Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-16T23:20:18.739Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The future of the European Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: is it still possible and is it still desirable?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2015

Tobias Lock
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights – Hurdles erected by Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 – Analysis of soundness of the ECJ’s reasoning – Discussion of necessary changes to the Draft Accession Agreement – Criticism that not all obstacles can be removed by amending the Draft Agreement – Treaty change may be necessary – Question whether accession is worth it from a human rights perspective under these conditions

Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , September 2015 , pp. 239 - 273
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Lecturer in EU Law, University of Edinburgh. Drafts of this paper were presented at seminars hosted by the Liverpool European Law Unit on 25 March 2015 and by the United Kingdom Association of European Law at King’s College London on 23 April 2015; thank you to all participants for their thought-provoking questions and suggestions. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very useful suggestions and Emily Hancox for research support. All errors are, of course, my own.

References

1 ECJ 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

2 Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (47+1(2013)008rev2) (hereafter: DDA).

3 Picod, F., ‘La Cour de justice a dit non à l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention EDH’, La Semaine Juridique – Édition Générale (2015) p. 230Google Scholar at p. 234.

4 This had become necessary after the ECJ had held in Opinion 2/94 that accession could not be based on Art. 235 TEC (now Art. 352 TFEU) because the implications of accession would be of constitutional significance and could thus only be brought about by way of Treaty amendment: ECJ 28 March 1996, Opinion 2/94, Accession to the ECHR, paras. 34-35.

5 See Art. 3(1) DAA.

6 On the differences to third party intervention cf. Lock, T., ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg’, 35 European Law Review (2010) p. 777Google Scholar at p. 785-786.

7 Art. 3(3) DAA.

8 Art. 3(5) DAA.

9 Art. 3(7) DAA; on the exception see infra.

10 See the European Commission’s arguments in Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 82.

11 See Art. 34 ECHR.

12 Art. 267 TFEU.

13 Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010, available at <www.curia.europa.eu>, visited 10 August 2015.

14 ECJ 18 April 2002, Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, paras. 12-13.

15 ECJ 12 September 2006, Case C-131/03 P, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. and Others v Commission of the European Communities, para. 102.

16 For details see Lock, T., ‘Walking on a tightrope: The draft ECHR accession agreement and the autonomy of the EU legal order’, 48 CML Rev (2011) p. 1025Google Scholar at p. 1028-1033.

17 ECJ 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, para. 285.

18 ECJ 8 March 2011, Opinion 1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system, para. 80.

19 This is evident from the (now declassified) negotiation directives, Council document 10602/10.

20 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 156.

21 Editorial, ‘A Constitutional Moment: Acceding to the ECHR (or not)’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 1.

22 See Council Document 7977/15, which summarises discussions on the way forward, with Treaty change not among them.

23 See Art. 2 DAA.

24 ECtHR 29 April 1988, Case No. 10328/83, Belilos v Switzerland, para. 55.

25 See also ECtHR 4 March 2014, Case Nos. 18640/10; 18647/10; 18663/10; 18668/10; 18698/10, Grande Stevens and Others v Italy, para. 207.

26 E.g. in Belilos v Switzerland, n. 24 supra.

27 As happened ibid.

28 Cameron, I., ‘Treaties, Declarations of Interpretation’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2008)Google Scholar.

29 Advocated e.g. by P. Jan Kuijper, ‘Reaction to Leonard Besselink’s ACELG Blog’ <acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-besselinks’s-acelg-blog/>, visited 10 August 2015; Wessel, R. A. and Łazowski, A., ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to the ECHR’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 179Google Scholar at p. 197.

30 On disconnection clauses in general see Cremona, M., ‘Disconnection Clauses in EU Law and Practice’, in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart 2010)Google Scholar.

31 Cf. Unilateral declaration of the EU in respect of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (adopted 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007) 2240 UNTS.

32 Note that the order in which they are presented here differs from the order in the Opinion.

33 Art. 3(5) DAA.

34 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 224-225; a similar argument was made by AG Kokott: View of AG Kokott delivered on 13 June 2014 in ECJ, 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, paras. 231-232.

35 See Draft Explanatory Report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (47+1(2013)008rev2), para. 55.

36 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 229-235; View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 175-179.

37 See infra.

38 Halberstam, D., ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 105Google Scholar at p. 137.

39 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 226-228; View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, para. 265.

40 On reservations under Art. 57 ECHR see supra.

41 Art. 57 ECHR; Art. (1)(d) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

42 See Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010; Joint communication from the Presidents of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, further to the meeting between the two courts in January 2011, both available at <www.curia.europa.eu>, visisted 10 August 2015.

43 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 238.

44 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 242-247.

45 Ibid, para. 239.

46 Ibid, paras. 245-246.

47 View of A-G Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 222-228.

48 See to this effect ECJ 14 December 1991, Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, para. 35; Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 201; Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, supra n. 17, para. 282; Art. 3 of Protocol No. 8 expressly protects Art. 344 TFEU.

49 ECJ 30 April 1974, Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgium; Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 204.

50 Haegeman v Belgium, n. 49 supra.

51 View of A-G Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 114-119.

52 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 208.

53 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 209.

54 Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 120.

55 ECJ 30 May 2006, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland.

56 Johansen, S. Ø., ‘The Reinterpretation of TFEU Art. 344 in Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 169Google Scholar at p. 172-176. Hence a solution would have to prevent such

57 See Art. 282 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3; see Commission v Ireland n. 55 supra, para. 125.

58 Ibid., para. 213.

59 This is suggested by Johansen, supra n. 56, p. 178.

60 ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, para. 60, confirming inter alia ECJ 17 December 1970, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel.

61 ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 19-22.

62 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 189.

63 In hierarchical terms international agreements concluded by the EU are on a mezzanine level between primary and secondary law. Their prevalence over secondary law results from Art. 216(2) TFEU and their need to comply with primary law is presupposed by Art. 218(11) TFEU.

64 Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 120.

65 See Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, which according to Art. 52(7) CFR must be given ‘due regard’.

66 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 192.

67 Ibid, para. 194.

68 Ibid, para. 193.

69 Ibid, para. 168.

70 See e.g. the Court’s reliance on only these two concepts in Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, para. 65.

71 ECJ 20 February 1979, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein.

72 See Arts. 3 and 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 [2003] OJ L 50/1.

73 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Case No. 14038/88, Soering v United Kingdom; ECtHR 15 November 1996, Case No. 22414/93, Chahal v United Kingdom; recently confirmed in ECtHR 28 February 2009, Case No. 37201/06, Saadi v Italy.

74 E.g. Chahal v United Kingdom, supra n. 73.

75 E.g. ECtHR 17 January 2012, Case No. 8139/09, Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom.

76 ECtHR 21 January 2011, Case No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, paras. 341-369.

77 ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department.

78 ECJ 10 December 2013, Case C-394/12, Shamso Abdullahli v Bundesasylamt, para. 60.

79 ECtHR 4 November 2014, Case No. 29217/12, Tarakhel v Switzerland, paras. 114-120. Switzerland is of course not a member state of the EU, but partakes in the Dublin system and was thus treated by the ECtHR as if it were a member state, ibid., para. 88.

80 Laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1.

81 E.g. in ECtHR 18 June 2013, Case No. 3890/11, Povse v Austria; on the presumption cf. infra.

82 ECtHR 4 May 2010, Case No. 56588/07, Stapleton v Ireland.

83 ECtHR 18 March 2014, Case No. 46706/08, Ignaoua and Others v United Kingdom.

84 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, paras. 194-195.

85 They are suggested by Krenn, C., ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 147Google Scholar at p. 164-165.

86 Halberstam, , supra n. 38, p. 135Google Scholar argues that the issue would resolve itself once changes to the co-respondent mechanism have been made. However, this author does not agree with Halberstam’s suggestions concerning Art. 3(7) DAA so that an automatic resolution is not convincing, see supra.

87 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 197.

88 Art. 1 of Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Explanatory Report <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_ENG.pdf>, visited 10 August 2015; on the exact workings of the Protocol see Dzehtsiarou, K. and O’Meara, N., ‘Advisory Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: a magic bullet for dialogue and docket-control?’, 34 Legal Studies (2014) p. 444CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89 Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

90 Art. 5 of Protocol No. 16.

91 See supra.

92 To this effect see Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 120-123.

93 NB: reservations to the provisions of Protocol No. 16 are not permissible, cf. Art. 9 of the Protocol.

94 Cf. Art. 275 TFEU.

95 This term was coined by Jacqué, J-P., ‘The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 48 CML Rev (2011) p. 995Google Scholar at p. 1005; for examples cf. T. Lock, ‘End of an epic? The draft accession agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR’, 31 Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 162 at p. 188-190.

96 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 252.

97 Ibid, para. 255.

98 Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, para. 18.

99 Opinion 2/13, supra n. 1, para. 255.

100 This consideration also refutes the argument made by Halberstam that the function of the ECJ as a harmonising voice would be undermined as the member states clearly did not want the Court to have this role, cf. Halberstam, , supra n. 38, p. 137-144Google Scholar.

101 View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, para. 192.

102 Ibid., para. 193 (emphasis in the original).

103 Art. 19(1) TEU.

104 Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, in particular at para. 80.

105 Hillion, C., ‘A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law (Hart 2014) p. 47Google Scholar at p. 67; this view is shared by E. Regelsberger and D. Kugelmann, ‘Art. 275 AEUV’, in R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV (C. H. Beck 2012) at para. 10.

106 View of AG Kokott, supra n. 34, paras. 96-100.

107 Opinion 1/09, supra n. 18, in particular at para. 83 ff.

108 A reservation excluding the review of CFSP measures would probably be met with similar concerns, as the ECtHR would have jurisdiction to interpret the reservation.

109 This is proposed by Krenn, supra n. 85, p. 166 and Halberstam, supra n. 38, p. 144.

110 A similar modification is discussed by Wessel and Łazowski, supra n. 29, p. 206.

111 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report (2014) 6.

112 Peers, for instance, concludes that it has become necessary to oppose accession instead of supporting it: Peers, S., ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 213Google Scholar at p. 222.

113 E.g. Lock, T., ‘Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights’, 10 Human Rights Law Review (2010) p. 529CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

114 ECtHR 18 February 1999, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v United Kingdom, para. 32.

115 ECtHR 30 June 2005, Case No. 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland, paras. 154-166; an up-to-date analysis of subsequent cases can e.g. be found in Ryngaert, C., ‘Oscillating between Embracing and Avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights on Member State Responsibility for Acts of International Organisations and the Case of the European Union’, 39 European Law Review (2014) p. 176Google Scholar.

116 As was e.g. the case in ECtHR 6 December 2012, Case No. 12323/11, Michaud v France, para. 113.

117 ECtHR 9 December 2009, Case No. 73274/01, Connolly v 15 Member States of the EU.

118 See Art. 1(4) DAA.

119 E.g. by Besselink, L. F. M., ‘The European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights: From Sovereign Immunity in Bosphorus to Full Scrutiny Under the Reform Treaty?’, in I. Boerefijn and J. E. Goldschmidt (eds.), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights, Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman (Intersentia 2008) p. 295Google Scholar at p. 303.

120 For a more detailed discussion cf. Lock 2010, supra n. 6, p. 797-798.

121 Except for possible delays and increased costs.

122 E.g. ECtHR 18 January 1978, Case No. 5310/71, Ireland v United Kingdom; ECtHR 10 May 2001, Case No. 25781/94, Cyprus v Turkey; ECtHR Preliminary Objections 13 December 2011, Case No. 38263/08, Georgia v Russia; ECtHR pending, Case No. 20958/14, Ukraine v Russia.

123 Ireland v United Kingdom, n. 123 supra.

124 Spaventa, E., ‘A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union after Opinion 2/13’, 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2015) p. 35CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 51.

125 E.g. in Povse v Austria, supra n. 81.

126 This could well happen given the comments by the President of the European Court of Human Rights referred to in the conclusion.

127 See above.

128 ECtHR 8 January 2013, Case Nos. 43517/09; 46882/09; 55400/09; 57875/09; 61535/09; 35315/10; 37818/10, Torreggiani and Others v Italy.

129 ECtHR 27 January 2015, Case Nos. 36925/10; 21487/12; 72893/12; 73196/12; 77718/12; 9717/13, Neshkov and Others v Bulgaria; the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs also voiced its concerns over the effective protection of human rights compliance in the European Arrest Warrant system (Draft Report 2013/2109(INL)).

130 For details see Lock, supra n. 9, p. 188-190.

131 On the political hurdles see the Editorial of the last issue of this review, supra n. 21.

132 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report (2014) 6.

133 E.g. the pending Grand Chamber decision of Case No. 17502/07, Avotiņš v Latvia concerns mutual recognition under the Brussels I Regulation.