¹ President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, ‘Congratulations on the second anniversary of Crimea and Sevastopol’s reunification with Russia’, 18 March 2016, <en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51535>, visited 30 June 2016.

² Decision No. 6-P of 19 March 2014, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Federal issue No. 6335, 19 March 2014.

³ The Constitutional Court is the authoritative voice on the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and its decisions constitute binding precedent. Marochkin, S., ‘International Law in the Courts of the Russian Federation: Practice of Application’, 6 Chinese Journal of International Law (2007) p. 329 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 332.

⁴ Lukyanova, E., ‘O prave nalevo’ [On the Right of Left], Novaya Gazeta, 19 March 2015, <www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/67715.html>>Google Scholar, visited 30 June 2016; A. Merezhko, ‘Okkupaciya kryma I antipravovoe gosudarstvo putina’ [Occupation of Crimea and non-Rule of Law State], Forumdaily, <www.forumdaily.com/okkupaciya-kryma-i-antipravovoe-gosudarstvo-putina/>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁵ President Putin admitted in April 2014 that ‘Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self-defence forces’, and that in Crimea ‘Russia created conditions – with the help of special armed groups and the Armed Forces … for the expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol’. ‘Direct Line with Vladimir Putin’, 17 April 2014, <eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁶ ‘Ukrainian Crisis Timeline’, 13 November 2014, <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁷ Supra n. 6. On 6 March 2014 the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted a resolution ‘On the All-Crimean Referendum’ on the basis of the Arts. 18(1)(7) and 26(2)(3) of the Crimean Constitution. See I. Bilych, et al., ‘The Crisis in Ukraine: Its Legal Dimensions’, Razomforukraine, 14 April 2014, <razomforukraine.org/report>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁸ Supra n. 6, p. 21.

⁹ Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the ‘Venice Commission’) on ‘Whether Draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 462741-6 on Amending the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject within the Russian Federation is Compatible with International Law’, Opinion no. 763/2014, Venice 21 March 2014 (the ‘Venice Commission Opinion’).

¹⁰ Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ of 17 December 2001, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Federal issue No. 247, 20 December 2001.

¹¹ Art. 4 (2.1) Draft Amendment to the Incorporation Law.

¹² Lukyanova, E., ‘On the Rule of Law in the Context of Russian Foreign Policy’, 3 Russian Law Journal (2015) p. 10 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 20.

¹³ See ‘Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the adoption of the Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol’, 11 March 2014, <www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/4751D80FE6F93D0344257C990062A08A>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹⁴ Tomsinov, V., ‘“Crimean law” or legal basis for the reunification of the Crimea and Russia’, 11 Vestnik of the Moscow State University (2014) p. 3 Google Scholar at p. 4.

¹⁵ See ‘Crimean Parliament Formally Applies to Join Russia’, 17 March 2014, <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26609667>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹⁶ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 147 ‘On the Recognition of the Republic Of Crimea’, 17 March 2014.

¹⁷ See Venice Commission Opinion, supra n. 9, at para. 2.

¹⁸ Draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 475944-6 ‘On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol’, 20 March 2014.

¹⁹ Venice Commission Opinion, supra n. 9, at para. 2.

²⁰ Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ ‘On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol’, 21 March 2014, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Federal issue No. 6338, 24 March 2014.

²¹ Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ ‘On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation’, 21 July 1994.

²² Supra n. 2, p. 5, Section 2.

²³ Supra n. 2, p. 4.

²⁴ Supra n. 2, p. 6, citing Art. 80(3)-(4), Art. 86(a)-(b) of the Constitution.

²⁵ Supra n. 2.

²⁶ Supra n. 2, p. 7.

²⁷ Supra n. 2, pp. 7-8.

²⁸ Supra n. 2, p. 9.

²⁹ Art 68 Constitution; supra n. 2, p 9.

³⁰ Supra n. 2, pp. 9-14.

³¹ Supra n. 2, pp. 14-15.

³² Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 9 July 2012 Decision No. 17-P, On the Matter of constitutional review of a pending entry into force treaty of the Russian Federation – Protocol on the accession of Russian Federation to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the ‘World Trade Organization Accession Judgment’), para. 2.4; Art. 86(2) Law on the Constitutional Court.

³³ Supra n. 2, p. 7, para. 3.

³⁴ Danilenko, G., ‘Implementation of International Law in Russia and Other CIS States’, 10 EJIL (1999) p. 13 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ This exact formulation is restated in Art. 5 of the Federal law on International Treaties of the Russian Federation of 15 July 1995, No. 101 – FZ (the ‘Law on Treaties’), which also commits Russia to the ‘unwavering observance of treaty and other norms’, and affirms ‘its adherence to the fundamental principle of international law – the principle of performance in good faith of international obligations’. Art. 1 Law on Treaties.

³⁶ See e.g. World Trade Organization Accession Judgment, supra n. 32, Section 2.4; Constitutional Court of the Russian Constitution, 27 March 2012 Decision No. 8-P ‘On the Matter of constitutional review of Section 1 Article 23 of the Federal law “On the International treaties of the Russian Federation” in connection with the individual complaint of Ushakov’ (the ‘Ushakov Judgment’), Sections 2-3.

³⁷ Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Decision No. 10-P 31 July 1995 ‘On the Measures to Restore Constitutional Law and Order on the Territory of Chechen Republic’, Point 5.

³⁸ Vajpan, G. and Maslov, A., ‘Ot dogmatiki k pragmatike: postanovlenie Konstititsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po ‘delu Markina’ v kontekste sovremennyh podhodov k sootnosheniju mezhdunarodnogo I natsionalnogo prava’ [From dogmatics to pragmatics: the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the ‘case of Markin’ in the context of contemporary approaches on the relationship of international and national law], 2 Comparative Constitutional Review (2014) p 127 at p. 130 Google Scholar. Vajpan and Maslov argue that Art. 17(1) of the Constitution, according to which human rights in Russia are recognised and guaranteed pursuant to ‘generally recognized principles and norms of international law and in accordance with the present Constitution’, militates against placing constitutional norms above general principles concerning human rights.

³⁹ Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 14 July 2015, Decision No. 21-P.

⁴⁰ Both the 1995 and the 2003 decrees of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation addressing the application of international law classify ratified treaties that have been properly transformed into Federal law as superior to other domestic laws. Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 31 October 1995, Decree No. 8, para. 5; Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russian Federation, 10 October 2003, Decree No. 5 (the ‘2003 Decree’), para. 8. But see B. Tuzmukhamedov, ‘Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in the Russian Federation’, 850 International Review of the Red Cross (30 June 2003) p. 385 at p. 387, arguing that read in conjunction with Art. 15(1), Art. 15(4) has been interpreted to mean that in case of a conflict between an internal regulation other than the Constitution and an obligation arising out of an international treaty, the latter must not necessarily cancel the earlier.

⁴¹ The 1996 Federal Constitutional Law on the Judicial System of the Russian Federation provides that in such matters a court, having considered the Constitution, federal constitutional law, federal law, generally recognised principles and norms of international law, and international treaties of the Russian Federation, ‘shall render a decision in accordance with the legal provision having the greatest legal force’. Art. 5 Federal Constitutional Law No. 1 FKZ on the Judicial System of the Russian Federation, 31 December 1996.

⁴² Zorkin, V.D. and Lazareva, L.V. (eds.), Kommentarii k Konstitucii Rossiiskoj Federacii: Konstitucija 1993 goda – pravovaya legitimizatziya novoy Rossii [Commentary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Constitution of the year 1993 – legal legitimation of the new Russia] (Eksmo 2010)Google Scholar, Section 4, available at <kommentarii.org/konstitutc/page1.html>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Art. 125(2) Constitution.

⁴⁵ Supra n. 42, Art. 125(2) <kommentarii.org/konstitutc/page135.html>, visited 30 June 2016. Its competences can also be established by other laws pursuant to Art. 3(7) of the Law on the Constitution Court.

⁴⁶ Syryh, V.M., ‘Sposoby svyazi zakona s drugimi pravovymi aktami’ [Methods of Connection of Laws with other normative acts] in Y. Tikhomirov (ed.), ‘Zakonodatel’naja tehnika: nauchno-prakticheskoje posobije’ [Legislative technique: scientific application guide] (Gorodetz 2000) p. 168-169 Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Bakhtova, E., ‘Kommentaryi k Konstitucii Rossiiskoi Federacii’ [Commentary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation] (Prospect 2010)Google Scholar, Art. 108(1), online edition available at <constitution.garant.ru/science-work/comment/5817497/>, visited on 30 June 2016 (the ‘Bakhtova Commentary’). These might also resemble what in the Spanish constitutional discourse is referred to as the bloque de constitucionalidad, the legal norms recognized by the 1978 constitution as detailing and complementing the constitution. de Visser, M., Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Hart Publishing 2013) p. 263 Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Art. 3 Law on the Constitutional Court.

⁴⁹ Art. 74(2) Law on the Constitutional Court mandates the Court to evaluate not only the literal meaning of the treaty, but also its meaning in light of other authoritative statements, judicial practice, and the role of the treaty in the domestic legal order. Gilligan, E., Defending Human Rights in Russia: Sergei Kovalyov, Dissident and Human Rights Commissioner, 1969-2003 (Routledge 2004) p. 180-181 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ Art. 91(2) Law on the Constitutional Court.

⁵¹ World Trade Organization Accession Judgment, supra, n. 32.

⁵² Art. 86(2), (3) Law on the Constitutional Court.

⁵³ Art. 2(a) Law on Treaties.

⁵⁴ Art. 1 Law on Treaties.

⁵⁵ Butler, W., ‘National Treaty law and Practice: Russia’, in D.B. Hollis et al. (eds.), National Treaty Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) p. 537 Google Scholar at p. 557.

⁵⁶ The 2003 Decree, supra n. 40, Point 1; supra n. 42, Art. 15(4).

⁵⁷ Art. 86(1)-(6) Law on the Constitutional Court; supra n. 2, p. 5.

⁵⁸ The Incorporation Law was enacted to give force to Art. 65(2) of the Constitution. Its preamble provides that ‘in conformity with part 2 of Article 65 of the Constitutional of the Russian Federation [this law] establishes the main conditions and procedure for the admission to the Russian Federation and for formation of a new constituent entity of the Russian Federation.’

⁵⁹ See e.g. Bakhtova Commentary, supra n. 47, Art. 125(2), noting that while the Constitutional Court decides exclusively matters of law, practice of the Constitutional Court shows that the Court relies not only on the Constitution, but also on ordinary laws arising out of references found in the Constitution. Indeed, the Court confirms the same in the Decision itself by stipulating that the admission of Crimea under Art. 65(2) of the Constitution must be realised according to the procedures established by the Incorporation Law. Supra n. 2, pp. 1,7.

⁶⁰ Butler, supra n. 55, p. 554.

⁶¹ 1995 Decree, supra n. 40, Point 2. As the website of the Supreme Court explains, the Plenum of the Supreme Court ‘evaluates and decides questions concerning petitions to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on requests for constitutional review of laws and other normative acts’, <supcourt.ru/>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁶² Venice Commission Opinion, supra n. 9, para. 45.

⁶³ As to the general competence of the Court to apply international law, Art. 3 of the Law on the Judicial System, which regulates the activities of all courts in Russia, ensures the unity of the judicial system by, among other things, mandating the courts to apply ‘generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.’ See also supra n. 42, Art. 15(4).

⁶⁴ 1995 Decree, supra n. 40, Point 5.

⁶⁵ World Trade Organization Accession Judgment, supra n. 32, Sections 3.2-3.4. The definition provided in Art. 15(4) has served as the normative basis for the application of international treaty law, and general principles and customary rules of international law, including jus cogens, in Russia’s domestic judicial practice. Danilenko, supra n. 34 at p. 62.

⁶⁶ Ibid.; Ushakov Judgment, supra n. 36, Sections 2-3. In the Ushakov Judgment, the Constitutional Court invoked general principles and norms of international law, treaty norms arising out of the Vienna Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Federal laws to validate the provision of the Law on Treaties allowing for temporary application of a treaty prior to its entry into force.

⁶⁷ World Trade Organization Accession Judgment, supra n. 32, Section 3.2; Ushakov Judgment, supra n. 36, Section 2.

⁶⁸ Art. 4(2) Incorporation Law.

⁶⁹ Venice Commission Opinion, supra n. 9, para. 10.

⁷⁰ Ibid. paras. 2, 35.

⁷¹ See e.g. G. Fox, ‘Guest Post: The Russia-Crimea Treaty’, OpinioJuris, 20 March 2014, <opiniojuris.org/2014/03/20/guest-post-russia-crimea-treaty/>, visited 30 June 2016; C. Borgen, ‘From Intervention to Recognition: Russia, Crimea, and Arguments over Recognizing Secessionist Entities’, OpinioJuris, 18 March 2015, <opiniojuris.org/2014/03/18/intervention-recognition-russia-crimea-arguments-recognizing-secessionist-entities/>, visited 30 June 2016; A. Dolidze, ‘Ukraine Insta-Symposium: Potential Non-recognition of Crimea’, OpinioJuris, 17 March 2014, <opiniojuris.org/2014/03/17/ukraine-insta-symposium-potential-non-recognition-crimea/>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁷² ‘A new state comes into existence when a community acquires not momentarily, but with a reasonable probability of permanence, the essential characteristics of a state, namely an organized government, a defined territory, and such a degree of independence from control by any other state as to be capable of conducting its own international relations.’ Clapham, A., Brierly’s Law of Nations (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 149 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ See Fox, supra n. 71.

⁷⁵ See Marxsen, C., ‘Crimea’s Declaration of Independence’, <www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-declaration-of-independence/>>Google Scholar, visited 30 June 2016. See also ‘Girkin rasskazal, kak “sgonyal deputatov” v Krymu golosovat za prisojedinenie k RF’ [‘Girkin tells how he “rounded up deputies” to vote for joining the RF’, <www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/01/24/7056252/>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁷⁶ International Court of Justice 22 July 2010 General List No. 141, Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, para. 81.

⁷⁷ Even though one view regards international legal personality as pre-determined by the legal order, according to another, title to rights and duties is established directly rather than preventively. This means that an entity that is the addressee of international rights and duties enjoys international personality, irrespective of the pre-determination of the personality of that very entity by the legal order. Here, the treatment of Crimea as a state was evidenced by Russia’s express recognition of Crimea, as well as the conclusion of the Crimea Treaty, which purports to give rise to rights and obligations of Crimea under international law. Arts. 2(1)(a) and 6 Vienna Convention; International Court of Justice 11 April 1949, Advisory Opinion on the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, para.178. See also Barberis, J., ‘Nouvelles questions concernant la personnalité juridique internationale’, 179 RCADI (1983) p. 145 Google Scholar at p.165; and Dupuy, P.M., ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international’ 297 RCADI (2002) p. 9 Google Scholar at p. 110.

⁷⁸ Supra n. 2, pp. 5-6.

⁷⁹ The Vienna Convention was formally ratified by the USSR on 23 May 1990, see Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 23 May 1990, No. 1511-1, published by the Vedomosti of the Congress of people’s deputies of the USSR and Supreme Soviet USSR’, No. 23, 6 June 1990. By virtue of the Russian Federation’s succession of the USSR in all of the latter’s international obligations, the Vienna Convention entered into force for Russia effective 1 September 1991.

⁸⁰ Corten, O. and Klein, P., The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: a Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 1230 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸¹ Ibid., at p. 1226.

⁸² Vol. II, ILC Yearbook (1953) p. 154.

⁸³ Vol. II, ILC Yearbook (1966) p. 248. Cf. ILC ‘Report on the work of its fifty third session’, A/56/10, 112, para. 4. On the prohibition of aggression as peremptory norm see the Commentary to Art. 26 of the Articles on State Responsibility, para. 5. See also Report of the ILC, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 85. Such an obligation is of an erga omnes nature and could be invoked by any State, regardless of whether it suffered a breach or not. See 2008 Commentary to Art. 40 of the ASR, p. 114.

⁸⁴ See e.g. Hofmann, R., ‘Annexation’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 21, available online at <opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>>Google Scholar, visited 30 June 2016. This has been reaffirmed by the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, providing that ‘[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force.’ G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25^th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/8082 (24 October 1970). See also UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974), Art. 5(3).

⁸⁵ President Putin confirmed the presence of troops in Crimea in several televised statements. See e.g. ‘Ukraine Conflict: Putin “was ready for nuclear alert’”, <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31899680>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁸⁶ Agreement No. 643_076 ‘On the Status and Conditions of the Presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of Ukraine’, 8 August 1997.

⁸⁷ UNGA Res. 3314, supra n. 84, Art. 3(e); R. Geiß, ‘Russia’s Annexation of Crimea. The Mills of International Law Grind Slowly but They do Grind’, 91 Int’L L. Stud. 425 (2015) p. 426 at p. 432; A. Sari, ‘Ukraine insta-symposium: when does the breach of a status of forces agreement amount to an act of aggression? The case of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of SOFA’, OpinioJuris, 6 March 2014, <opiniojuris.org/2014/03/06/ukraine-insta-symposium-breach-status-forces-agreement-amount-act-aggression-case-ukraine-black-sea-fleet-sofa/>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁸⁸ See e.g. Art. 2 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217.

⁸⁹ See Geiß, supra n. 87, pp. 432, 444, also arguing that a strong case could be made for the most straightforward option, namely that Russia was itself exercising effective control over Crimea prior to the 16 March referendum.

⁹⁰ See Geiß., supra n. 87, pp. 432-3.

⁹¹ See e.g. W. Hague, ‘Oral statement to Parliament: Russian actions in Crimea’, 18 March 2014, <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-actions-in-crimea>, visited 30 June 2016.

⁹² See Allison, R., ‘Russian “deniable” intervention in Ukraine’, 90 International Affairs (2014) p. 1255 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 1263.

⁹³ Allison, supra n. 92, p. 1262; Geiß, supra n. 87, p. 432.

⁹⁴ See Art. 7 UNGA Res. 3314, supra n. 84, which states that ‘nothing in the Definition could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination … nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support in conformity with the Declaration on Principles of international Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States and the UN Charter’.

⁹⁵ See e.g. 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n. 84.

⁹⁶ Ibid. Such military support would also constitute intervention in the internal or external affairs of another state, in violation of the principle of non-intervention. See International Court of Justice 26 November 1984, General List No. 70, Nicaragua v United States of America, at para. 195.

⁹⁷ Chechnya Judgment, supra n. 37, para. 2.

⁹⁸ Allison, supra n. 92, p. 1264.

⁹⁹ Geiß, supra n. 87, p. 445. See also D. Wisehart, ‘The crisis in Ukraine and the prohibition of the use of force: a legal basis for Russia’s intervention?’, EJILTalk, 4 March 2014, <www.ejiltalk.org/the-crisis-in-ukraine-and-the-prohibition-of-the-use-of-force-a-legal-basis-for-russias-intervention>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Geiß, supra n. 87, p. 445.

¹⁰¹ Preamble, Crimea Treaty.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ See Marxsen, supra n. 75.

¹⁰⁴ Supra n. 2, p. 13.

¹⁰⁵ Venice Commission Opinion, supra n. 9, paras. 44-45.

¹⁰⁶ Only those treaties that the author considers still binding on the Russian Federation are addressed here.

¹⁰⁷ Arts. 1 and 2 Budapest Memorandum, available at <www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹⁰⁸ Art. 15 Law on Treaties.

¹⁰⁹ Art. 11 Vienna Convention provides that ‘The consent of a state to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.’ Notably, even if the Budapest Memorandum did not constitute a treaty within the scope of the Vienna Convention; according to Art. 3 of the Vienna Convention an agreement falling outside of the definition of a treaty nevertheless retains its legal force. See also V. Ryabtsev, ‘Russia strayed from the norms of the Budapest Memorandum back in 1999’, Forbes Ukraine, 6 March 2014, <forbes.net.ua/nation/1366750-vladimir-ryabcev-ot-norm-budapeshtskogo-memoranduma-rossiya-otstupila-eshche-v-2003-godu>, visited 13 July 2016.

¹¹⁰ Federal law No. 42-FZ of 2 March 1999, available at <kremlin.ru/acts/bank/13509>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹¹¹ Preamble bases the document on the Friendship Treaty. ‘Declaration on the Terms of Russia-Ukraine Strategic Partnership’, available at <news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1258>, visited 30 June 2016. ‘Yanukovych, Putin to sign declaration of strategic partnership between states’, Kyiv Post, <www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/yanukovych-putin-to-sign-declaration-of-strategic--309785.html>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹¹² The text of the treaty is available, in Russian and Ukrainian, at <flot2017.com/file/show/normativeDocuments/26152>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹¹³ Federal law No. 24 –FZ of 22 April 2004, available at <kremlin.ru/acts/bank/20833>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹¹⁴ L. Mälksoo, ‘Crimea and (the lack of) Continuity in Russian Approaches to International Law’, EJIL:Talk!, 24 March 2014, citing Kremnev, P.P., Raspad SSSR: mezhdunarodno-pravovye problemy [Dissolution of USSR: international legal issues] (2005) p. 68-91 Google Scholar, <www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-the-lack-of-continuity-in-russian-approaches-to-international-law/>, visited 30 June 2016.

¹¹⁵ Venice Commission Opinion, supra n. 9, para. 44.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., paras. 44-45.

¹¹⁷ Lukyanova, supra n. 12, pp. 23-24.