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Financial Tunnelling and the Mandatory Bid Rule*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 August 2009
Abstract
In this paper, we use case studies to document how dominant shareholders have circumvented mandatory bid rules to appropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Dominant shareholders are numerous in Continental Europe. Creative compliance with mandatory bid rules reveals the failure of boards and regulators to protect minority shareholders and the difficulties of legislating in this area. We propose enhanced means for protecting their interests.
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- Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2009
Footnotes
Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the title ‘Financial Tunnelling and the Revenge of the Insider System’. We would like to thank Peter Abell, Bernard Black, Irma Clots-Figueras, Luca Enriques, Rafael Gomez, Christoph Kumpan, Sir Geoffrey Owen, Miguel Segoviano and David Webb for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed are purely those of the authors.
References
* Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the title ‘Financial Tunnelling and the Revenge of the Insider System’. We would like to thank Peter Abell, Bernard Black, Irma Clots-Figueras, Luca Enriques, Rafael Gomez, Christoph Kumpan, Sir Geoffrey Owen, Miguel Segoviano and David Webb for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed are purely those of the authors.
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