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The Vacuous Concept of Shareholder Voting Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2013

Daniel Attenborough*
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Law, University of Leicester. The author wishes to thank participants in the Society of Legal Scholars Conference, University of Bristol, September 2012. This article has also benefited from the insightful observations of the anonymous reviewer. Particular thanks are owed to Andrew Keay, Paul O&Connell and Lorraine Talbot for extremely helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. The usual disclaimers apply.
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Abstract

The shareholder empowerment debate in corporate law is premised upon a reoccurring assumption that, historically, there has been an erosion of shareholder rights. This article contends that this premise is inaccurate and that shareholder rights have remained fundamentally constant. It goes on to argue that a more promising approach to theexisting understanding of rights in the shareholder empowerment debate may be found in the broader legal rights literature. In analysing shareholder rights through this lens it is contended that, while there has not been an appreciable abrogation of shareholder rights, it is in the nature of legal rights per se to contain power whilst simultaneously reinforcing the institutions and structures from where those rights emanate.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2013 

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