The purpose of this paper is to illustrate – in an argumentative style – that once we refrain from the usual neoclassical assumptions and integrate transaction costs, imperfect foresight and bounded rationality into present neoclassical (spot and futures) market theory, we get a more realistic perception of the decentralisation of intertemporal economic decision making. The failure of most futures markets for goods and services is compensated by firms (‘hierarchies’), which are led by entrepreneurs in the sense of Knight (1921) who may be seen as surrogate forward traders of goods and services. We claim that the ‘more realistic assumptions’ of New Institutional Economics, inter alia, provide a better perception of what takes place behind the veil of ‘money and finance’ than neoclassical economics, and why it makes sense to occasionally limit liability and, as a consequence, apply forms of private or public regulation. It might also help to explain some aspects of the financial crisis of 2008.