat paradoxical’, as Prechal has noted, because the protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order actually began by way of reference to general principles of law. Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 178 and 184. See text between n. 96 and 99 infra.

42 Von Bogdandy, A., ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A theoretical and doctrinal sketch’, 16 ELJ 2 (2010) p. 95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 ECJ 17 February 2009, Case C-465/07, Elgafaji, para 28. ECJ 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, para 21. Peers, S. and Prechal, S., ‘Article 52’, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Hart 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, para 52.163.

44 The ECJ did not accept that equality of shareholders was a general principle because it does not entail ‘the general, comprehensive character which is otherwise naturally inherent in general principle of law’. ECJ 15 October 2009, Case C-101/08, Audiolux SA ea v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL), para 42 and 63. A.G. Trstenjak noted that general principles imply ‘fundamental principles’ because of their hierarchical status as primary law; A.G.Trstenjak in Audiolux, para 66, 70 and 74.

45 The ECJ ruled that the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression by Directive 2000/78, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation; ECJ 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, para 43.

46 Note that Art. 6(3) TEU stipulates that general principles of EU law are still a separate source of fundamental rights in addition to the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter. This means that the Charter principles exist alongside – and must thus be distinguished from – the general principles of EU law encompassing fundamental rights. See also Lazzerini, N., ‘(Some of) the fundamental rights granted by the Charter may be a course of obligations for private parties: AMS’, 51 CML Rev. (2014) p. 907Google Scholar at p. 932. See also A.G. Kokott, Opinion 12 March 2015, Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria ED, para 144.

47 ECJ 26 June 2001, Case C-173/99, BECTU, para 40.

48 Ibid., para 43. Text to n. 126 infra.

49 Art. 25 (the rights of the elderly) and 26 (integration of persons with disabilities).

50 Lenaerts, K., ‘Exploring the limits of the EU Charter of fundamental rights’, 8 EuConst (2012) p. 375Google Scholar at p. 399. O’Gorman, R., ‘The ECHR, the EU and the weakness of social rights protection at the European level’, 12 GLJ (2011) p. 1833Google Scholar at p. 1835-1836. Fredman, S., ‘Transformation or dilution: fundamental rights in the EU social space’, 12 ELJ (2006) p. 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 42.

51 ECJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Viking, para 44. ECJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para 91. For subsequent cases on Article 28, see ECJ 15 July 2010, Case C-271/08, Commission v Germany. ECJ 8 September 2011, Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10, Hennings and Mai.

52 Text to n. 49-50 supra. Gijzen, M., ‘The Charter: A milestone for social protection in Europe’, 8 MJ (2001) p. 33Google Scholar at p. 38. Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 17.

53 Art. 23 (principle of equality), 37 (sustainable development) and 47 (legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties).

54 Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32. Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 182.

55 O.J. 2007, C 303/35.

56 CHARTE 4473/00, ‘Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set

out in CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50’, 11 October 2000.

57 Ibid., p. 2.

58 Ibid., p. 6.

59 O.J. 2007, C 303/35.

60 Art. 21, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34(3) should refer to ‘principles’ or Art. 52(5). Contribution of the Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal QC, Working Group II, WD 28, 12 June 2003.

61 CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8. Lenaerts, supra n. 50, p. 400.

62 Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, supra n. 23, p. 315.

63 The Final Report of the Working Group II, nonetheless, talked about the ‘exact attribution of Articles to the two categories’; CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8. Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 31. Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 687. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.183.

64 Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 182-183. M. De Mol et al., ‘Inroepbaarheid in rechte van het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de Europese Unie: Toepassingsgebied en het onderscheid tussen “rechten” en “beginselen’, 60 SEW (2012) p. 222 at p. 232.

65 Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 182.

66 Lenaerts, K., ‘La solidarité ou le chapitre IV de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne’, 82 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme (2010)Google Scholar para 43.

67 Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 98. ACA report, supra n. 32, para E10. T. Von Danwitz, ‘Questionnaire’, <aca-europe.eu/seminars/DenHaag2011/Report_ECJ.pdf>, visited 28 April 2014, para E3.

68 Von Danwitz, supra n. 67, para E3. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.170.

69 Another criterion deals with the origin of a Charter provision. It has been argued that the provisions which correspond to the ECHR should be qualified as rights, even when they are broadly formulated. The Explanations to Art. 52(3) outline Charter provisions with a similar meaning and the scope as in the ECHR. O.J. 2007, C 303/32, 17-18. Ladenburger gave the examples of Art. 9, 48 and 49, which are formulated in an objective way, but qualify as rights because they correspond to the ECHR. Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 98.

70 Vitorino as quoted in Craig, P., The Lisbon Treaty. Law, politics, and treaty reform (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 ‘No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’.

72 Interventions of Schoo, Piris and Petit on 23 July 2002, Working Group II, WD 13, 5 September 2002, p. 22.

73 Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32.

74 Krommendijk, supra n. 15, p. 348.

75 De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 232.

76 Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32-33.

77 A.G. Trstenjak, Opinion 8 September 2011, Case C-282/10, Dominguez, para 78.

78 De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 232.

79 Such references are made in the following Charter provisions: 9, 10(2), 14(3), 16, 27, 28, 30, 34(1), (2) and (3), 35 and 36.

80 ECJ 17 September 2002, Case C-413/99, Baumbast, para 86.

81 ECJ 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Viking, para 44. ECJ 18 December 2007, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, para 91.

82 Heringa, A.W. and Verhey, L., ‘The EU Charter: text and structure’, 8 MJ 1 (2001) p. 11Google Scholar at p. 14.

83 Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, supra n. 23, p. 297. J. Tooze, ‘Social security and social assistance’, in Hervey and Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 161 at p. 163

84 These quotes are from the online dictionaries of Cambridge, Longman and Oxford.

85 This was also noted by A.G Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 46.

86 EU Network, supra n. 26, p. 407. De Mol et al, supra n. 64.

87 In particular, reference is made here to case law on the ‘precautionary principle’, as laid down in Art. 191(2) TFEU and on Art. 33 TFEU related to the principles of agricultural law, including the principle of market stabilisation and of reasonable expectations. See respectively, CFI 11 September 2002, Case T-13/99, Pfizer v Council; ECJ 11 March 1987, Case C-265/85, Van den Berg.

88 De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 234. Craig, supra n. 70, p. 220-221.

89 Prechal, supra n. 16, p. 183. The CFI held: ‘It is not disputed by the parties that the [precautionary] principle also applies where the Community institutions take, in the framework of the common agricultural policy, measures to protect human health’. Pfizer, supra n. 87 , para 114 and 125. Hilson, for example, pointed to ECJ 9 September 2003, Case C-236/01, Monsanto; ECJ 16 April 1991, Case C-290/90, Commission v Belgium; ECJ 29 April 1999, Case C-293/97, Standley. Hilson, C., ‘Rights and principles in EU law: a distinction without foundation’, 15 MJ (2008) p. 192Google Scholar at p. 199-202.

90 CFI 26 November 2002, Case T-74/00, Artegodan, para 182 and 184. Hilson, supra n. 89, p. 199.

91 Lenaerts, supra n. 50, p. 400. Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 687-688. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.182.

92 Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 33.

93 ECJ 2 March 2010, Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Abdulla and others, para 51 and 54.

94 ECJ 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89 ERT, para 42. Prechal, supra n. 16, 179. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.182.

95 ECJ 17 February 1998, Case C-249/96, Grant, para 45. ECJ 9 September 2003, Case C-25/02, Rinke, para 26.

96 EU Network, supra n. 26, p. 407. H.M. Sagmeister, Die Grundsatznormen in der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta (Duncker & Humblot 2010) p. 181 and 265-267. Braibant, supra n. 16, p. 46. Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulis, supra n. 23, p. 292. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.181-182.

97 O.J. 2007, C 303/32, 19. Ladenburger, supra n. 25, para 86.

98 CONV 354/02, supra n. 33, p. 8.

99 The limited possibilities for judicial review reflects the idea that a provision of EU law can only produce an independent effect (within national legal systems) after it has satisfied the criteria of direct effect. This is what Dougan referred to as the ‘trigger model’. Dougan, M., ‘When worlds collide! Competing visions of the relationship between direct effect and supremacy’, 44 CML Rev. (2007) p. 931Google Scholar at p. 934-937.

100 Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 33. EU Network, supra n. 27, p. 406.

101 See text between n. 28 and 31 supra. Lenaerts, supra n. 50, p. 400-401. Von Danwitz, supra n. 67, para E4. De Witte, B., ‘Direct effect, primacy, and the nature of the legal order’, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 323Google Scholar at p. 331.

102 De Witte noted that direct effect has originally been construed as the creation of rights for individuals, but has over time been replaced by the notion of invocability, whereby a norm can act as a standard for review of the legality if it is ‘sufficiently operational in itself to be applied by a court’; De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 330-331. Likewise, Prechal highlights the application of a provision of EU law ‘either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal review’ as the defining feature of the broader concept of direct effect; Prechal, S., ‘Direct effect, indirect effect, supremacy and the evolving Constitution of the European Union’, in C. Barnard (ed.), The fundamentals of EU law revisited (Oxford University Press 2007) p. 35Google Scholar at p. 37-38. For a further discussion of the different understandings of direct effect, see Muir, E., ‘Of ages in – and edges of – EU law’, 48 CML Rev. (2011) p. 39Google Scholar.

103 Concrete expressions of these broader readings are the doctrines of indirect effect, the duty of consistent or harmonious interpretation for national courts, and incidental horizontal effect. The ECJ, for example, explicitly determined that judicial review is not precluded even if the provisions do not have direct effect; ECJ 9 October 2001, Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament/ Council, para 54. Likewise, the ECJ held in Pupino that the exclusion of direct effect of (framework) decisions in the former third pillar did not preclude consistent interpretation; ECJ 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, Pupino. De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 337. For a good overview, see Craig, P. and De Búrca, G. (eds.), EU Law. Text, cases, and materials (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 200-211CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104 Dougan labeled this as the ‘primacy model’ as opposed to the ‘trigger model’. Dougan, supra n. 99, p. 932-933.

105 De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 234.

106 De Witte referred in this context to ECJ 24 April 2008, Cases C-55/07 and C-56/07, Othmar Michaeler and others; De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 332. See also n. 103 supra.

107 This case dealt with Art. 2(1) of Directive 85/337. ECJ 24 October 1996, Case C-72/95, Kraaijeveld, para 59.

108 EU Network, supra n. 26, 406. De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 234.

109 Burgorgue-Larsen, supra n. 1, p. 684 and 687.

110 Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1213.

111 This also corresponds to the approach of the ECJ in relation to the precautionary principle where it held that the Community institutions have a broad discretion. Pfizer, supra n. 87, para 166-170. De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 235. Craig, supra n. 70, p. 220. Von Danwitz, supra n. 67, para E4. Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.183.

112 Art. 31(2) stipulates: ‘Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave.’

113 This contrasts with two earlier judgments in which the ECJ made a passing reference to Art. 31(2). ECJ 15 September 2011, Case C-155/10, Williams, para 18; ECJ 22 November 2011, Case C-214/10, KHS, para 37. Nonetheless, the ECJ failed to refer to Art. 31(2) in ECJ 14 October 2010, Case C-243/09, Fuß; ECJ 22 April 2010, Case C-486/08, Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols.

114 Dominguez, supra n. 3, para 16 and 18. In this context, the ECJ referred to BECTU, supra n. 47.

115 Ibid., para 21.

116 Ibid., para 18 and 19. This is in line with the earlier case law of the ECJ. In Jaeger, the ECJ held: ‘the fact that the definition of the concept of working time refers to “national law and/or practice” does not mean that the Member States may unilaterally determine the scope of that concept.’ ECJ 9 September 2003, Case C-151/02, Jaeger, para 59. See also: BECTU, supra n. 47, para 53.

117 According to Peers and Prechal, the ECJ wanted to emphasise the fundamental character of entitlement with its reference to ‘a particularly important principle’. They understood this as an implicit reference to the general principles of EU law; Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.165. De Mol, however, noted that the ECJ did not determine that the right is a general principle of EU law; De Mol, M., ‘Dominguez: A deafening silence’, 8 EuConst (2012) p. 280Google Scholar at p. 282.

118 A.G. Trstenjak held that ‘the Court is being invited to state how entitlement to paid annual leave should be categorised within the hierarchy of norms’ in the EU legal system; Trstenjak, supra n. 77, para 3. See also Pech, L., ‘Between judicial minimalism and avoidance: the Court of Justice’s sidestepping of fundamental constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez’, 49 CML Rev. (2012) p. 1841Google Scholar at p. 1852-1853.

119 It is interesting that Trstenjak used the term ‘respect’ for principles, whereas Article 51(1) links ‘respect’ to rights’. Ibid., para 76.

120 Idem.

121 Ibid., para 79.

122 ECJ 8 November 2012, Joined Cases C-229/11 and C-230/11, Heimann, para 22 and 23. See also, among many other judgments, ECJ 19 September 2013, Case C-579/12 RX-II, European Commission v Strack, para 26.

123 Dominguez, supra n. 3, para 22. The ECJ used this phrase for the first time in Neidel. ECJ 3 May 2012, Case C-337/10, Neidel, para 40.

124 The fact that the ECJ did use Art. 31(2) as a standard of legality does not tell us anything about the nature of Art. 31(2). This is because, at least in a wide reading of the competence of the Court under the Charter, both rights and principles can be used as standards of review, as shown above. Nonetheless, the ECJ did not examine whether Directive 2003/88/EC actually implements Art. 31(2). This would be relevant if the ECJ is of the view that Art. 31(2) is a principle in the sense of Art. 52(5) and when it favours a restrictive interpretation of Art. 52(5), limiting review to measures implementing principles.

125 See text to n. 70-71 supra.

126 See text to n. 48 supra. Dominguez, supra n. 3, para 18-20. Heimann, supra n. 122, para 23.

127 Art. 34(3) provides: ‘In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices.’

128 Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 23. De Mol et al., supra n. 64, p. 233. Gijzen, supra n. 52, p. 40. Tooze, supra n. 83, p. 163.

129 For this distinction, see Barnard, supra n. 40, p. 660.

130 J. Morijn, European Human Rights Cases 2012/162, para 10.

131 Kamberaj, supra n. 4, para 81 and 92. Goldsmith, supra n. 17, p. 1213.

132 This is what Robin-Olivier referred to as ‘combined effects’ of norms as a result of their association (‘normative combination’) with other EU law provisions irrespective of whether norms are capable of having direct effect; Robin-Olivier, S., ‘The evolution of direct effect in the EU: stocktaking, problems, projections’, 12 ICON (2014) p. 165Google Scholar at p. 171-175.

133 Morijn, supra n. 130, para 12.

134 Ibid., para 11.

135 A.G. Bot, Opinion 13 December 2011 in Kamberaj, supra n. 4, para 54.

136 A.G. Cruz Villalón held that Art. 34(1) ‘cannot be overlooked in interpreting the provision at issue’, Art. 11(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the EU; A.G. Cruz Villalón, Opinion 27 June 2013, Case C-166/12, Radek Časta v Česká správa sociálního zabezpečení, para 63. The ECJ paid no attention to the Charter in its judgment.

137 Art. 27 stipulates: ‘Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.’

138 AMS, supra n. 5, para 36.

139 Ibid., para 39-40.

140 Ibid., para 41.

141 Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 42. For a critical analysis, see Frantziou, E., ‘Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some reflection on the horizontal effect of the Charter and the reach of fundamental employment right in the European Union’, 10 EuConst (2014), p. 332Google Scholar.

142 According to Frantziou, the ECJ added a new hierarchy of rights-conferring and non-rights-conferring Charter provisions in addition to the rights-principle distinction. Frantziou, supra n. 141, p. 344-346.

143 The ECJ recognised that this principle is laid down in Art. 21(2) of the Charter as well; Kücükdeveci, supra n. 45, para 22.

144 AMS, supra n. 5, para 46-47.

145 Ibid., para 45.

146 See text to n. 80-81 supra.

147 AMS, supra n. 5, para 48. It is still uncertain whether Art. 27 can never meet the criteria for direct effect. It cannot be ruled out that the ECJ would arrive at a different conclusion when the facts of the case are different. M. De Mol, European Human Rights Cases 2014/70, para 6. Frantziou, supra n. 141, p. 339-340.

148 Alternatively, Art. 27 might also be a ‘right’ which does not fulfill the conditions for direct effect. Lazzerini, supra n. 46, p. 932.

149 Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 43-80.

150 Ibid., para 53.

151 Ibid., para 45.

152 Ibid., para 53 and 55. The ECJ had earlier referred to the different character of the provisions in Title IV when it noted that Article 16 Charter ‘differs from the wording of other fundamental freedoms laid down in Title II thereof, yet is similar to that of certain provisions of Title IV of the Charter’. The ECJ furthermore noted the ‘broad range of interventions’ which may limit Art. 16; ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk, para 46.

153 Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 55.

154 See text to n. 49-51 supra.

155 See also Trstenjak, supra n. 77.

156 Fredman warned that Art. 52(5) ‘threatens to resuscitate the well-worn division between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights’. Fredman, supra n. 50, p. 43.

157 See text to n. 12 supra.

158 Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 54.

159 Kenner held that Art. 27 entails a ‘qualified guarantee’ and hence ‘blur[s] the rights/ principles distinction’; Kenner, supra n. 9, p. 19-20. Ladenburger also mentioned Art. 27 as one of the ‘hardest cases of doubt’; Ladenburger, supra n. 33, p. 32.

160 See text to n. 80-91 and 146 supra.

161 Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 29, para 69.

162 See text between n. 96 and 110 supra.

163 ‘Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection’.

164 A.G. Wahl referred to Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in AMS with respect to the distinction and the conditions under which principles can be invoked; A.G. Wahl, Opinion 12 December 2013 in Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 66.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid. O.J. 2007, C 303/02, p. 12 and 19.

167 Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 52.

168 The ECJ did not explicitly state that Directive 93/13 implements Art. 38 Charter within the meaning of Art. 52(5) Charter. Note that Directive 93/13 only refers to Art. 100 EEC (now 115 TFEU) and not Art. 129a(1) EC (now 169 TFEU). The latter is the only Treaty provision mentioned in the Explanations to Art. 38 Charter. Interestingly, the A.G. seemed to adopt a restrictive interpretation of Art. 52(5) Charter, because he only mentioned the possibility of interpreting and legality review of ‘Union acts’ and omitted any reference to ‘acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law’; A.G. Wahl, supra n. 164, para 66. M. De Mol, De directe werking van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie [The direct effect of the fundamental rights of the European Union] (Wolf 2014) p. 51.

169 Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 52. A.G. Wahl, supra n. 164, para 67.

170 What militates against this possibility is that the ECJ came to the same finding as regards Article 47 Charter, which is formulated as an individual entitlement. Pohotovost, supra n. 6, para 53.

171 The ECJ eventually determined that the Directive does not preclude national legislation allowing the recovery of debts based on potentially unfair contractual terms by the extrajudicial enforcement of a charge on immovable property. Note that it is difficult to construe this Slovak law as an act implementing a principle (Art. 38 Charter) within the meaning of Art. 52(5) Charter. ECJ 10 September 2014, Case C-34/13, Monika Kušionová v SMART capital a.s., para 45-47.

172 Art. 26 stipulates: ‘The Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community.’

173 Glatzel, supra n. 7, para 74.

174 Ibid., para 78.

175 Ibid., para 41-58.

176 O.J. 2007, C 303/32, p. 19.

177 Glatzel, supra n. 7, para 74.

178 Text to n. 132 and 171 supra. See also Cruz-Villalón, supra n. 161-162 and the text to n. 96-110 supra.

179 Ibid., para 76.

180 Respectively ‘aangezien’ and ‘da’.

181 Directive 2006/126 does, however, refer to disabled persons in recital 14, Art. 4(5), 5(2), 6(4)(a) and Annex III.

182 Glatzel, supra n. 7, para 78.

183 This, and the fact that the criteria used to make a distinction between Charter rights and principles closely resemble the conditions for direct effect, implies that this distinction is largely a ‘modern’ and adapted version of the doctrine of direct effect. Robin-Olivier, supra n 132, p. 169. See text to n. 67 and 102 supra and n. 188 infra.

184 This also reflects the broader trend that the ECJ not always examines whether the conditions for direct effect are fulfilled, but just applies an EU provision to the case. Othmar Michaeler, supra n. 106. De Witte, supra n. 101, p. 332. Robin-Olivier, supra n. 132, p. 174-175.

185 A.G. Cruz Villalón,, supra n. 136. In Petru, the Commission (and the applicant) proposed an interpretation of Art. 22 Regulation 1408/17 in conformity with Art. 35 Charter dealing with health care; A.G. Cruz Villalón, Opinion 19 June 2014, Case C-268/13, Elena Petru, para 12 and 14. See also A.G. Bot held that the achievement of a high level of environmental protection, as laid down in – amongst others – Article 37 Charter, is ‘an imperative requirement’ which enjoys ‘pre-eminence over other considerations’; A.G. Bot, Opinion 8 May 2013, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, Essent Belgium NV, para 95-96.

186 De Búrca, for instance, noted the ECJ’s lack of human rights experience and expertise; De Búrca, G., ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a human rights adjudicator?’, 20 MJ (2013) p. 168Google Scholar at p. 170-171. Pech, supra n. 118. Sánchez, S. Iglesias, ‘The Court and the Charter: the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights’, 49 CML Rev. (2012) p. 1565Google Scholar at p. 1568. Douglas-Scott, S., ‘The European Union and human rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 11 HRLR 4 (2011) p. 645Google Scholar at p. 678-679.

187 Pech, supra n. 118, 1861. Iglesias Sánchez, supra n. 186, 1609. Lazzerini referred to the fear to open the ‘Pandora’s box of the rights-principles distinction’; Lazzerini, supra n. 46, p. 931.

188 Peers and Prechal, supra n. 43, para 52.190.

189 She made these statements during a seminar on the EU Charter. ‘Verslag NJCM-Seminar. Het EU-Handvest. Van toenemende betekenis voor EU-Grondrechtenbescherming?’ [Report of the NJCM Seminar. The EU Charter. Of increasing significance for EU fundamental rights protection?], 39 NTM/NJCM-Bulletin (2014) p. 121.

190 See n. 183 supra.

191 One explanation for this difference might be that Prechal was not a judge in Glatzel. Judges in Glatzel were, amongst others, Von Danwitz and Rosas, who both have written on the difference between rights and principles in terms of possibilities for judicial review. Von Danwitz, supra n. 68. A. Rosas and Armati, L., EU Constitutional Law. An introduction (Hart 2012) p. 178-179Google Scholar.