Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T13:01:15.986Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Stabilisation Activity in Italian IPOs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2011

Dmitri Boreiko
Affiliation:
Respectively, Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, Italy, email: [email protected] CRELE Associate (Center for Research in Law and Economics, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano), and Assistant Professor of Economic and Business Law, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, email: [email protected], Visiting Fellow, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, October 2010-June 2011, email: [email protected], ECGI Research Associate and CRELE Associate.
Stefano Lombardo
Affiliation:
Respectively, Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, Italy, email: [email protected] CRELE Associate (Center for Research in Law and Economics, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano), and Assistant Professor of Economic and Business Law, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, email: [email protected], Visiting Fellow, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, October 2010-June 2011, email: [email protected], ECGI Research Associate and CRELE Associate.
Get access

Abstract

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 regulates price stabilisation activities for equity initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe as a form of permitted market manipulation. To test the actual practices and effects of stabilisation we empirically analyse the support provided by underwriters of 141 Italian IPOs from 2000 through to 2008. We find that underwriters support the share prices not only by short covering, but also by posting pure stabilisation bids. Pure short covering is mostly used by more reputable underwriters for IPOs with higher institutional participation and more secondary shares in the offer, whereas the opposite is true for pure stabilization IPOs. We try to identify some patterns in underwriters' aftermarket activities and analyse the extent to which the stabilisation activity, permitted for four weeks after trading begins, produces temporary or permanent effects on share prices.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)