As the following papers demonstrate, Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars continues to provoke thought and debate two decades after its publication. The book remains widely taught in college courses and is cited whenever the morality of war is discussed. It is appropriate, then, to celebrate the book's twentieth anniversary by reconsidering its arguments in light of what we have learned in the intervening years

The papers were discussed at a symposium hosted by the Carnegie Council in May 1996 and have been revised to take account of the conversation that occurred there. David Hendrickson takes issue with the book's criticism of realism, pointing to realist elements in Walzer's own argument. Theodore Koontz provides a careful analysis of some problems in Walzer's treatment of the noncombatant immunity principle. Both papers deal with the tension in Walzer's book between a morality of rights and a morality of consequences, a tension that Joseph Boyle illuminates in his contribution. And in a paper inspired by the symposium debate, Michael Joseph Smith provides an appreciation that serves as a readable introduction to the issues considered by the other contributors. Finally, Michael Walzer responds in what, if past is prologue, won't be the last word on the argument of Just and Unjust Wars.

After twenty years, Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars continues to engage scholars in discussions of the moral realities of war. Smith provides a summary of Walzer's work, with particular emphasis on his method of moral argument. Walzer's argument focuses on moral norms or “practical” morality, but ultimately emphasizes the importance of moral judgment based on the principle of human rights rather than on utilitarian calculation. Addressing realists' critiques of Walzer, in particular David C. Hendrickson's (see below), Smith reaffirms Walzer's call for the need to constrain the realist doctrine of necessity, which argues that moral considerations should be subordinate to the security of the state. Walzer's treatment of nuclear deterrence and intervention is discussed in relation to the end of the Cold War. Smith concludes by paying tribute to Just and Unjust Wars as a continuing reminder of the human capacity for hope and the will to change our world for the better.

A significant portion of Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars is an argument “against realism.” While Hendrickson applauds Walzer for his examination of the just war tradition, he nevertheless asserts that Walzer has characterized the tradition of political realism in a misleading way. Not simply the moral atheism it is portrayed to be, realism recognizes the moral reality of war while emphasizing state security and independence as the most important factors for the protection of citizens and the continuity of the political community. Indeed, Hendrickson identifies many realist aspects of Walzer's own moral arguments. He takes issue, however, with Walzer's treatment of intervention, self-determination, and the legitimate aims of war, stating that Walzer's framework is exceedingly permissive and ambiguous in these areas. Hendrickson concludes that the use of such a just war theory may lead to significant problems in the post-Cold War world.

Issues of immunity from attack and the assignment of responsibility for civilian deaths are central to the modern war convention. Koontz addresses several difficulties with Walzer's treatment of noncombatant immunity in Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer's theory of noncombatant immunity states that immunity from attack is a fundamental human right that can only be lost once a person becomes a direct threat or consents to give up his or her right to immunity. Koontz cites inconsistencies in Walzer's method of determining the immunity of soldiers and civilians. He argues from a deontological perspective that there can be no grounds for consent to the loss of immunity other than a direct threat posed by a civilian. This strengthens the protection of noncombatants, a principle that had been weakened by Walzer.

Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars utilizes a moral doctrine known as casuistry, which applies existing moral norms to practical cases while putting aside the actual origins of morality. Boyle contrasts Walzer's casuistry to other methods of moral judgment, including consequentialism, institutionalism, and deontology. He discusses deontology, which derives precepts from moral principles, particularly making a case with reference to Alan Donagan's The Theory of Morality, which appeared the same year as Just and Unjust Wars. Boyle cites casuistry as a highly practical method, but cautions that it is an insufficient guide in extreme situations for which there are no existing moral norms. Boyle points out that in cases where casuistry fails Walzer he turns to consequentialism, which bases moral decisions upon the likelihood that the benefit of an action will outweigh the harm. Boyle argues that such utilitarian calculation weakens the authority of the moral world by allowing exceptions to moral principles in times of emergency. He concludes that the method of rationalistic deontology provided by Donagan is preferable to Walzer's casuistry.

Responding to the critiques of the four previous authors, Walzer opens with a statement of the inherent imperfection of any theory of war. He reminds us that theories are merely frameworks for decisions and cannot provide answers in and of themselves. Moral decisions in war are especially difficult, for it is often necessary to choose between equally valid claims. Walzer continues the discussion of sieges initiated by both Koontz and Boyle and concedes the validity of Koontz's criticism of inconsistency in his theory of noncombatant immunity. Addressing the different authors' moral doctrines–Hendrickson's consequentialism and Koontz's and Boyle's deontology–Walzer argues that it is better to judge each case individually, weighing both the consequences and principles, rather than strictly adhere to one moral doctrine, an approach commended by Smith. Finally, in the search for a perfect just war theory, Walzer issues a realist reminder that there can be no such thing as a morally perfect war.

Pasic and Weiss examine the limitations and the ethical dilemmas of the humanitarian impulse in light of the recent surge in humanitarian intervention. The authors use the experience of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia as an example of the way in which politics and humanitarianism are inextricably intertwined. They describe a spectrum of intervention, from rescue to restorative to revolutionary efforts. Rescue efforts often fail to address the underlying political problems, but for a rescuing nation to commit to “revolutionary” intervention and sustained support raises the issue of state sovereignty. Asserting that humanitarian intervention is a highly ambiguous principle, the authors warn of the dangers of politically driven rescues that often force trade-offs between the pursuit of rescue and political order.

In a response to Pasic and Weiss, Natsios supports the authors' critique of the unintended political consequences of relief interventions but takes issue with their portrayal of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Natsios asserts that the authors misrepresent the doctrine of the ICRC in associating it with a mission of “restorative” rescue, one that is purely custodial in nature and blind to political problems. While the ICRC does support political reform, it maintains that relief should not be contingent upon or advance reform efforts. In conclusion, Natsios argues for case-by-case decisions on the objectives of each intervention, based on an approach that falls in between restorative rescue and revolutionary intervention in Pasic and Weiss' framework.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system in place since the end of World War II has been struggling to find answers to new problems and questions of international responsibility. In his response to “The Politics of Rescue,” Winston argues that the real dilemma facing the international system is not a question of what form intervention will take, but rather a question of the existence of political will to act on the humanitarian impulse. While acknowledging the political ramifications of intervention, he argues that once a state can no longer care for its people, the responsibility falls to the international community, with the goal of intervention being the restoration of state capacity. Winston calls for the establishment of the international equivalent of a 911 emergency call number to provide an institutionalized response to such crises, with the risks and costs shared equally among the international community.

The intervention in the former Yugoslavia is a clear example of the ways in which humanitarian intervention is often deeply complicated by political concerns. Destexhe expands upon the discussion of the humanitarian mission in Bosnia begun in “ The Politics of Rescue,” stating that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in choosing a humanitarian route rather than a political one, further enabled ethnic cleansing and prolonged the conflict in the Balkans. Destexhe concludes, in agreement with Pasic and Weiss, that a strict humanitarian approach that ignores deeper political problems will only prolong such conflicts and lead to cynicism toward future humanitarian efforts.

Although humanitarian intervention is never politically neutral, Mapel maintains that this point can be overdrawn. Arguing that humanitarian agencies cannot always actively pursue political agendas, Mapel asserts that the objectives of such missions must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Pushing the issue a step further, he argues that in deciding whether there is an obligation to intervene, the nature of the conflict, the costs and risks of intervention, and other factors must all be taken into consideration. Mapel concludes in support of Winston's call for a standing UN military force for humanitarian interventions but notes that debates over the objectives of interventions and the nature of justice in complex situations remain obstacles to the establishment of such a force.

The end of the Cold War and the growth of economic, political, and informational globalization are challenging our traditional definitions of self. Franck displays the complexity and growing subjectiveness of identity by providing a detailed lexicon of identity, including definitions of nation, state, tribe, and ethnicity. He argues that recent appeals to nationalism based on a common sociocultural, geographic, and linguistic heritage should be seen as reactions against the broadening communities of trade, information, and power. However, Franck asserts that anomie and xenophobia can be countered by giving substatal ethnicities, minorities, and political parties a voice and a vote in international forums.

Focusing on the nature of modern nationalism, Kymlicka asserts that Franck overstates the dichotomy of so-called romantic tribal nationalism and traditional nationalism as seen in the United States and France, which Franck claims is liberal, inclusive, and based on political principles rather than blood lines. Using examples from France, the United States, and Quebec, Kymlicka shows that language and common identity as well as liberal principles of freedom and democracy compose modern liberal nationalism. More sympathetic to minority nationalism than Franck, Kymlicka argues that minority movements are not irrational but often based upon legitimate claims, claims that majorities frequently fail to take seriously. Kymlicka concludes in agreement with Franck that minority nationalists should have greater representation at the international level, not simply as a means of pacifying minority nationalists but in the interests of international justice.

In recent years China has entered the international human rights debate, consistently making the case for cultural diversity in the formulation of human rights policy. Ames follows this argument of cultural relativism, emphasizing China's cultural differences and critiquing the concept of universal human rights, particularly as presented by Jack Donnelly in his book Universal Human Rights. Discussing the history of universal human rights and Confucian values, Ames asserts that a growing dialogue between China and the United States would benefit China in terms of political and individual rights and the United States in terms of a greater sense of civic virtue.

In a rebuttal of Ames's critique of his conception of universal human rights, Donnelly asserts that Ames has misrepresented his arguments, creating a straw man from Ames's own preconceived notion of the Western liberal tradition while ignoring the substantive debates. In response to Ames's cultural approach to human rights, Donnelly argues that culture cannot be viewed as static. Structural, political, and economic factors have significant effects upon culture and the rights of each citizen. Donnelly concludes that the more significant cause of China's failure to recognize the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not Confucian culture but rather China's own corrupt and dictatorial regime; thus the international community must continue to condemn China's violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In his recent article “The Law of Peoples,” John Rawls attempts to develop a theory of international justice. Paden contrasts “The Law of Peoples” with Rawls's “A Theory of Justice,” reconstructing Rawls's new theory to be more consistent with the earlier work. Paden finds Rawls's new theory inadequate in its response to communitarian criticisms, those that advocate a different theory of good than that of liberal societies. Paden goes back to “A Theory of Justice” to state that all societies seek one good, that is, the protection of their just institutions. In so doing, he provides a more expansive view of the interests of societies, which, he argues, is more consistent with “A Theory of Justice” than “The Law of Peoples,” yet avoids the flaws identified in the original argument.

The end of the Cold War has left the international system in a state of paradox, most prominently in the growing conflict between the legal-political global order and the growth of civil society. Monshipouri identifies and discusses three paradoxes that exemplify this central conflict: state-building versus democratization; economic liberalization versus political liberalization; and human rights versus state sovereignty. In discussing each of these paradoxes, the author describes the difficulties and ethical questions involved in making economic and political reforms without the necessary means and institutional resources. Monshipouri concludes that in order to manage such dilemmas, Third World states must find a delicate balance between global economic reforms and an ethically sensitive international political and legal order.

As the father of the realist theory of international relations, Hans Morgenthau consistently argued that international politics is governed by the competitive and conflictual nature of humankind. Myers discusses the history of U.S. foreign policy and the ongoing debate over the continued relevance of realist thought in the post-Cold War era. He argues that despite vast changes in the international system, realism remains relevant as an accurate description of human nature and hence of the interactions among nations. Analyzing Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, Myers provides a point-by-point discussion of his theory. He concludes by stating that the relevance of realism will be seen particularly in the search for a new balance of power in the post-Cold War world.

While the United States is now an international leader in the fight against genocide and human rights abuses, it only recently ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide– forty years after the convention's unanimous adoption by the UN General Assembly. Korey provides a description of the long struggle for ratification of the Genocide Convention, detailing decades of work by a committee of fifty-two nongovernmental organizations lobbying the Senate and the American Bar Association, the treaty's key opponent. Despite the public support for the United Nations and human rights by the United States, failure to ratify the Genocide Convention stemmed primarily from the fear that international covenants were threats to U.S. sovereignty. The United States finally overcame this fear with the ratification of the Genocide Convention in 1988, which opened the door for U.S. leadership.