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The Responsibility to Protect: Locating Norm Entrepreneurship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 August 2021

Cristina G. Stefan
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Abstract

As part of the roundtable “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this essay examines the issue of norm entrepreneurship as it has been used in conjunction with the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), twenty years after the emergence of The Responsibility to Protect report produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It examines norm entrepreneurs with enough drive, motivation, and resources to keep RtoP on the international agenda in a changing world order, after Western middle powers, such as Canada and some European Union member states, had previously acted as indispensable norm entrepreneurs. An examination of both Western and non-Western entrepreneurship efforts to date reveals three key observations. First, RtoP champions are now facing additional challenges in today's transitional global order, where nationalistic foreign policy agendas are replacing liberal agendas, such as RtoP. Second, the drive and adaptability of non-Western norm entrepreneurs with regional ambitions mean that small states can emerge as rather-unexpected RtoP champions. Third, giving non-Western states a visible regional or international platform allows them to display leadership in reframing prevention under the RtoP framework. The last two observations point to the increasing role of non-Western states in global governance and in the promotion of prevention measures to protect the most vulnerable, which in turn increases the legitimacy of the RtoP norm itself.

Keywords

Responsibility to Protectnorm entrepreneurspreventionnon-Western norm entrepreneurshipWestern normative championsCanadaBrazilEuropean UnionQatarEgypt
Type
Roundtable: The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , Summer 2021 , pp. 197 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

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References

NOTES

1 For example, see Carpenter, R. Charli, “Lost” Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014)Google Scholar; and Davies, Sara and True, Jacqui, “Norm Entrepreneurship in Foreign Policy: William Hague and the Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict,” Foreign Policy Analysis 13, no. 3 (July 2017), pp. 701–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See, for instance, Badescu, Cristina G. and Weiss, Thomas, “Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 4 (November 2010), pp. 354–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Badescu, Cristina G., “Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention: Hard Choices in Saving Strangers,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 51–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the monographs and edited collections on RtoP, including Badescu, Cristina G., Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar; Bellamy, Alex J., The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)Google Scholar; and Bellamy, Alex J. and Dunne, Tim, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001), p. vii.

4 Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, p. 120.

5 For an analysis on how RtoP embraces both sovereignty and human rights, see Badescu, Cristina G., “The Responsibility to Protect: Embracing Sovereignty and Human Rights,” in Shawki, Noha and Cox, Michaelene, eds., Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009)Google Scholar.

6 Mohamed Sahnoun, “Africa: Uphold Continent's Contribution to Human Rights, Urges Top Diplomat,” AllAfrica, July 21, 2009.

7 For one example of Francis Deng's contributions in this sense, see Francis M. Deng, “Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian Action,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Constructing Political and Economic Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), pp. 295–310.

8 For a more detailed coverage of individual norm entrepreneurs, see Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 122–25.

9 For a discussion of Canada's engagement with RtoP, see ibid., pp. 126–27; and also, Kirsten Fisher and Cristina G. Stefan, “The ICC, R2P, and Canada's ‘Return’: Opportunity and Moral Duty in an Anti-Cosmopolitan Global Climate,” Canadian Yearbook of Human Rights 2, no. 2016/2018 (2019), pp. 3–19; and Fisher, Kirsten J. and Stefan, Cristina G., “Canada and the International Responsibilities to Protect and Prosecute in Cases of Mass Atrocity,” in McGrane, David and Hibbert, Neil, eds., Applied Political Theory and Canadian Politics (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2019), pp. 459–79Google Scholar.

10 For more details on states acting as norm entrepreneurs in relation to RtoP, see Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 126–27.

11 Ibid., p. 127.

12 See Badescu, Cristina G. and Bergholm, Linnea, “The African Union,” in Black, David R. and Williams, Paul D., eds., The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 108–10Google Scholar; and also, Badescu, Cristina G. and Bergholm, Linnea, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down,” Security Dialogue 40, no. 3 (June 2009), pp. 287–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Ramesh Thakur, “R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers,” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 2 (April 2013), pp. 61–76, at p. 62.

14 Currently, two regional organizations—the European Union and the Organization of American States—have appointed RtoP focal points. In addition to the two regional RtoP focal points, there are over sixty governmental RtoP focal points, appointed by states from across all regions of the world as senior-level representatives. The Global Network of RtoP focal points was established in 2010. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the very active advocacy organization in New York, acts as its secretariat, with all member states getting together on a yearly basis.

15 Such efforts were spearheaded by the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, which released the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes in October 2014. See UN, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (New York: UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014). A comprehensive list of risk indicators was developed for this Framework of Analysis, to assist with early action in order to prevent atrocities.

16 On Brazil's engagement with RtoP, see Cristina G. Stefan, “On Non-Western Norm Shapers: Brazil and the Responsibility while Protecting,” European Journal of International Security 2, no. 1 (February 2017), pp. 88–110; and also, Kai Michael Kenkel and Cristina G. Stefan, “Brazil and the Responsibility while Protecting Initiative: Norms and the Timing of Diplomatic Support,” Global Governance 22, no. 1 (2016), pp. 41–58.

17 Maria Luiza Viotti, quoted in Stefan, “On Non-Western Norm Shapers,” pp. 96–97.

18 Dilma Rousseff, General Debate of the 66th Session of United Nations General Assembly (statement, United Nations General Assembly, UN headquarters, New York, September 21, 2011).

19 This account came up in my conversations with Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota.

20 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept,” A/66/551–S/2011/701 (annex to the November 9, 2011, letter from the permanent representative of Brazil to the United Nations, addressed to the secretary-general, November 11, 2011).

21 See Stefan, “On Non-Western Norm Shapers,” pp. 99–102.

22 This resolution welcomed the secretary-general's report on RtoP and promised to hold annual debates on RtoP centered on the subsequent themes from the annual UN secretary-general's reports. See United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 14 September 2009: The Responsibility to Protect,” A/RES/63/308, September 14, 2009.

23 See, for instance, Kirsten J. Fisher and Cristina G. Stefan, “The Ethics of International Criminal ‘Lawfare,’” International Criminal Law Review 16, no. 2 (2016), pp. 237–57.

24 Abubacarr Marie Tambadou, Gambia's justice minister and attorney general at the time, quoted in “Aung San Suu Kyi to Lead Myanmar Team to Fight Genocide Accusation,” New York Times, November 20, 2019.

25 Isatou Touray, the vice-president of the Gambia, quoted in Owen Bowcott, “Gambia Files Rohingya Genocide Case against Myanmar at UN Court,” The Guardian, November 11, 2019.

26 The Organization of American States became the second regional organization, after the EU, to appoint an RtoP focal point in 2019, working together with over sixty RtoP focal points appointed by individual states.

27 Gareth Evans, “R2P: The Next Ten Years,” in Bellamy and Dunne, Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 913–31.

28 For an account of the European Union work on RtoP, see Edward Newman and Cristina G. Stefan, “Normative Power Europe? The EU's Embrace of the Responsibility to Protect in a Transitional International Order,” Journal of Common Market Studies 58, no. 2 (March 2020), pp. 472–90; and Edward Newman and Cristina G. Stefan, “Europe's Contested Engagement with R2P in a Transitional International Order,” in Cecilia Jacob and Martin Mennecke, eds., Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: A Future Agenda (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 124–38.

29 Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne, “After Liberal World Order,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January 2018), pp. 25–42.

30 G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 56–62, 63–68, at p. 56.

31 G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (January 2018), pp. 7–23, at p. 19.

32 On the role of the UN Human Rights Council in advancing RtoP, see Elisabeth Pramendorfer, “The Role of the Human Rights Council in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Responsibility to Protect 12, no. 3 (2020), pp. 239–45.

33 Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, quoted in “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs: Implementing Responsibility to Protect Principle Is Paramount,” News, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2020. For summaries of statements from this ministerial event held on the sidelines of the 75th UN General Assembly, see “Ministerial Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect: Building Back Better,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 24, 2020, www.globalr2p.org/resources/ministerial-meeting-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-building-back-better/.

34 “Qatar Backs Efforts to Protect Civilians in Countries Facing Conflict: FM,” Middle East North Africa Financial Network, September 25, 2020.

35 Rory Miller and Harry Verhoeven, “Overcoming Smallness: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Strategic Realignment in the Gulf,” International Politics 57 (2020), pp. 1–20.

36 Brussels International Center, Qatar and Terrorism: A Dangerous Game (Brussels: BIC, July 7, 2017).

37 Aidan Hehir, “‘Utopian in the Right Sense’: The Responsibility to Protect and the Logical Necessity of Reform,” Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 3 (2017), pp. 335–55.

38 I am grateful to Ambassador Antonio Patriota for highlighting this Egyptian initiative to me as an important example of non-Western entrepreneurship on prevention.

39 Ambassador Ihab Awad at the Aswan Forum, quoted in Abdullahi Tsanni, “Aswan Forum: Fostering Africa's Ownership of Its Peace and Security Agenda,” African Newspage, January 3, 2020.

40 According to the concept of sustaining peace, as outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016) and General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (2016), sustainable peace can be achieved only when all segments of society are included and empowered, which is in line with the people-centered approach of the UN's Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015).