At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

Although international security studies tend to focus on the nature of armed conflict and how nations fare in the face of such conflicts, our attention has been drawn to the challenge of managing the peace. Specifically, given the enormity of the damage caused by state-sponsored violence, both in terms of property and in terms of human damage, how can the people of a nation that has served as a battleground be assisted in their recovery from the devastation caused by conflict? Ongoing trauma from armed conflict has peculiarly gendered dimensions and requires solutions that are attentive to those dimensions. Here, we focus on remedies that shift from perpetrator-centered tribunals to victim-centered compensation commissions. Using the United Nations Compensation Commission established to provide restitution to Kuwaiti citizens following the Iraqi invasion as an example, we argue that the restitution model is a more humane and ethical option for managing the aftermath of conflict than war crimes tribunals, which employ a retributive philosophy. Using the limited evidence available on compensation and rebuilding, we make concrete recommendations for an approach to post-conflict adjudication that makes the well-being of victims its top priority.

Child labor evokes deep emotions and is cause for growing international concern. Most recent global estimates show that 186 million children are engaged in full time economic activity. This paper discusses the possibilities and pitfalls of Western policies that seek to curb child labor abroad. Since such policies aim to combat practices in other societies, policy-makers should be aware of the many relevant differences between developing and developed countries. We discuss three issues that are central to this debate: different conceptions of childhood and the dominance of the Western conception in these debates; the distinction between child work and child labor; and socioeconomic causes of child labor. We then evaluate the implications of these investigations for direct and indirect policy options against child labor abroad.