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Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: constitutional constraints and proposals for strengthening the European Parliament

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2018

Wolfgang Weiß
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Abstract

EU Free Trade Agreements joint organs – Comprehensive powers beyond executive implementation – Democratic legitimacy concerns – Establishment of treaty bodies in CETA as a conferral of public powers – Limits to delegation prescribed by EU constitutional law – Mechanisms to strengthen the control of the European Parliament over the treaty bodies’ decision-making

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Articles
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 532 - 566
Copyright
© The Authors 2018 

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Footnotes

*

The author holds the Chair of Public Law, European and Public International Law at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer. He would like to thank the anonymous reviewer. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 721916 (EUTIP).

References

1 ECJ 10 September 1996, Taflan-Met and Others ECLI:EU:C:1996:315, paras. 18-21.

2 Art. 36 ff Additional Protocol, annexed to the Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, OJ 1977 L 361/59. Art. 36 reads: ‘Freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement. The Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that end’. Art. 12 of the Association Agreement, OJ 1977 L 361/1, states that ‘the Contracting parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the [ECT] for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for workers between them’.

3 Bradley, C. and Kelly, J., ‘The concept of international delegation’, 71(1) Law and Contemporary Problems (2008) p. 1 Google Scholar.

4 Art. 15.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2011 L 127, 6.

5 Art. 2.5.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement.

6 Art. 15.5.2 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement regarding Annexes, Protocols and Notes; Art. 15.1.4 d) on binding interpretations.

7 Similarly, Art. 5.14.2(d) CETA with regard to the joint management committee decision to amend the annexes to Chapter 5.

8 See German Federal Constitutional Court 13 October 2016, Case 2 BvR 1368/16, Huber v German Federal Government para. 64, available at <www.bverfg.de/e/rs20161013_2bvr136816.html>, visited 8 July 2018.

9 See also Alemanno, A., ‘The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences’, 18(3) Journal of International Economic Law (2015) p. 625 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 635 ff.

10 Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 10-17.

11 The CETA joint committee may decide on the extension of the concept of intellectual property (Art. 8.1), or on the meaning of fair and equitable treatment of investors (Art. 8.10.3). It may amend or supplement CETA provisions with respect to the Harmonized System (Art. 2.13.1(b)), and consider amendments to Chapter 4 of the CETA (Art. 4.7.1(f) read in conjunction with Art. 26.1.5(c)) or make amendments to Chapter 23 (Art. 23.11.5).

12 Under Art. 8.28.3 read in conjunction with Art. 8.28.7 CETA, the CETA joint committee sets out administrative and organisational aspects of the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal, including procedural issues. By virtue of Arts. 8.44.2 and 8.44.3(b), the Committee on Services and Investment establishes a code of conduct for the tribunal members that may address issues of disclosure, confidentiality, impartiality and independence, and procedural and transparency rules. The parties’ role as such is to complete their respective internal requirements and procedures.

13 For example, the joint CETA committee may change the number of investment tribunal members (Art. 8.27.3), settle their salary (Art. 8.27.15), decide the list of arbitrators (Art. 29.8), or remove a member from the tribunal (Art. 8.30.4). Art. 10.5.2(b) grants the competence to exchange and adopt common criteria and interpretations for the implementation of Chapter 10 on temporary entry and residence for business purposes to the contact points of both sides, i.e. the Canadian Immigration Director and the EU Director General for Trade.

14 See the competences of the financial services committee in Annex 13-B CETA.

15 Art. 11.3 CETA on mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Those agreements are negotiated in a specific procedure provided in Art. 11.3.3–11.3.6 CETA and finally adopted by decision of the MRA Committee, whose binding force is conditional upon subsequent notification to the MRA Committee by each Party of the fulfilment of its respective internal requirements. The negotiations are conducted by each Party.

16 Under Art. 20.22.1, read in conjunction with Article 26.1.5(c), the CETA joint committee may, by amending Annex 20-A, add or remove protected geographical indications of origin. The joint management committee shall amend the Annexes to Chapter 5 (Art. 5.14.2(d)) (explicitly subject to approval by the parties in accordance with their procedures necessary for the entry into force of the amendment). See also Art. 20.22.1 in combination with Art. 26.1.5(c) CETA. For this classification see Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 10.

17 The Committee on Trade in Goods endorses the implementation measures, Art. 21.7.5 CETA.

18 Under Art. 6.14.4, in conjunction with Art. 2.8.4 CETA, the joint Customs Cooperation Committee can resolve customs issues raised by a Party.

19 Art. 5.14.1: regulatory and trade representatives that bear responsibility for sanitary and phytosanitary measures; Art. 6.14.2: representatives of customs, commercial or other competent authorities; Art. 13.18.1: representatives of financial services authorities; Art. 19.19.1 makes a general reference to representatives of the contracting parties; Art. 21.6.3: the Forum for Regulatory Cooperation is jointly chaired by senior representatives of Canada and the Commission, while the other members can be ‘relevant officials of each Party’ which might include national representatives of the EU Member States.

20 See for example Art. 15.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement. Prior acceptance by the parties is stipulated only with regard to decisions that amend the Agreement (Art. 15.5.2).

21 Appel, N., Das internationale Kooperationsrecht der EU (Springer 2016) p. 211 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff.

22 Art. 218(7) is a further simplification of para. (9), see Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in ECJ 16 July 2015, Case C-73/14, Council v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:490, para. 67; Opinion of A.G. Szpunar in ECJ 24 April 2017, Case C-600/14, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:296, para. 57.

23 See Art. 2 of the Council Decision 2017/38 on the provisional application of CETA, OJ 2017 L 11/1080.

24 Appel, supra n. 21, p. 212.

25 For recommendations see Art. 8.10.3, Art. 8.44.3(a), (d) and (e), Art. 23.11.5 CETA.

26 See Art. 5.14.2(d) CETA; Art. 11.3.6 CETA.

27 The provisional application of CETA as from 21 September 2017 does not comprise those Committee competences which are enshrined in CETA Chapter 8, see Art. 1 Council Decision 2017/38, 2017 OJ L 11/1080 and the notice concerning the provisional application of the CETA, 2017 OJ L 238/9. Hence, the present analysis applies to them once they enter into force.

28 The evolutionary history would militate in favour of this, see the exploration of the ECJ case law in Appel, supra n. 21, p. 328.

29 In favour of the latter see von Bogdandy, A. et al., ‘Legal Instruments in European Union Law and their Reform: A Systematic Approach on an Empirical Basis’, 23 YBEL (2004) p. 91 Google Scholar at p. 130; see also Alemanno, supra n. 9, p. 636.

30 See e.g. Art. 2(2) Council Decision 11436/12; Giegerich, T., ‘Article 218 AEUV’, in M. Pechstein et al. (eds.), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV (Mohr Siebeck 2017)Google Scholar marginal note 175.

31 Dashwood, A., ‘External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty’, 35 CML Rev (1998) p. 1019 Google Scholar at p. 1026.

32 This may explain why not all Council decisions under Art. 218(9) are published in the Official Journal, see Art. 297(2) TFEU.

33 See ECJ 24 October 2014, Case C-399/12, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, para. 63. For practical examples see Czuczai, J., ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order and the Law-making Activities of International Organizations: Some Examples Regarding the Council’s most Recent Practice’, 31(1) Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 452 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 See ECJ 14 November 1989, Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:1989:422, para. 13. Lavranos, N., Legal Interaction between Decisions of International Organisations and European Law (Europa 2004) p. 35 Google Scholar ff, 53, 93.

35 Appel, supra n. 21, p. 324 ff; Opinion of A.G. Szpunar, supra n. 22, para. 58, 162. International delegation does not require transfer of powers to a body that is independent from the parties and has its own will, cf Lavranos, supra n. 34, p. 79 ff; Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 6 ff.

36 ECJ 6 October 2015, Case C-73/14, Council v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:663, para. 65.

37 See also Art. 17.15 EU Singapore Free Trade Agreement. An explicit treaty rule on (the exclusion of) direct effect is binding on the ECJ, see ECJ 13 January 2015, Case C-401/12 P, Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht ECLI:EU:C:2015:4, para. 53.

38 See e.g. Arts. 23(2), 52(2), 53(1), 59(1), 82(2) TFEU.

39 The exclusion of direct effect in my opinion does not relate to the investment court systemm as its decisions must be enforced by domestic courts without any further implementation measure, see Art. 8.41.2 CETA. This issue, however, is not relevant for the time being as provisional application of CETA does not comprise the ISDS mechanism.

40 Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 34, para. 13; ECJ 20 September 1990, Case C-192/89, Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1990:322, para. 9. Not least in the case of an EU free trade agreement, they enjoy the same legal status as the agreements. See R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans, The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the EU, Brugge Research Paper 1/2014, p. 20. The ECJ refers to Art. 216(2) only with regard to the agreements themselves, see ECJ 16 July 2015, Case C-612/13 P, ClientEarth v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:486, para. 33.

41 In the cases cited above, direct effect of the treaty bodies’ decisions was not an issue. The character of such a decision as an integral part of EU law does not require its direct effect, nor even its legal binding force; for the latter see ECJ 21 January 1993, Case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg ECLI:EU:C:1993:24, para 17-18; Mendez, M., The Legal Effects of EU Agreements (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 113 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff. See also Taflan-Met, supra n. 1, para. 18 ff, where the Court distinguished between the binding force of a treaty-body decision for the Member States and the issue of its direct effect.

42 See again Deutsche Shell AG, supra n. 41, paras. 17-18.

43 Cf Lavranos, supra n. 34, p. 60; Appel, supra n. 21, p. 384 ff.

44 This is in line with the maximalist enforcement paradigm of the ECJ as regards EU Agreements, see Mendez, supra n. 41, p. 157. The binding force for the member states of a treaty-body decision established by a mixed agreement does not depend on the adoption of implementing measures, see Taflan-Met, supra n. 1, para. 19-22.

45 Recently, ECJ 25 October 2017, Case C-687/15, European Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:803, para. 48-49 confirmed the constitutional significance of respecting the principle of allocation of powers also with regard to international action of the EU.

46 For the genesis of Art. 218(9) TFEU see the Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in ECJ 24 October 2014, Case C-399/12, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:289, para. 39 ff; Dashwood, A., ‘EU Acts and Member State Acts in the Negotiation, Conclusion, and Implementation of International Agreements’, in M. Cremona and C. Kilpatrick (eds.), EU Legal Acts (Oxford University Press 2018) p. 189 Google Scholar at p. 228 ff.

47 See ECJ, Opinion 1/78 ECLI:EU:C:1979:224, para. 51; see also Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 44-45. With regard to some treaty bodies in EU Agreements, specific arrangements or procedures had been concluded between Council and Commission or provided in the concluding act, see Dashwood, supra n. 31, p. 1025.

48 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 80.

49 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, paras. 51, 80.

50 ECJ 26 April 1977, Opinion 1/76 ECLI:EU:C:1977:63, para. 5

51 See recently ECJ 16 May 2017, Opinion 2/15 ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 276; ECJ 18 December 2014, Case C-81/13, UK v Council of the EU ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449, para. 61; ECJ 5 December 2017, Case C-600/14, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:935, para. 60.

52 Council v Commission, supra n. 36, para. 65.

53 Germany v Council, supra n. 33, para. 56 ff, 63 ff.

54 In contrast, Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, paras. 89-99 opined that Art. 218(9) applied only to acts which have binding force under international law.

55 In the French version one can observe the change from ‘des décisions ayant des effets juridiques’ in Art. 300(2) subpara. 2 ECT to ‘des actes ayant des effets juridiques’ in Art. 218(9) TFEU, in the German version from ‘rechtswirksame Beschlüsse’ to ‘rechtswirksame Akte’.

56 See Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 52 who opines that the changes in Art. 218(9) did not imply ‘fundamental changes of substance’.

57 Bradley, K., ‘Legislating in the EU’, in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds.), European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 97 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 101.

58 See Chalmers, D. et al., European Union Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press 2014) p. 112 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 von Bogdandy, A. et al., ‘Handlungsformen im Unionsrecht’, 62 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (2002) p. 77 Google Scholar at p. 147 ff.

60 See also von Bogdandy et al., supra n. 29, p. 129.

61 See mutatis mutandis UK v Council of the EU, supra n. 51, para. 66.

62 See Annex III, para. 9 of the Framework Agreement between Commission and European Parliament, 2010 OJ 304/47.

63 See Martenczuk, B., ‘Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements and the Community Legal Order’ in V. Kronenberger (ed.), The EU and the International Legal Order (Asser Press 2001) p. 141 Google Scholar at p. 150 ff.

64 Dashwood, supra n. 46, p. 189 at p. 230.

65 Dashwood, supra n. 46, p. 231; Eeckhout, P., EU External Relations Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 208 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 This concern was already raised with regard to Association Council decisions by Neuwahl, N., ‘The European Parliament and Association Council Decisions: The example of Decisions 1/95 of the EC/Turkey Association Council’, 33 CMLRev (1996) p. 51 Google Scholar at p. 56.

67 Chapter 27 on Transparency contains stipulations only with regard to domestic implementation. The legitimacy concerns caused by the restraining effects treaties have for public participation lack participatory standards established in EU law, and may even deplete these standards in their implementation, see Mendes, J., ‘EU law and global regulatory regimes: Hollowing out procedural standards’, 10(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law (2012) p. 988 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 Para. 26 of the Framework Agreement, supra n. 62, provides for a possible observer status for Members of the European Parliament at meetings of decision-making bodies set up by multilateral agreements only, not with regard to bilateral ones.

69 See Art. 218 VI(ii), (iii) TFEU.

70 German Federal Constitutional Court 30 June 2009 (Lisbon Treaty), Case 2 BvE 2/08, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 262.

71 Lenaerts, K., ‘The Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’, 62 ICLQ (2013) p. 271 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 280.

72 Appel, supra n. 21, p. 303.

73 von Bogdandy, A, ‘Founding Principles’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Hart 2009) p. 11 Google Scholar at p. 49.

74 For such conception of the dual democratic legitimacy of the EU see von Achenbach, J., Demokratische Gesetzgebung in der EU (Springer 2014) p. 300 Google Scholar ff, 452 ff; von Achenbach, J., ‘The European Parliament as a Forum of National Interest? A Transnationalist Critique of Jurgen Habermas’ Reconstruction of Degressive Proportionality’, 55(2) Journal of Common Market Studies (2017) p. 193 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sangi, R., Die auswärtige Gewalt des Europäischen Parlaments (Springer 2018) p. 63 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff. See also ECtHR 29 October 1997, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v United Kingdom, para. 52: the European Parliament ‘must be seen as that part of the European Community structure which best reflects concerns as to “effective political democracy”’.

75 See Schütze, R., Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution (Cambridge University Press 2014) p. 385 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff; Ott, A., ‘The European Parliament’s Role in EU Treaty-Making’, 23(6) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2016) p. 1009 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meissner, K., ‘Democratizing EU External Relations: The European Parliament’s Informal Role in SWIFT, ACTA and TTIP’, 21(2) European Foreign Affair Review (2016) p. 269 Google Scholar.

76 ECJ 24 June 2014, Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, para. 56.

77 Germany v Council, supra n. 51, para. 71.

78 Lenaerts, supra n. 71, p. 293 ff.

79 For non-delegation in other jurisdictions see Schütze, R., ‘“Delegated” legislation in the (new) European Union: a Constitutional Analysis’, 74(5) MLR (2011) p. 661 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 663 ff; for Germany see Art 80 Basic Law. Schütze, R., ‘Constitutional Limits to Delegated Powers’, in A. Antoniadis et al. (eds.), The EU and Global Emergencies (Hart 2011) p. 49 Google Scholar at p. 50, was the first to use the phrase ‘delegation doctrine’ in EU constitutional law, yet focusing on the internal side, specifically EU agencies.

80 ECJ 5 September 2012, Case C-355/10, Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2012:516, paras. 64-67, 76, 78; ECJ 27 October 1992, Case C-240/90, Germany v Council ECLI:EU:C:1992:408, para. 37.

81 Parliament v Council, supra n. 80, para, 77; ECJ 10 September 2015, Case C-363/14, Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:579, para. 53. See also den Heijer, M. and Tauschinsky, E., ‘Where Human Rights Meet Administrative Law: Essential Elements and Limits to Delegation’, 10 EuConst (2013) p. 513 Google Scholar at p. 527, 533; Curtin, D. and Manucharyan, T., ‘Legal Acts and Hierarchy of Norms in EU Law’, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 103 Google Scholar at p. 112.

82 In Schütze, R., ‘Constitutional Limits to Delegated Powers’, in A. Antoniadis et al. (eds.), The EU and Global Emergencies (Hart 2011) p. 49 Google Scholar at p. 54 terms: specificity principle.

83 See ECJ 6 December 2005, Case C-66/04, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2005:743, para. 48 f.

84 Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in ECJ 16 July 2015, Case C-88/14, Commission v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:304, para. 45.

85 See W. Voermans, J. Hartmann and M. Keading, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy in EU Secondary Legislation’, 2(1) Theory and Practice of Legislation (2014) p. 5 at p. 9: ‘democratic update’ of the implementing system.

86 This position is based on J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Second Treatise, Chapter XII, para. 146 ff.

87 See recently in the context of external relations European Commission v Council, supra n. 45, para. 40.

88 See Craig, P., ‘Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 41 Google Scholar ff.

89 ECJ 13 June 1958, Case 9/56, Meroni v Haute autorité ECLI:EU:C:1958:7.

90 ECJ 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and 155/04, Alliance for Natural Health and Others ECLI:EU:C:2005:449, para. 90.

91 ECJ 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para. 41 ff; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 155.

92 Meroni v Haute autorité , supra n. 89, [1958] ECR 133 at 152; Alliance for Natural Health and Others, supra n. 90, para. 90.

93 Discretionary powers are critical as soon as they imply a wide margin of discretion, see Meroni v Haute autorité, supra n. 89, [1958] ECR 133 at 154; United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, supra n. 91, para. 50. For this understanding see also Schütze, ‘“Delegated” legislation in the (new) European Union: a Constitutional Analysis’, supra n. 79, p. 661 at p. 674, fn 89. For a criticism of a distinguishability between wide and simple discretion see Saurer, J., ‘Supranational Governance and Networked Accountability Structures: Member State Oversight of EU Agencies’, in S. Rose-Ackerman et al. (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law, 2nd edn (2017) p. 619 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 627 ff.

94 Accord von Bogdandy et al., supra n. 29, p. 130.

95 Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in ECJ 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, para. 85.

96 See Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 75.

97 See Schmalenbach, K., ‘Art. 218’ in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV, 5th edn (CH Beck 2016)Google Scholar para. 31.

98 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 80 ff.

99 Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalon in Germany v Council, supra n. 46, para. 75.

100 Opinion of A.G. Szpunar, supra n. 22, para. 58, fn. 30

101 See Kuijper, P.J. et al., The Law of EU External Relations, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 182 Google Scholar.

102 Schütze, supra n. 75, p. 396: ‘absolute limitation [following] from the constitutional frame’.

103 Other agreements also establish that a treaty body may set up further committees and define their tasks, see Art. 15.1.4 EU Korea Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2011 L 127, 6; Art. 31.3 EU Norway Agreement, OJ 1973 L 171, 2; Art. 43 EU Interim Treaty with Bosnia and Hercegovina, OJ 2008 L 169, 13; Art. 49 EU Mexico Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2000 L 276, 45.

104 ECJ 8 April 2014, Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, para. 68.

105 See para. 25 ff Framework Agreement (fn. 62).

106 Currently, Rule 108(4) Rules of Procedure of the EP, January 2017 <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+RULES-EP+20170116+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN> and para. 23 of the Framework Agreement only provide for EP recommendations that are required to be taken into account with regard to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements. Rule 109 (2) merely foresees that the EP may issue recommendations which may include requests to the Council.

107 See Annex III, para. 4 of the Framework Agreement.

108 See Annex III, para. 9 of the Framework Agreement.

109 Accord Alemanno, supra n. 9, p. 636 ff.

110 For a proposal of an EU Trade Act see Cottier, T., ‘Front Loading Trade Policy-Making in the European Union: Towards a Trade Act’, European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2017) p. 35 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It should contain the rules proposed here.

111 See Craig, P., The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 53 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff.