Nardin uses the Eastern European experience of the late 1980s and the works of Adam Michnik and Vaclav Havel to demonstrate the traditional cosmopolitan Kantian notion of morality in the “appeal to universal human values.” Nardin uses three major elements to argue the impossibility of such a concept: “the law of nature,” based on Stoic and Judeo-Christian foundation, focusing on reason and rationality of the individual rather than custom or divine authority; the uniqueness of various cultures challenging the universal “cosmopolitan” outlook on morality; and the differences among universal principles of morality relative to personal human experiences throughout time. Nardin concludes that the moral renewal in Eastern Europe is evidence that destructive consequences of moral diversity do not preclude a civil society once agreements on authoritative principles and laws are institutionalized. Each individual's own ethical conduct and internal moral guidance offer the basis for criticism and reform of law through membership in particular communities and common humanity.

China's vast borders and unique geographical conditions predisposed it to a hierarchically arranged multi-state “zoning system,” first instituted in the Chou dynasty's (13th-8th centuries B.C.) feudal network. “The Mandate from Heaven” embodied the moral implications and its “judging god” that the Chou incorporated into their political ethics of a system of a universal state. The Mandate essentially reflected the will of the people and stated that rulers could be removed if they failed to fulfill their prescribed Mandate. As the foundation for Confucian ethics, the Mandate was the guiding force of any political or social choice based on benevolence and humanism, jen and li, respectively. Drawing on the writings of two ancient Chinese philosophers, Motzu (ca. 479–390 B.C.) and Mencius (ca. 370–296 B.C.), Hsu shows how the Confucian virtues of governing emphasized that only a compassionate and just king would be supported by the people, would be able to avoid violence, and would promote moral values among the citizenry. According to Confucius, only moral individuals can create a moral order at every level of society and therefore a moral world with China at its center. The Confucian sino-centric concept of morality and ethics, which dictated both domestic and international policies, maintained that through good government and internal peace and prosperity, China would play a leadership role in the world and serve as a universal paradigm for other nations.

Ethical dilemmas of international relations have led to two distinct principles of thought, as presented in this article. The Western tradition has generally advocated the distinct differences between politics and morality, though asserting that the former is grounded on the latter. The “normative prudence” school of Aristotle, Aquinas, Burke, and Niebuhr interlink a nation's morality and politics in an ethical and pragmatic statecraft of nations. Realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, on the other hand, divorce the two, maintaining that “prudence” is the most vital element in the political realm. Realists argue that politics supersedes morality and is upheld through self-interest as the pure search for the truly good. Both views spotlight the individual citizen as the center of moral society yet differ on the importance of the means and ends of statecraft and political adroitness of leaders. Adhering to Aristotelian views, Coll clearly advocates the notion that “moral principles are ultimately realized only in specific acts which human beings choose to carry out.” The author cites Washington, Lincoln, and Churchill as examples of leaders whose moral wisdom in political reasoning led to remarkable statecraft explicitly derived from prudence.

In response to Charles Taylor's book Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Becker defends the Western view of ethical conceptions based on our unique identity, reasoning, and historical heritage. Taylor presents a vision of transcultural universal ethical principles that cannot be grounded on cultural idiosyncrasies, and he criticizes Western cultural convictions of beliefs and values leading to unequivocally individualistic and personalized perceptions of ethics. Becker notes the uniqueness of the person and the “awesomeness of human life,” which are directly linked with our respect for rational evaluation of ethics and the crucial importance of the ability of the individual to search for his/her human identity. Our “moral vision” is precisely based on “the good life in terms of respect for humanity and all its diversity,” therefore establishing ethics on personal selfhood and individuality. The author concedes that Taylor's motivations for the belief in creating a vision of the common good are plausible, but criticizes him for failing to account for the historical context of our values.

The collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes led to a re-evaluation of Hegel's philosophies as inspiration for shaping the post-communist governments. Concerned that the reappearance of literature on Hegel's ideas often expresses inaccurately and one-sidedly the philosopher's views, Brown attempts to clarify Hegelian ideas of absolute knowledge and self-knowledge that lead to the model of the modern state as “the vehicle for the self-expression of spirit…governed only by the requirements of reason” upon which Hegel grounds international ethics. The author links Hegel's work to some practical international concerns, such as internationalism, ethnocentrism, relativism, and the vision of the end of history. The author refers to Francis Fukuyama's essay “The End of History?” (1989) celebrating the triumph of political and economic history, and showing how it was based on an inaccurate interpretation of Hegel. When evaluating recent interpretations of Hegel's work, Brown shows that one must be cautious to review the accuracy of his explicit views.

The author presents how Russia's struggle to find its new identity in the aftermath of Communism's collapse is analogous to America's historical experience of drawing on religious and cultural roots in moving toward democracy. By rediscovering religion and forming voluntary cultural organizations, the Russians are patterning the evolution of the American democracy. Billington highlights Mikhail Gorbachev's crucial role in the early stages of the process. Noting the American experience in dealing with diversity, he notes the central role this experience can play in dealing with “a global process that… is moving forward to democratization and back to religion,” which is where the previously irreconcilable “Slavophile-Westernizer polarity” tends to converge.

Kegley, skeptical of the Western perception that Soviet surrender was proof of American superiority in the arms race and the reliance on NATO to “spend the Soviets into submission”-the new containment “myth”-analyzes the origins of the U.S. containment doctrine. He contrasts the harsher realist Hobbsian/Machiavellian views focusing on a stringent containment policy to those of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan, who advocated a gradual opposition to the Soviets through patient political and diplomatic means. Kegley advocates Kennan's argument that the “inevitable triumph of Western liberalism” was certain and the failure of the communist regime was predetermined by its insulation. Empirical tests have not validated the extent of influence of NATO and practice of nuclear deterrence on the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Kegley argues for a focus on promoting the success of Russia while using the relative success European integration as grounds to work within a transnational collaboration framework based on Kennan's initial recommendations.

Russell probes Morgenthau's realist ethics and the underpinnings of the nuclear threat in a technologically evolving modern world with increasingly obsolescent national boundaries. In the classic political question of a ‘just war,’ Russell argues that Morgenthau was concerned with dilemmas created by the very successes of science and the resulting decay of traditional Western thinking, where scientific reason was prevailing over social reason. Morgenthau's gloomy emphasis on “man's uncertain moral destiny in the nuclear era”-and, particularly, on the uniquely individualistic perceptions of scientific advancements at a time when nations seek collective security against the nuclear threat-highlights his confidence in the strong intellectual, moral and spiritual power of man. He is skeptical in the endurance of the morally disintegrating “scientific man.” Morgenthau analyzes man's new understanding of “life” and “death” and examines the new scientist, who creates “a new nature out of his knowledge of the forces of nature,” and the new statesman, who creates “a new society out of his knowledge of the nature of man.” Morgenthau sees politics as an art, not a science, and “what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and moral strength of the statesman.”

Pope John Paul's great vision of communitarianism and a New Global Order has yet to receive the recognition it deserves in furthering the understanding that humanity is built on religious values, without which transformations in totalitarian regimes would have been impossible. The essence of communitarianism, as put forth by the Vatican, consists of seeking middle ground between Marxist collectivism and rigid individualism and capitalism. Phillips traces the history of communitarianism through Aristotelian and Judeo-Christian writings, clarifying the proper function of the community in helping individuals help themselves by mobilizing church resources and countering anti-religious movements such as Nazism and communism. Communitarianism presents an encouraging universal notion of freedom, transcending the one-sided stances of Marxism and libertarian capitalism and promoting the vision of a unified human destiny.

International development ethics is moral reflection on the ends and means of societal and global change. Who should engage in this activity and how should it be done? Should only citizens of a given nation reflect on, and morally evaluate, that country's development goals and strategies? Or do foreigners have a contribution to make as well? Crocker answers these questions by first briefly discussing and critiquing the context within which these questions are frequently debated, namely the ethnocentrism/anti-ethnocentrism and particularism/universalism controversies. He explains the distinction between social insiders and outsiders arguing that in development ethics there are advantages and disadvantages to being both. He urges development ethicists to cultivate a mixture of insider/outsider perspectives, beginning and ending in their own groups, but learning from and benefitting others in the process. Crocker concludes that international and regional progress are closely interrelated. Universalists and ethnocentrists must converge to “think and act globally, regionally, nationally, and locally.”

If individuals are such rational and maximizing agents, why has history demonstrated that government intervention in economics plays a consistently positive role in a developing country's economic performance? This article emphasizes the inevitable link of the political arena with progress of economic success, primarily in the developing world, thereby rejecting the neoclassical view of pure market-driven economics. The author highlights the market-oriented accomplishments of the Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) and some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Turkey, pointing out time periods when authoritarian regimes acted as indisputable impetus for economic growth spurts in these countries. Because the poor are afflicted most heavily during transition periods, the author advocates that governments ensure the involvement of the poor not only in the market reforms but most importantly in the policy-making process. Governments must ensure proper allocation of national resources, income distribution, and commitment to poverty alleviation through direct intervention in the economy to stimulate growth and success. Under these circumstances, Haggard concludes, the poor will demonstrate a higher level of success in the emerging economies than many expect.

Weiss and Minear explore the problems associated with attempting to operationalize the evolving international humanitarian norm that civilians, regardless of location, are entitled to sustenance and medical assistance. In a host of recent civil wars in Africa, the attention of the international community has been drawn to the use of food deprivation by both governments and insurgents. The use of such deprivation has traditionally been part of the arsenals of warring factions, but the widespread and active mobilization of international public opinion against such tactics is relatively new. The authors argue that, while all historical situations are in some sense unique, Sudan is not so idiosyncratic that the lessons and the precedents cannot be replicated elsewhere to protect civilians caught between warring sides in civil wars.

This program is evaluated in order to analyze the ethical and practical issues likely to influence its success. Among those critical issues discussed are the U.S.'s definition of “democracy,” the relationship between culture and democracy, and the ability, or desirability, of the United States to export its own form of government as historical and cultural goals. Substantial attention is given to the ethical dimension of whether the United States is, or should be, concerned with democracy as a generic form of political organization or be more committed to the expansion of American influence irrespective of a country's political or ideological character. Noting that foreign aid is pragmatic rather than altruistic in origin, the essay questions the likely effectiveness of the Democratic Pluralism Initiative.

In a recent report by Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, “Education in U.S. Schools of International Affairs,” Princeton's former president Robert F. Goheen presents several crucial factors in the apparent decline of international studies in the U.S. The private sector, which at first demanded broadly-educated professionals, have recently shown little enthusiasm for students of international affairs. This has resulted in lack of funding and lack of interest in the field of international studies. This is paradoxical primarily because the students of international affairs undergo a multidiscplinary curriculum, facilitating their adaptation to practically any field of work following graduation, contrary to those students who have chosen a strict and narrow profession. Unfortunately, much of the fault, according to the report lies with the universities and the graduates themselves, who fail to articulate properly their comparative essential advantage in the broad field of their education. Thompson expounds on a more serious ramification of the decline in interest in international studies: the imminent failure to foresee future international crises. As the case of Iraq's growing power in the Middle East has demonstrated, the U.S. looked the other way, toward the developments in the former Soviet Union, and was not able to act in time to circumvent Iraq's aggression. With the world looking to the U.S. for strategic leadership in ethics and power, Americans cannot afford to deny American youth a strong foundation and education in international studies.